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INTRODUCTION: A TOTAL JUDICIAL ECLIPSE
In its 2006-2007 term, the Supreme Court decided five environ-
mental law cases, a significant amount to fall under one subject area.1 Of
particular importance in the constellation of decisions was the Court's
reversal of unanimous judicial precedent, announced unanimously in 2007
in United States v. Atlantic Research Corp.2 The Supreme Court explored
the seldom visited issue of hazardous waste, having done so only once
since the turn of the twenty-first century.3 There is more than meets the
eye. This decision turned the legal liability for hazardous waste upside
down, but is as noteworthy for enshrining a new era of "plain meaning"
interpretation by the Roberts Court.'
Seldom in judicial history does the Supreme Court decide a case
where it can, let alone will, reverse the standing precedent articulated by
every federal judicial circuit. It is as rare as a total eclipse. The Atlantic
Research decision launched such an eclipse.
I ROBERT MELTZ, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS: THE SUPREME COURT TAKES FIVE
ENVIRONMENTAL CASES FOR ITS 2006-2007 TERM 1 (2007), available at https://www
.policyarchive.org/bitstream/handle/10207/4463/RS22618_20070308.pdPsequence=l.
2 127 S. Ct. 2331 (2007).
3 See Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Aviall Servs., Inc. 543 U.S. 157 (2004). Only a rare few con-
structions of the Superfund statute have been granted certiorari by the Court. See, e.g.,
United States v. Cordova Chem Co. of Mich., 113 F.3d 572 (6th Cir. 1997), cert. granted
sub nom. United States v. CPC Int'l, Inc., 522 U.S. 1024 (1997) and vacated sub nom.
United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51 (1998) (discussing parent corporate liability); Key
Tronic Corp. v. United States, 984 F.2d 1025 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. granted, 510 U.S. 1023
(1993); Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 832 F.2d 1348 (3d Cir. 1987), cert. granted, 485
U.S. 958 (1988) (discussing state liability); Exxon Corp. v. Hunt, 481 A.2d 271 (N.J.
Super. App. Div. 1984), prob. juris. noted, 472 U.S. 1015 (1985) (discussing Superfund
expenses). However, untilAviall, none of these had directly construed the cost allocation
mechanisms of sections 107 and 113 of CERCLA. See Comprehensive Environmental
Response Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-510, §§ 107,
113, 94 Stat. 2767, 2781-85, 2795 (1980), amended by Superfund Amendments and
Reauthorization Act (SARA), Pub. L. No. 99-499, sec. 113, § 113, 100 Stat. 1613, 1647-52
(1986) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (2000)).
The Supreme Court has heard many cases contesting the ability of cities, towns,
and states to restrict the interstate transport of solid, as opposed to hazardous, waste,
as well as related flow control statutes, which have reached the Court more than a half
dozen times since the approximate time of the enactment of RCRA and CERCLA. See,
e.g., C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383 (1994); Chem. Waste Mgmt.
v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334 (1992); Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill v. Michigan Dep't of Natural
Res., 504 U.S. 353 (1992); Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978); Hughes v.
Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976).
'Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Aviall Servs., Inc. 543 U.S. 157, 165-68 (2004).
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There are significant differences between the two liability provi-
sions of the Superfund statute: Sections 107 and 113. Key advantages
unique to section 107 are the application ofjoint and several liability, a
statute of limitations period twice as long to initiate suit, the necessity
only to name and prosecute a few, and not all of the liable parties, and
the unavailability of equitable defenses to defendants beyond the statuto-
rily prescribed defenses.' Therefore, access to these provisions is impor-
tant. Nonetheless, one after the other, in a compressed period, eleven
federal circuits barred the use of the statute's section 107 cost recovery
by plaintiffs.7
This judicial cascade occurred at a time when the Superfund haz-
ardous substance clean-up effort was starved by budgetary depravation.
EPA had to delay beginning remediation activities at 34 separate priority
sites in FY 2004 because of funding shortfalls.8 The practical result of the
2004 Supreme Court decision inAviall, coupled with the decisions of the
eleven circuit courts regarding section 107, combined to greatly discourage
voluntary remediation activities at some of the 450,000 contaminated sites
in the U.S.9 The nation's hazardous liability scheme descended into total
chaos. The federal circuit courts were caught in a judicial cascade, where
later courts followed questionable earlier decisions of other circuits. °
The decisions of these circuit courts paralyzed hazardous waste
clean-up across the nation, until the Supreme Court found a decisional
vehicle through which it could reverse the precedent. In 2007, the Supreme
Court unanimously reversed a decade of consistent precedent from these
eleven unanimous federal circuit courts."
'Compare CERCLA § 107,42 U.S.C. § 9607 (2000 & Supp. 112002) with CERCLA § 113,
42 U.S.C. § 9613 (2000 & Supp. II 2002).
6Id. § 9607. See also Adhesives Research, Inc. v. Am. Inks & Coatings Corp., 931 F. Supp.
1231, 1237 (M.D. Pa. 1996) ("[Although not expressly stated within the text of the statute,
courts to rule on the issue have nearly unanimously determined that liability under § 107
is joint and several unless the defendant can demonstrate that the harm is divisible.").
' The Seventh Circuit in July 1994, the First Circuit in August 1994, the Tenth Circuit
in March 1995, the Eleventh Circuit in September 1996, the Third Circuit in May 1997,
the Ninth Circuit in July 1997, the Fifth Circuit in August 1997, the Fourth Circuit in
April 1998, the Sixth Circuit in August 1998, the Second Circuit in September 1998, and
the Eighth Circuit in August 2003. See infra Part II.A.1.
'Linda Roeder, Insufficient Funds for Cleanup Operations, Supreme Court Decision Lead
EPA Concerns, 36 BNA ENV'T REP., S-14, S-15 (2005).
9 See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, RCED-00-178, COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT: LOCAL
GROWTH ISSUES--FEDERAL OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES 118 (2000).
10 See infra Part III for a discussion and analysis of the circuit court opinions.
'1 United States v. Atl. Research Corp., 127 S. Ct. 2331 (2007).
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As important as the substantive outcome of this decision was in
rectifying national waste liability, Atlantic Research enshrines a funda-
mental judicial interpretive shift in Supreme Court statutory construc-
tion. The Atlantic Research precedent elevates a new era of construction
and decision rule by the new Roberts Court. Building on the rationale of
the Supreme Court's 2007 global warming decision, the Atlantic Research
decision establishes a new interpretive rule of "plain meaning" construc-
tion of federal statutes enacted by the third branch of government. 12 The
lasting legacy of this decision may be its new judicial interpretive rule,
more than its substantive pivot in hazardous waste liability. This article
analyzes the following:
Part I substantively examines the operation of the
federal hazardous substance statute, Comprehen-
sive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act (CERCLA), with particular emphasis
on its two statutory routes for hazardous clean-up
cost allocation, emphasizing strategic advantages
of each.
Part II analyzes in comparative detail:
(A) How eleven federal circuits, between 1994
and 2004, often reversing well-reasoned opin-
ions of their trial courts, walled off private
hazardous waste cost recovery and descended
the entire national system into chaos;
(B) Professor Cass Sunstein's theory of mis-
informed judicial cascades, here applied to
circuit court environmental decisions;
(C) The pivotal impact of the 2004 Supreme
Court decision in Aviall, complicating the
lower court precedential chaos; and
(D) The 2007 procedural and substantive
groundbreaking unanimous Supreme Court
opinion in Atlantic Research that changed
national hazardous waste liability based on
statutory "plain meaning."
12 Atl. Research, 127 S. Ct. at 2336-37, 2339; see also Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct.
1438, 1457-63 (2007).
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0 Part III charts the policy implications and docu-
ments the resulting chaos wrought by the circuit
court decisions, and efforts of litigants to try to
surmount the chaos.
* Part IV traces the applicable precedent overlooked
by the circuit courts, and their failure to apply
relevant canons of statutory construction.
The article concludes by discussing the new era of
"plain meaning" Supreme Court statutory interpre-
tation that emerges from these key environmental
decisions.
The 2007 Supreme Court decision represents a fundamental water-
shed both substantively and with regard to the future rules of statutory
interpretation. I first start with an examination of the complexities of the
hazardous waste laws under CERCLA, focusing on two key provisions of
CERCLA-sections 107 and 113-that so confounded eleven federal
circuits. From there, I will examine how the Supreme Court changed the
course and future of statutory interpretation. Lasting judicial imprints
and transcendent impacts are examined throughout this article.
I. How LIABILITY DISTINCTIONS MATTER BETWEEN SECTIONS 107
AND 113 OF THE FEDERAL SUPERFUND
This section analyzes the liability mechanisms operation of Super-
fund, contrasting the avenues under sections 107 and 113. If the reader
is knowledgeable about the liability of Superfund, and the nuances be-
tween the operations of sections 107 and 113 of Superfund, he or she might
advance over this material to Part II.
A. Key Provisions
The federal Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensa-
tion, and Liability Act ("CERCLA"), or Superfund law, forces a massive
reallocation of private wealth in the United States. 3 There are currently
1255 sites on the National Priorities List ("NPL") as well as 63 proposed
sites. 4 EPA's projected average clean-up costs for sites was $140 million
13 See CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (2000).
14 U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, National Priorities List (NPL): NPL Site Totals by Status and
Milestone, http'//www.epa.gov/superfund/sites/query/queryhtm/npltotal.htm (last visited
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for megasites and $12 million for non-megasites. 15 The most expensive
of these megasites has remained on the NPL since 1983.16 To date, that
site has received $165 million of Superfund Trust fund money, and the
EPA plans to disperse another $150 million for clean-up efforts there in
the future. 7 In addition to the sites listed on the NPL, there are 44,997
other federally identified hazardous waste sites.'8
CERCLA, a comprehensive statute, gives the President the author-
ity to command both private parties and government agencies to clean up
hazardous waste sites. 19 CERCLA cost recovery litigation actions typi-
cally require potentially responsible parties ("PRPs") to fund the clean-up
of hazardous waste sites.2° This includes substantial costs for both remov-
ing hazardous wastes and responding to the remnant hazardous condi-
tions.2 Section 107 of CERCLA specifies both the liabilities that may be
imposed on private parties as well as potential defenses that may be
asserted to avoid liability.22
Although CERCLA clearly provides for complete reimbursement
for the government's costs, allocation among various private PRPs is less
Feb. 5, 2009). The United States Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") uses a
"hazardous ranking system" ("HRS") to quantify the potential risks of each site. Sites in
need of remedial or removal action are placed on the NPL. See U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency,
National Priorities List (NPL): Basic Information, http://www.epa.gov/superfund/sites/
npl/npl hrs.htm (last visited Feb. 5,2009). See also 42 U.S.C. § 9605(a)(8) (2000) (setting
forth the criteria used to determine the priority and ranking requirements for the NPL).
15 See SUPERFUND SUBCOMM. OF THE NAT'L ADVISORY COUNCIL FOR ENVTL. POL'Y AND
TECH., FINAL REPORT 16-18 (2004). Megasites are Superfund sites where the total clean-
up costs are expected to exceed $50 million). Id. at 17.
'6 Id. at 17.
1 Id. at 17-18. This monetary estimate does not include the money expended by the PRPs
or work already conducted by PRPs at the site. Furthermore, some of the projected $315
million expended for actual or planned obligations for the site may be cost-recoverable.
Id. at 18.
18 See U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, National Priorities List (NPL), http://www.epa.gov
.superfimd/accomp/ei/hpl.htm (last visited Mar. 16, 2009); U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency,
Superfund, http://www.epa.gov/superfund/about.htm (last visited Mar. 16, 2009). In
theory, non-NPL sites do not pose a serious health and environmental risk, as such the
problems associated with them can be addressed through short-term clean-ups, as
opposed to the long-term clean-ups required for NPL sites. However, listing on the NPL
requires an act of Congress, and is influenced by political factors.
19 Key Tronic Corp v. United States, 511 U.S. 809, 814 (1994).
20 id.
21Id. See also CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601(23)-(24), 9607 (2000 & Supp. 112002) (defining
"removal" and "remedial action" and describing liabilities).22Key Tronic, 511 U.S. at 814. (describing provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)-(b)).
20091 639
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV.
well-defined.23 Gaps in the statutory allocation process exist due to the
interaction of several factors. First, CERCLA itself provides no express
details for the apportionment of liability among PRPs. Specifically, under
Section 113(f)(1) it is the responsibility of the court to allocate response
costs among responsible parties utilizing those equitable factors that the
court deems appropriate.24 Second, joint, several, and strict liability are
created among an often unrelated group of responsible parties. Section
9607(a)(4)(B) makes all PRPs liable for "any ... necessary costs of re-
sponse incurred by any other person . . . ." Because this provision of
CERCLA is nondescript and nonspecific, any party deemed a PRP might
be held responsible for clean-up costs at the site regardless of its degree
of involvement. Third, there is no specified distributive share of liabil-
ity among different categories of owners, operators, generators, or trans-
porters of waste.26 Finally, the statute provides two separate and distinct
mechanisms-sections 107 and 113-for allocating responsibility.
PRPs who settle with the government can recover expended re-
sponse costs from other responsible parties under Section 107(a), or con-
tribution to clean-up expenses under Section 113(f) of CERCLA.2" Under
Section 107(a), liability of PRPs in cost recovery actions against PRPs is
strict.2 By utilizing the provisions of Section 107, the plaintiff can shift
liability to named defendants jointly and severally as a class. Section 107
shifts joint and several liability to the defendants, unless a defendant can
affirmatively demonstrate that the harm is divisible. 0 Joint and several
23 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A)-(B). See also Karras v. Teledyne Industries, Inc., 191 F. Supp.
2d 1162, 1165-66 (S.D. Cal. 2002)
Section 107(a) establishes that PRPs shall be liable for: (A) all costs of
removal action incurred by the United States Government or a State
of an Indian tribe not inconsistent with the national contingency plan;
(B) any other necessary costs of response incurred by any other person
consistent with the national contingency plan.
Id. at 1166.
24 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1) (2000). See also Durham Mfg. Co. v. Merriam Mfg. Co., 294 F.
Supp. 2d 251,264 (D. Conn. 2003) (citing Goodrich Corp. v. Town of Middlebury, 311 F.3d
154, 168 (2d Cir. 2002)).
42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B) (2000).
26Seegenerally id. §§ 9607, 9613 (2000 & Supp. 112002) (omitting reference to a specified
distributive share of liability among different categories of owners, operators, generators,
or transporters of waste).
2 See id. §§ 9607, 9613(f).
Id. §§ 9607(a), 9613(f).
Centerior Serv. Co. v. Acme Scrap Iron & Metal Corp., 153 F.3d 344, 348 (6th Cir. 1998).
o Id. See also 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a).
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liability, however, is generally the norm because of the difficulty imposed
on a PRP to affirmatively demonstrate the divisibility of the harm.31
Recovery under section 113 is more complicated. Since liability
under section 113(f) is not joint and several, but merely several, plaintiffs
must prove the proportionate share of liability for each and every defen-
dant severally.32 The burden, therefore, is on the plaintiff to definitively
prove each defendant's liability and equitable share of the costs. 33 Further-
more, liability is never completely shifted from the PRP plaintiff; rather,
the plaintiff still retains its equitable share of the clean-up, as well as the
share of any PRP against whom the plaintiff cannot sustain its burden.34
These different avenues cause radically different outcomes for the tens of
thousands of businesses and persons caught in the Superfund liability net.
B. The CERCLA Scheme
CERCLA, enacted in 1980, was created to "provide for liability,
compensation, clean-up, and emergency response for hazardous substances
released into the environment, and the clean-up of inactive hazardous
waste disposal sites."35 CERCLA includes four fundamental elements:
(1) a system for information-gathering and analysis; (2) federal authority
to respond to and clean up releases of hazardous substances; (3) a hazard-
ous substance superfund (the "Superfund") to fund clean-ups; and (4) a
liability scheme for releases of hazardous substances.
1. Remediation Authority
The second basic CERCLA element authorizes the federal gov-
ernment to clean up sites from which releases of hazardous substances
3" Centerior, 153 F.3d at 348.
32 Id. See also 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f).
3 Centerior, 153 F.3d at 348. See also 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f).
4 See 42 U.S.C. § 9613.
3' Arc Ecology v. U.S. Dep't of Air Force, 294 F. Supp. 2d 1152, 1156 (N.D. Cal. 2003)
(quoting CERCLA, Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980)). "Response," as defined in
42 U.S.C. §§ 9601(25) (2000), includes enforcement activities related to responses.
36 COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 1981: 12TH ANNUAL
REPORT 99-101 (1981) [hereinafter CEQ REPORT]. The first element of CERCLA-infor-
mation gathering-requires owners of hazardous waste sites to notify EPA of the nature
of hazardous wastes stored at those sites. This system of notification enables EPA and
federal and state authorities to compile a list of problem sites throughout the country,
assess the relative potential danger of these sites to the public, and develop appropriate
response plans. Id. at 99.
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occurred or are occurring. 7 Two categories of federal response activities
are authorized: (1) short-term removal or emergency response activities,
and (2) long-term remedial activities.3" The President is also authorized
to issue orders.39 Section 104 of CERCLA provides the President with the
authority to issue compliance orders after appropriate notice and oppor-
tunity for consultation.4 ° Section 106 of CERCLA provides the President
with so-called "imminent hazard" authority if the President determines
that an "imminent and substantial endangerment to the public health or
welfare or the environment" is posed by "an actual or threatened release
of a hazardous substance from a facility."4'
Options available to EPA under section 106 include civil judicial
injunctive actions and unilateral EPA administrative orders.42 An alter-
native in some jurisdictions may be for a party to voluntarily step forward
at an early stage, negotiate a favorable settlement as to its liability with
the government (especially if it is a large volume party with the potential
for significant liability), and then attempt to instigate a section 107 cost
recovery action against a select group of defendants. Therefore, the courts'
recognition of these distinctions between the avenues of allocation and
17 CERCLA § 104, 42 U.S.C. § 9604 (2000 & Supp. V 2005). Implementation of health-
related authorities provided in CERCLA section 104 is a joint responsibility of the EPA
and the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry ("ATSDR"), which was
established under section 104. Id. § 9604 (i) (providing a listing of responsibilities of the
ATSDR administrator and of other EPA/ATSDR joint responsibilities).
3 See id. § 9604(a)(1) (2000). See also id. § 9601(23) (defining "removal"); id. § 9601 (24)
(defining "remedial action"). The President is authorized to acquire real property, or any
interest therein necessary, in the President's discretion, to conduct remedial actions. Id.
§ 9604(j)(1) (2000). See also id. § 9601(33) (defining "pollutant or contaminant"); id. § 9605
(discussing the preparation contents, revision, and republication of the national contin-
gency plan).
" 42 U.S.C. § 9604 (2000). The President has the authority to act under section 104 of
CERCLA to:
remove or arrange for the removal of, and provide for remedial action
relating to such hazardous substance, pollutant or contaminant at any
time (including its removal from any contaminated natural resource),
or take any other response measure consistent with the national con-
tingency plan which the President deems necessary to protect the public
health or welfare or the environment.
Id. § 9604(a)(1).
4 Id. § 9604(e)(5)(A).
41 Id. § 9606(a).
42 Id. § 9606(a)-(b). CERCLA section 106 directs the federal courts to use their equitable
powers to cause responsible parties to abate the danger caused by the release or threatened
release. Id. § 9606(a).
642 [Vol. 33:633
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the stages of CERCLA suits can serve to promote earlier private party
remediation and settlement with the government.
There are situations where the government is willing to make
advantageous settlements with certain parties.43 Early settlement leaves
both the government and the settling parties free to initiate section 113
contribution or section 107 response costs actions against nonsettling par-
ties. There is a potential advantage to the government because it gets an
immediate settlement, either in the form of a cash settlement, a commit-
ment to perform response actions, or both. Whatever discount the govern-
ment affords settlors in litigation can be recouped jointly and severally
from any nonsettlor. Where the government knows that not all the parties
will settle and that viable nonsettling parties will remain, this strategy
may offer both advantages and less risks to the government."
For private settling parties, there can also be advantages to an early
settlement. First, voluntary settlement avoids the potential liability to
EPA for treble damages if EPA performs response actions itself in the face
of recalcitrant PRPs.45 It also avoids a compulsive order from EPA pursu-
ant to section 106, with its $25,000 per day penalties for each violation.46
Second, delay in reaching settlement can escalate private costs
in several ways. Postponement of remediation expenditures causes the
' EPA Region I and the Commonwealth of Massachusetts employed this strategy in
settling a matter involving four sites. See United States v. Cannons Eng'g Corp., 720 F.
Supp. 1027 (D. Mass. 1989) affd, 899 F.2d 79 (1st Cir. 1990). Most of the major non-de
minimis parties received an initial settlement at a discount of approximately seventy-five
percent from their proportionate shares based on waste-in volume. Id. at 1041 n. 18. Sub-
sequently, individual governments sued several dozen additional nonsettling parties,
requiring them to make the governments whole by incurring approximately nine times
their proportional share of costs. Small volume parties received de minimis settlements
crafted in several stages. Also note that non-settling PRPs may not bring contribution
actions against settlingde minimis parties. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9613(f)(2), 9622(g)(5) (2000);
Avnet, Inc. v. Allied-Signal, Inc., 825 F. Supp. 1132 (D.R.I. 1992).
"Of course, after the initial settlement the government may seek either to litigate against
nonsettlors or use the initial settlement as leverage to compel a subsequent settlement
with the nonsettling parties. While reducing the number of parties by an initial settle-
ment, the government may or may not have resolved all liability or maximized recovery.
This partial settlement mode has the advantage for the government of prompting a quick
settlement with some liable parties, while leaving additional nonsettling parties against
whom unreimbursed present or future response costs can be incurred. In certain appli-
cations, this is an ideal solution in that it operates much like an insurance policy while
expediting some initial settlement.
4See CERCLA § 107, 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (2000 & Supp. II 2002). Multiple damages also
exist at the state level. See, e.g., MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 21E, § 11 (West 2002).
46 42 U.S.C. § 9606(b)(1).
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expenditures to be priced in inflated dollars in subsequent years. Delay
also risks statutory amendment or evolution of precedent so as to require
changed requirements or more exacting clean-up standards. Over time,
the technical ability to detect the presence of small quantities of hazardous
substances has increased, exposing responsible parties to more precise
technical parameters of detection and more exacting standards for re-
mediation. Delay also allows for protracted scrutiny and involvement by
neighbors or by government agencies. Finally, during the period of delay,
additional legal expert and transactional costs are often incurred by pri-
vate parties, increasing the ultimate cost of resolution.
2. The Superfund
The third basic CERCLA element establishes the Superfund to
finance the federal government's response to actual and threatened re-
leases of hazardous substances, and claims for natural resource damages.47
Sales taxes on chemical corporations and general appropriations origi-
nally provided funding for the trust fund." However, this "polluter pays"
provision expired in 1995, when the trust fund contained an all-time high
of $3.6 billion.49 By 2004, the fund was depleted completely, thus forcing
the government to pay entirely for Superfund clean-ups from annual fed-
eral appropriations and amounts recovered from liable parties.5 ° The gov-
ernment acquires the right to seek reimbursement from PRPs for costs
incurred and paid from the Superfund for clean-up, administration, legal
removal, oversight, and resource restoration.51
47 See 42 U.S.C. § 9611 (2000). If the Superfund is exhausted in response to public health
threats, natural resource damage claims are not payable out of the Superfund that year.
Id. § 9611(e)(2).
48 42 U.S.C. § 9631 (1982), repealed by Pub. L. No. 99-499, § 517, 100 Stat. 1772, 1774
(1986) (codified at 26 I.R.C. § 9507) ("The Hazardous Substance Superfind established
by the amendments made by this section shall be treated for all purposes of law as a
continuation of the Hazardous Substance Response Trust Fund established by section
221 of the Hazardous Substance Response Revenue Act of 1980.").49 J.R. Pegg, Funding Woes Plague Superfund Clean Up, ENVTL. NEWS SERVICE, Aug. 7,
2003, httpJ/www.ens-newswire.com/ens/aug2003/2003-08-07-10.asp (last visited Dec. 18,
2008).
5
°See id.
51 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9607(a), 9612(c) (2000). Thus, the EPA may respond quickly to a
hazardous substance release with the assurance of Superfund monies to pay for clean-up.
See id.
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3. Liability Allocation
The fourth basic CERCLA element provides a liability allocation
scheme.52 CERCLA precedent imposes strict, joint and several liability for
clean-up costs incurred as a result of releases, or threats of release, of
hazardous substances on four categories of responsible parties: (1) owners
and operators of a facility from which hazardous substances were threat-
ened to be released or actually released, (2) persons who owned or operated
a facility at the time of hazardous substance disposal, (3) persons who
arranged for disposal of hazardous substances, and (4) persons who trans-
ported hazardous substances and selected the disposal sites.5 3 One EPA
enforcement approach to hazardous substance releases under CERCLA
is clean-up by private parties, either voluntarily or pursuant to enforce-
ment order issued by EPA.' EPA compiles lists of priority sites and related
PRPs to promote and maximize the number of privately funded clean-ups,
marshalling the Superfund to finance those priority clean-ups for which
there is an inadequate private response, or no response at all.55
The allocation of liability under CERCLA usually involves two
stages.5" The first stage is the macro-level shift of remediation expenses
from the plaintiff to the defendants. This stage involves determining
whether liability should be imposed on the entire group of liable PRPs
jointly and severally or divided equitably. In the Superfund context this
dimension triggers issues ofjoint and several responsibility, contribution,
allocation among categories of responsible parties, and plaintiffs choice
of the cause of action and designation of named defendants. 8
12 Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 9607, in order to establish a prima facie case for liability, the
government must prove four things:
(1) that the site is a "facility," as that term is defined in 42 U.S.C.
§ 9601(9);
(2) that a "release" or "threatened release" of a "hazardous sub-
stance" from the site has occurred, as required by 42 U.S.C.
§ 9607(a);
(3) that the release or threatened release has caused the United
States to incur "response costs," as required by 42 U.S.C.
§ 9607(a); and
(4) that each of the defendants is a "person," as that term is de-
fined in 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a).
s 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (2000).
s4 Broward Gardens Tenants Ass'n v. EPA, 311 F.3d 1066, 1071 (11th Cir. 2002).
s Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. City of Lodi, 271 F.3d 911, 924 (9th Cir. 2001).
s Some courts have merged these two stages together. When harm is divisible, there is no
need for apportionment of harm which occurs in the second stage. See infra Part II.C.2.a.57 See 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f).
58 See id. § 9613(f)(1).
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The second stage entails a micro-level reallocation of response costs
among liable defendant parties. This allocation may be accomplished as
part of the original imposition ofjoint and several liability, or subsequently
in reallocation of shares among PRPs.59 This second dimension allocation
can divide those who choose to settle their liability with the government
from nonsettlors, juxtaposing the interests of settling and nonsettling
responsible parties.
Either to compel PRPs to clean up or to recover its own response
costs, the government can bring suit under section 107 to shift the liability
for clean-up to the defendants PRPs.6° This shifting or imposition of lia-
bility constitutes the first macro-level stage of allocation. The defendant
PRPs then must equitably allocate this liability among themselves in the
second micro-level stage of allocation.6' If some PRPs settle with the gov-
ernment, they in turn can bring suit against other PRPs by either shift-
ing their incurred response costs under section 107, or by seeking cost
contribution under section 113 from nonsettling PRPs.62
CERCLA provides two non-parallel routes-section 107 and section
113-to assign liability and reach an allocation among private parties."
Section 107, which contemplates the recovery of response costs, does not
incorporate equitable factors. Under the express language of the statute,
this provision may be used by "any other person"-either by the govern-
ment or a private party plaintiff-to shift liability "jointly and severally"
to responsible defendant parties.' In effect, these settling PRPs step into
the same cost-shifting shoes of the government.
The second avenue, section 113, contemplates an equitable reallo-
cation of total costs incurred "severally" among PRPs.65 The difference
between several liability and joint and several liability is profound. Not
only do these two routes yield potentially different reallocations, but they
also yield distinct outcomes depending on whether or not the plaintiff has
previously settled its liability with the EPA.
59 Id. ("Any person may seek contribution from any other person who is liable or potentially
liable under section 9607(a) of this title, during or following any civil action... under
section 9607(a) of this title.").
5 Id. § 9607(a).61 1d. § 9613(f)(1)
62 CERCLA §§ 107, 113, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9607, 9613 (2000).63 id.
6 See id. § 9607 (a)-(c).
5Id. § 9613.
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C. The Alternative Allocation Schemes of CERCLA Section 107
and Section 113
1. Section 107 Joint and Several Liability
Both the government and private parties can recover the response
costs they have incurred.66 The plaintiffs can impose liability on PRPs by
bringing claims under section 107 of CERCLA, which provides for the
recovery of:
(A) all costs of removal and remedial action incurred
by the United States Government or a State or an
Indian tribe not inconsistent with the national con-
tingency plan;
(B) any other necessary costs of response incurred by
any other person consistent with the national con-
tingency plan.67
Courts have interpreted this provision as allowing plaintiffs to
recover all costs of remediationjointly and severally against defined cate-
gories of responsible parties.6" Consequently, under a theory ofjoint and
several liability, any one liable defendant may bear the total burden of
the damages. Although the final version of CERCLA deleted all reference
to joint and several liability,69 courts have held that PRP liability is joint
and several if no basis exists for dividing the harm of the contamination
and the response costs.
7°
" See id. § 9607(a)(4)(A)-(B). Response costs are those costs associated with removal and
remediation actions at the waste site. Id. § 9601(25).
67 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A)-(B).
' See, e.g., United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 573 F. Supp. 802,809-10 (S.D. Ohio 1983)
(stating that where the harm is indivisible, each liable party is responsible for the entire
harm).
69 See 126 CONG. REC. 31,965 (1980).
70 See Amoco Oil Co. v. Borden Inc., 889 F.2d 664, 672-73 (5th Cir. 1989). See also United
States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 169-70 (4th Cir. 1988) (stating that it was sufficient
for plaintiff to show that a waste like that sent by the defendants was found at the site);
Colorado v. ASARCO, Inc., 608 F. Supp. 1484, 1486 (D. Colo. 1985) ("It is clear, however,
that the deletion of all references to joint and several liability from [CERCLA] did not
signify that Congress rejected these standards of liability."). But see New York v. Shore
Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1042 n.13 (2d Cir. 1985) (stating that joint and several lia-
bility is not absolute under certain circumstances). Courts have used different standards
when determining whether or not there exists as basis of divisibility. See, e.g., In re Bell
Petroleum Servs., Inc., F.3d 889, 903 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding that joint and several liability
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In addition, "[b] ecause CERCLA incorporates by reference, section
311 of the Clean Water Act, which holds violators strictly liable for dam-
ages. courts have correspondingly overwhelmingly held that strict liability
applies to PRPs for cost recovery actions under CERCLA section 107, re-
gardless of negligence by owners, operators, transporters, or generators."7'
According to these decisions, plaintiffs can shift their burden entirely to
any one or all of the PRPs, who could bear the total burden. 2 "Plaintiffs
are therefore not required to link their response costs with particular re-
leases by particular defendants, because to require such 'fingerprinting'
of wastes would eviscerate CERCLA's liability provisions and would be
inconsistent with Congress's intent."7'
Thus, plaintiffs establish the requisite causation against a gener-
ator or transporter of hazardous substances once they show that: (1) the
defendant is a generator or transporter who shipped hazardous substances
to (2) a facility, (3) the defendant's hazardous substances, or substances
like those of the defendant, were present at the site, (4) there was a release
or threatened release of hazardous substances at the site, and (5) this
release or threatened release caused the incurrence of response costs.7 4
Unless PRPs can avail themselves of one of the extremely limited defense
doctrines available,7 liability is joint, several, and strict.7' Furthermore,
should be imposed only in "exceptional circumstances" when the "expert testimony and
other evidence establishes a factual basis for making a reasonable estimate that will
fairly apportion liability," and that the court should not be dissuaded from dividing liability
just because apportionment is difficult to determine with certainty).
"' Steven Ferrey, The Toxic Time Bomb: Municipal Liability for the Cleanup of Hazardous
Waste, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 197, 234 (1988).
72 Monsanto, 858 F.2d at 168 ("Under section 107(a)(2), any person who owned a facility
at a time when hazardous substances were deposited there may be held liable for all costs
of removal or remedial action.") (emphasis in original); Ne. Pharm. & Chem, Co., 579 F.
Supp. at 844.73 See Ferrey, supra note 71, at 235.
74 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4) (2000); United States v. S. Carolina Recycling & Disposal, Inc.,
653 F. Supp. 984, 992 (D.S.C. 1984, affd sub nom. United States v. Monsanto Co., 858
F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1988)). Proximate cause, however, must be shown to impose liability
on transporters of hazardous substances, whom both the statute and case law link to
clean-up costs only if the transporters selected the disposal site. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)
(2000); United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 619 F. Supp. 162, 191 (W.D. Mo. 1985).
75 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9607(b) (limiting the availability of defenses to occurrences where
releases of hazardous materials are caused by: (1) acts of war, (2) acts of God, or (3) acts
of unrelated third parties with whom a PRP has no director or indirect contractual link,
where the PRP exercises due care with respect to any hazardous substances, and where
the PRP took precautions against foreseeable acts or omissions of any such third party).
76 Other possible defenses, though limited, include a lack of authorization for national
service. See, e.g., In re Acushnet River & New Bedford Harbor, 675 F. Supp. 22, 29 n.7
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when a municipality, country, or state agency owns or operates the dis-
posal site, CERCLA treats the entity like a private person.7"
A settling PRP can also strategically choose which nonsettling
defendants to sue under section 107.78 It is much easier for a plaintiff to
prove damages against a lesser number of defendants; if section 107 is
employed, only a few defendants need to be named to potentially shift the
entire liability to the named defendants. This is much easier than bear-
ing the burden of proof severally against every PRP.
2. Section 113 Several Liability
Section 113(f) provides an alternative avenue for the allocation of
response costs or liability.79 It was held to provide an implied right of
contribution, even before the 1986 amendments made the right statutorily
express.8" This statutory section codifies common law equitable remedy
(D. Mass. 1987); Wehner v. Syntex Agribusiness, Inc., 616 F. Supp. 27, 28-29 (E.D. Mo.
1985). But see United States v. Bliss, 23 ERC 1638, 1645 (E.D. Mo. 1985) (finding that
CERCLA authorizes nationwide service of process for abatement actions under section
106). Another possible defense is unjust enrichment to prevent a landowner from obtaining
contribution or indemnification. Cf Gould v. American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 387 F. Supp.
163, 170-71 (D. Del. 1974) (denying contribution in a federal securities action on unjust
enrichment grounds), vacated on other grounds, 535 F.2d 761 (3d Cir. 1976). A possible
final defense is the statute of limitations. See 42 U.S.C. § 9612 (d) (2000).
77 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (21); Ferrey, supra note 71, at 239; see also Artesian Water Co. v. New
Castle County, 605 F. Supp. 1348, 1355 (D. Del. 1985) (finding that Congress did not
intend to differentiate between governmental and nongovernmental entities for purposes
of CERCLA liability).
78 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f) (2000).
79 Id.
80 See, e.g., Wickland Oil Terminals v. Asarco, Inc., 792 F.2d 887 (9th Cir. 1986); NL Inds.,
Inc. v. Kaplan, 792 F.2d 896 (9th Cir. 1986); Levin Metals Corp. v. Parr-Richmond
Terminal Co., 799 F.2d 1312; (9th Cir. 1986); Walls v. Waste Res. Corp., 761 F.2d 311
(6th Cir. 1985); United States v. New Castle County, 642 F. Supp. 1258 (D. Del. 1986);
New York v. Exxon Corp., 633 F. Supp. 609 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); Colorado v. Asarco Inc., 608
F. Supp. 1484 (D. Colo. 1985); Wehner v. Syntex Agribusiness Inc., 616 F. Supp. 27 (E.D.
Mo. 1985); United States v. A&F Materials Co., 578 F. Supp. 1249 (S.D. 111. 1984);
Philadelphia v. Stepan Chem. Co., 544 F. Supp. 1135 (E.D. Pa. 1982). But see United
States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 22 ERC 1230 (S.D. Ind. 1983). A few courts also found
that parties had a right of contribution under federal common law. See, e.g.,Asarco, 608 F.
Supp. at 1489 (D. Colo. 1985). This rationale is of note for the later discussion in Part IV
wherein we compare that while the circuit courts have applied this finding, they have
diverged from this principle dramatically in one area of CERCLA litigation involving
precisely these private party response costs.
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principles 8' and imposes only "several" liability."s Pursuant to this ave-
nue, the liability is divided among the PRPs according to their proven
equitable proportionate shares.8 3 This follows the general common law
rule of contribution that requires all joint tortfeasors to contribute equally
to satisfy a collective burden.' A primary difference between section 107
and section 113 is that district courts are afforded great discretion in
allocating liability on an equitable basis under section 113(f)(1).
85
a. Equitable Apportionment
One recurring theme for the circuit courts denying access of PRPs
party-plaintiffs to claims under section 107 of CERCLA is the inability
to employ equitable factors in adjudicating a section 107 claim.8 6 "Equita-
ble factors" empower a court to cut the Superfund liability pie as it sees fit,
injecting a variety of objective and subjective variables in deciding which
PRPs should bear what costs for hazardous waste clean-up. "Equitable
factors" empower judges to make Solomonic decisions and depart from
rigid formulae.
Some courts have employed equitable considerations to allocate
relative degrees of responsibility based on the conduct of the parties. 8 In
" Barbara J. Gulino, Note, A Right of Contribution under CERCLA: The Case for Federal
Common Law, 71 CORNELL L. REv. 668 (1986).
82 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1) (2000).
' See id. The language of section 113 states that courts should determine the equitable
share on a case-by-case basis. Id.
' See McDonald v. Magruder, 28 U.S. 470,477 (1830); Adamson v. McKeon, 225 N.W. 414,
416-17 (Iowa 1929); Easterly v. Barber, 66 N.Y. 433,435-40 (1876). Contribution is inher-
ently equitable, and courts are free to fashion equitable remedies. Yates v. Donaldson,
5 Md. 389, 394-95 (1854).
" United States v. R.W. Meyer, Inc., 932 F.2d 568, 571-74 (6th Cir. 1991). Note that this
case is a subsequent opinion in United States v. Northernaire Plating Co., which held
defendants jointly and severally liable under section 107(a), F. Supp. 742, 748-49 (1987),
affd sub nom. United States v. R.W. Meyer, Inc., F.2d 1497 (6th Cir. 1989).
86 See infra Part III.
See In re Tutu Wells Contamination Litig., 994 F. Supp. 638,662 n.34 (1998) ("[While
a defendant in a Section 107 action can only avoid joint and several liability by demon-
strating that the harm at a given site is divisible, parties to a Section 113 action may
allocate among potentially responsible parties based on equitable considerations.").
' See, e.g., Chem. Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. Armstrong World Indus., 669 F. Supp. 1285 (E.D.
Pa. 1987) (holding that the extent of the private party's recovery was to be determined
based on "relative fault, the volume of waste deposited, and the relative toxicity of such
waste."). See also Amoco Oil Co. v. Dingwell, 690 F. Supp. 78 (D. Me. 1988), affd sub nom.
Travelers Indem. Co. v. Dingwell, 884 F.2d 629 (1st Cir. 1989). In its consideration of
whether the apportionment of damages is fair, the court cited factors such as:
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applying equitable factors to a claim, some courts have applied the factors
contained in the congressionally rejected Gore Amendment to apportion
liability among defendants.89 However, in their decisions over the past de-
cade, circuit courts have rejected the application of the Gore Amendment
factors as a defense to liability in a section 107 action.90 Instead, courts hold
that Gore Amendment factors would be appropriate only in a subsequent
contribution action under section 113.9' This would include equitable fac-
tors such as unclean hands.92
(1) the ability of the parties to demonstrate that their contribution to a
discharge release or disposal of a hazardous waste can be distinguished;
(2) the amount of the hazardous waste involved; (3) the degree of toxic-
ity of the hazardous waste involved; (4) the degree of involvement by
the parties in the generation, transportation, treatment, storage, or
disposal of the hazardous waste; (5) the degree of care exercised by the
parties with respect to the hazardous waste concerned, taking into
account the characteristics of such hazardous waste; and (6) the degree
of cooperation by the parties with Federal, State, or local officials to
prevent any harm to the public health or the environment.
Id. at 86.
89 See, e.g., United States v. A & F Materials Co., 578 F. Supp. 1249, 1256-57 (S.D. Ill.
1984). The Gore Amendment to CERCLA would have apportioned damages according to
the following criteria:
(i) the ability of the parties to demonstrate that their contribution to a
discharge, release, or disposal of a hazardous waste can be distinguished;
(ii) the amount of hazardous waste involved; (iii) the degree of toxicity
of the hazardous waste involved; (iv) the degree of involvement by the
parties in the generation, transportation, treatment, storage, or disposal
of the hazardous waste; (v) the degree of care exercised by the parties
with respect to the hazardous waste concerned, taking into account the
characteristics of such hazardous waste; and (vi) the degree of cooper-
ation by the parties with Federal, State, or local officials to prevent any
harm to the public health or the environment.
126 CONG. REc. 26,781 (1980).
o United States v. W. Processing Co., 734 F. Supp. 930,937-38 (W.D. Wash. 1990) (rejecting
defendants' arguments that liability in a section 107 action with a government plaintiff
should be apportioned according to equitable factors and reaffirming government plaintiffs
right to selectively sue fewer than all PRPs). The court held that it is consideration of all
environmental conditions at the site, not the expenditure of money by the government
on specific tasks, that must be considered to determine whether a harm is divisible; the
mere fact of different expenditures does not equate to divisibility. Id. at 937. See also
United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 171 n.22 (4th Cir. 1988) (explaining that
equitable factors are inappropriate to the question of joint and several liability).
91 See W. Processing, 734 F. Supp. at 938.
92See Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. Peck Iron & Metal Co. 814 F. Supp. 1285, 1288
(E.D. Va. 1993) (holding that the unclean hands defense is relevant to contribution phase
of litigation, but not to basic liability issue); In re Sundance Corp. 149 B.R. 641,664 (Bankr.
E.D. Wash. 1993) (stating that the court is free to apply equitable factors).
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Much of the circuit court imbroglio over section 107, and the re-
sulting chaos after Aviall, was justified by circuit courts claiming that
use of "equitable factors" can only be logically utilized under section 113
by finding an implied Congressional intent, which the Supreme Court has
now restricted. However, this is a false premise. First, there is no indication
that Congress sought to inject "equitable factors" into every Superfund
cost response action. Second, there is no express statutory prohibition
against equitable considerations applied to claims adjudicated under
section 107.93
b. Allocation Pursuant to State Model Statutes
The legislative history of the 1986 Superfund and Reauthorization
Act ("SARA") Superfund amendments indicates that federal common law
should govern CERCLA determinations. 94 Accordingly, courts deciding
CERCLA issues have generally looked to federal common law to resolve
these issues.95 Even though the legislative history designates federal
common law as the basis for deciding allocation pursuant to section 113,
some courts employ state statutory model laws, unrelated to hazardous
substances, to interpret the allocation of liability under this CERCLA
provision. This use, or non-use, of the various state tort acts further adds
to the disparate and unpredictable allocation of liability under CERCLA.
Courts have primarily used two model uniform acts to interpret
section 113: the Uniform Contributions Among Tortfeasors Act ("UCATA")
13 See United States v. Hardage, 116 F.R.D. 460, 465-66 (W.D. Okla. 1987) (raising
equitable factors as a defense to bar government's section 107 claims).
9 See H.R. REP. No. 99-253, pt. 3, at 18-19 (1985), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2835,
3041-42.
The committee emphasizes that courts are to resolve claims for appor-
tionment on a case-by-case basis pursuant to Federal common law,
taking relevant equitable considerations into account. Thus, after all
questions of liability and remedy have been resolved, courts may con-
sider any criteria relevant to determining whether there should be an
apportionment.
Id.
95 See, e.g., United States v. Nicolet, 712 F. Supp. 1193, 1202 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (holding that
there is a strong federal interest in uniform national enforcement and that application
of state law would frustrate objectives of the federal program regarding alter ego claims);
United States v. Bliss, No. 84-2086C(1), 20 E.L.R. 20,879, 20,882 (E.D. Mo. Sept. 27,
1988) (stating that because of substantial federal interests, Congress intended courts to
apply federal common law principles to fill gaps in the statutory scheme); In re Acushnet
River & New Bedford Harbor, 675 F. Supp. 22, 31 (D. Mass. 1987) (holding that federal
law should control determination of corporate separateness).
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and the Uniform Comparative Fault Act ("UCFA). 96 Both acts are de-
signed for interpretation of negligence principles, rather than the strict
liability contemplated by CERCLA.97 Both also allocate several liability, as
opposed to joint and several liability, making them appropriate to a section
113, but not a section 107, claim.9" Moreover, even though federal common
law is designated by the legislative history as the basis for interpretation,
where a court interprets CERCLA using one of two state statutory model
laws not related to hazardous substances, its decision can be influenced by
state precedent interpreting the application of these statutes.99 Conse-
quently, the allocation of liability under these uniform statutes can pro-
duce results somewhat at odds with those contemplated by CERCLA.
1) Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act
Many courts have decided that one of these model state tort allo-
cation statutes, UCATA, is best suited to resolve cost allocation pursuant
to section 107 claims brought by government plaintiffs."°° Each party pays
apro rata share, defined in the UCATA without consideration of relative
or proportionate degrees of fault or liability among the parties. Compara-
tive negligence principles play no part in an allocation pursuant to the
UCATA. Where there is a symbiotic confluence of factors causing indivisi-
ble damage, liability is indivisible and is apportioned pro rata.'°' This
application of UCATA results in apro tanto scheme of allocation between
settlors and nonsettlors. The liability of nonsettling parties is reduced
only by the amount of the settlement, not by the settlors' proportionate
share of liability.' °2 This makes the government whole without any ex-
cess recovery by the government, which courts have held is implied by
section 113(f)(2). 10 3
' Nineteen states have adopted the UCATA in either the 1939 or 1955 versions. See UNIF.
CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS ACT, 12 U.L.A. 193, 200 (2008). Two states have
adopted the UCFA. See UNIF. COMPARATiVE FAULT ACT, 12 U.L.A. 121 (2008).97 See UNIF. CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS ACT, supra note 96; UNIF. COMPARATIVE
FAULT ACT, supra note 96.
98See Town of New Windsor v. Tesa Tuck, Inc., 919 F. Supp. 662,684-85 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
See supra Parts II.A, E.
l See, e.g., United States v. SCA Servs. Of Ind., Inc., 827 F. Supp. 526, 534 (N.D. Ind.
1993).
101 Id. at 97-98.
'
02 Id. at 98.
"o3 See, e.g., Watson v. Reg'l Transp. Dist., 762 P.2d 133, 140 (Colo. 1988) (en banc) (stating
that the UCATA is "designed to permit the equitable apportionment of losses among
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The UCATA prevents the effects of a plaintiff placing the entire
burden of a common injury on a single joint tortfeasor. 10 4 To fairly dis-
tribute the liability, the UCATA allows a liable party to seek contribution
from the other liable parties. 15 The UCATA provides that no settling
tortfeasor is entitled to contribution from another tortfeasor unless the
former's settlement is in excess of its share. °6 The right of contribution
exists to a settling tortfeasor who pays more than her pro rata share of
common liability, and recovery is limited to the amount in excess of the
pro rata share that was paid.' Apro rata share is the result of equally
dividing the liability by the number of responsible parties.' For example,
multiple tortfeasors."); Bartlett v. New Mexico Welding Supply, Inc., 646 P.2d 579 (N.M.
1982) ("'This uniform act establishes the right of a person liable for damages for an un-
intentional wrong to compel others, who are liable with him for the same damages, to share
in discharging the common liability.) (quoting the Act's Prefatory Note).
104 See Markey v. Skog, 322 A.2d 513, 518 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1974) (holding that
a liable party may seek contribution from another party even if plaintiffs statute of
limitations against the latter party has run).
105 Section 1(a) of the UCATA reads:
Except as otherwise provided in this Act, where two or more persons
become jointly or severally liable in tort for the same injury to person or
property or for the same wrongful death, there is a right of contribution
among them even though judgment has not been recovered against all
or any of them.
UNIF. CoNTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS ACT § 1, 12 U.L.A. 201 (2008).
106 Section 1(d) of the UCATA reads:
A tortfeasor who enters into a settlement with a claimant is not en-
titled to recover contribution from another tortfeasor whose liability for
the injury or wrongful death is not extinguished by the settlement nor
in respect to any amount paid in a settlement which is in excess of what
was reasonable.
Id. at 202.
107 Section 1(b) of the UCATA reads:
The right of contribution exists only in favor of a tortfeasor who has
paid more than his pro rata share of the common liability, and his total
recovery is limited to the amount paid by him in excess of his pro rata
share. No tortfeasor is compelled to make contribution beyond his own
pro rata share of the entire liability.
Id. at 201-02.
'o Section 2 of the UCATA reads:
In determining the pro rata shares of tortfeasors in the entire liability,
(a) their relative degrees of fault shall not be considered; (b) if equity
requires the collective liability of some as a group shall constitute a
single share; and (c) principles of equity applicable to contribution
generally shall apply.
UNIF. CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS ACT § 2, 12 U.L.A. 263-64 (2008).
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if there are five responsible parties, each party bears one-fifth of the
liability, regardless of her actual contribution to the harm.
Thus, the UCATA allocates liability without consideration of
relative or proportionate degrees of fault among the parties."9 Such an
allocation scheme, with its simple mathematical formula, greatly facili-
tates the allocation of responsibility among all tortfeasors by the conclu-
sion of litigation. The concept of the UCATA, under which simple division
by the number of parties determines each individual's share of liability,
is consistent with the commingled and indivisible nature of contamina-
tion encountered at most multi-party Superfund sites.
As applied to CERCLA situations, imposition of liability under
UCATA results in apro tanto scheme of allocation between settling PRPs
and nonsettling PRPs. The UCATA stipulates that any settlement reduces
the amount of liability of nonsettlors by the amount of the original settle-
ment or the amount of consideration paid for it, whichever is greater."'
The settling party is totally discharged from all liability, including liability
for contribution to nonsettlors."' Importantly, the nonsettlors' liability is
only reduced by the amount of the settlor's settlement, not by any propor-
tionate share of liability.
1 2
The UCATA provides an incentive for parties to settle with the gov-
ernment if they can do so on favorable terms. The integrity of that settle-
ment is preserved under the UCATA. Nonsettlors remain potentially liable
for the amount of the liability not relieved by the settlement, regardless of
their proportionate or equitable share of liability. Therefore, the integrity
of a settlement of liability with the government is not reopened in a sub-
sequent section 113 action between liable PRPs.
109 Id.
... UNIF. CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS ACT § 4(a), 12 U.L.A. 284 (2008).
"I UNIF. CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS ACT § 4(b), 12 U.L.A. 284 (2008).
112 United States v. Cannons Eng'g Corp., 720 F. Supp. 1027, 1048 (D. Mass. 1989), affd,
899 F.2d 79 (1st Cir. 1990) (finding that it is of no consequence that nonsettlors absorb
a larger amount of liability than the settlors under the UCATA scheme). See also Akzo
Nobel Coatings, Inc. v. Aigner Corp, 197 F.3d 302,307 (7th Cir. 1999); Hillsborough County
v. A & E Road Oiling Serv., 853 F. Supp. 1402, 1408 (M.D. Fla. 1994); Allied Corp. v. Frola,
730 F. Supp. 626, 638 (D.N.J. 1990); In re Acushnet River & New Bedford Harbor, 712
F. Supp. 1019, 1029 (D. Mass. 1989) (stating that a proportionate scheme of liability would
allow nonsettlors to challenge the settlement after the fact, and that incentives to settlors
are justified); United States v. Rohm & Haas Co., 721 F. Supp. 666, 677-78 (D.N.J. 1989)
(stating that to promote quick remediation, nonsettlors can be left with a larger amount
of liability); United States v. Pepper's Steel & Alloys, Inc., 658 F. Supp. 1160, 1168 (S.D.
Fla. 1987).
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2) Uniform Comparative Fault Act (UCFA)
The second state liability allocation statute applied to CERCLA
settlements at the discretion and initiative of some courts is the Uniform
Comparative Fault Act ("UCFA").113 The UCFA applies a liability scheme
whereby each party is liable for a proportionate, or otherwise "equitable"
share of the total liability. In contrast to the UCATA, the share of liabil-
ity is based upon the nature of each PRP's conduct and the relation of the
conduct to the damages or response costs.
114
Courts have elected to apply UCFA where the plaintiff is a PRP
seeking to recover costs from other PRPs in a section 113 contribution
action." 5 This typically results because section 113(f)(1) provides that,
"[iun resolving contribution claims, the court may allocate response costs
among liable parties using such equitable factors as the court determines
are appropriate."" 6 With regard to the effect of settlement upon the allo-
cation of liability, the UCFA would reduce the liability of the nonsettlors
by the proportionate or equitable share of the settlors, regardless of the
amount of the settlement."7 Hence, in a subsequent contribution action,
113 See UNIF. COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT (Prefatory Note), 12 U.L.A. 121-23 (2008). As of
1977, thirty-three states had adopted some form ofcomparative fault. Because of its more
recent vintage, coupled with the fact that only two states have adopted the UCFA without
significant modification, there is much less interpreted precedent utilizing the UCFA than
there is precedent utilizing the UCATA. When proposed in 1977, the UCFA offered a uni-
form act to states that wished to adopt tort principles of comparative fault. At the time of
the proposal of the UCFA, the UCATA had existed for several years. The Commissioners
on the Uniform Laws consciously chose not to amend the UCATA to include comparative
fault principles. Rather, a new alternative model was proposed. Therefore, the UCATA
was preserved intact and unchanged for states utilizing traditional noncomparative tort
principles. The UCFA was proposed as a separate scheme applicable only to those states
that elected to apply comparative fault principles. Id.114 See Rohm & Haas Co., 721 F. Supp. at 677.
... See, e.g., Am. Cyanamid Co. v. King Indus., Inc., 814 F. Supp. 215, 219 (D.R.I. 1993);
Allied Corp. v. ACME Solvent Reclaiming, Inc., 771 F. Supp. 219, 223 (N.D. Ill. 1993);
Comerica Bank-Detroit v. Allen Indus., Inc., 769 F. Supp. 1408, 1414 (E.D. Mich. 1991).
116 CERCLA §113(f)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1) (2000).
117 Section 6 of the UCFA states as follows:
A release, covenant not to sue or similar agreement entered into by a
claimant and a person liable discharges that person from all liability for
contribution, but it does not discharge any other person liable upon the
same claim unless it so provides. However, the claim of the releasing
person against other persons is reduced by the amount of the released
person's equitable share of the obligation, determined in accordance with
the provisions of section 2.
UNIF. COMPARATIVE FALTAcT § 6,12 U.L.A. 147 (2008). Section 2 of the UCFA provides,
in part:
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settlors would not receive the benefits of their settlement, but only of
their proportionate share, however determined.
Under the UCFA, "a release, covenant not to sue, or similar" pro-
vision, discharges the settling party "from all liability for contribution,"
and reduces the claim of the releasing party against other responsible
persons by the amount of the released person's equitable share." 8 There-
fore, this proportionate rule of the UCFA requires the court to allocate re-
sponsibility among all parties on an informal ad hoc basis. This approach
is a substantial undertaking that involves much judicial time and effort.
It also results in the possibility of there being "orphan shares" that are
not recovered.119 A proportionate rule of allocation allows a nonsettlor a
subsequent opportunity to strike a better deal than if she were required
to live with the terms of a prior settlement between the government and a
(a) In all actions involving fault of more than one party to the action,
including third-party defendants and persons who have been released
under section 6, the court unless otherwise agreed by all parties shall
instruct the jury special interrogatories if there is no jury, shall make
findings, indicating:
(1) the amount of damages each claimant would be entitled to
recover if contributory fault is disregarded; and
(2) the percentage of the total fault of all the parties to each
claim that is allocated to each claimant, defendant, third-party
defendant, and person who has been released from liability
under section 6. For all purpose the court may determine that
two or more persons are to be treated as a single party.
(b) In determining the percentages of fault, the trier of fact shall con-
sider both the nature of the conduct of each party at fault and the extent
of causal relations between the conduct and damages claimed.
UNIF. COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT § 2, 12 U.L.A. 135-36 (2008).
'18 UN0F. COMPARATIVE FAULTACT § 6, 12 U.L.A. 147 (2008). Unless it so provides, a release
with one settling party does not release the other nonsettling parties. This provision is
similar to that of the UCATA. "Orphan shares" and other uncollectable amounts are re-
allocated proportionately among the solvent parties. Id. (Commissioner's Comments).
119 The UCATA, applied in the CERCLA context, impliedly allocates responsibility for
"orphan" and bankrupt shares of potentially responsible parties regarding cleanup. The
UCATA, by setting the settlors' share of liability at the amount of their settlement, by
implication allocates "orphan shares" to nonsettlors in subsequent litigation. See supra
Part II.C.2.b.1. By contrast, the UCFA, by reducing nonsettlors' liability by the amount
of an equitable share of the settlors' liability, could effectively be used to allocate "orphan
shares" to either group-settlors or nonsettlors. This could be accomplished by the court
deciding what is equitable in a particular situation. It is conceivable that neither settlors
nor nonsettlors would pay for "orphan shares." It is also possible that the reduction of
liability for nonsettlors would leave the settlors responsible for "orphan shares." See supra
Part II.C.2.b.2.
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third party PRP. A proportionate scheme provides little risk to nonsettlors
who ignore, or even frustrate, their own early settlement opportunities.
Some courts have noted the disadvantages of the UCFA applied
in Superfund cases, including the fact that the recovery of the full amount
of damages by the plaintiff is "entirely fortuitous when there has been a
partial settlement."2 ° This uncertainty discourages voluntary settlements
and imposes additional barriers to plaintiffs' recovery because of the neces-
sity at trial to convince the court of not only the plaintiffs' minimal fault,
but also the minimum fault of all settlors, thus minimizing the reallocation
by the court of responsibility back to the plaintiffs.'2 ' While not as widely
applied as the UCATA, some courts have applied the principles of the
UCFA to fashion Superfund common law.'22 While neither is designated
by Congress to apply in the Superfund context, both have been applied as
prudential principles by federal courts adjudicating Superfund matters.
c. The Shield of Contribution Protection after Certain Approved
Settlements
To encourage settlement and reduce litigation costs, Congress pro-
vided contribution protection to all settling PRPs under section 113(M.123
A PRP which has settled with the government in a judicially or admin-
istratively approved settlement is protected from additional liability to
both the government and other private PRPs for matters which are cov-
ered in the settlement.'24 Contribution protection is effective as soon as
120 United States v. W. Processing Co., 756 F. Supp. 1424, 1431 (W.D. Wash. 1990).
121 Id.
122 Compare Denver v. Adolph Coors Co., 829 F. Supp. 340, 345 (D. Colo. 1993) (finding the
UCFA to be inconsistent with the intent of Congress) and Allied Corp. v. Frola, 730 F. Supp.
626, 638 (D.N.J. 1990) with W. Processing, 756 F. Supp. at 1431 (adopting the UCFA as
the preferred uniform rule of allocation) and Lyncott Corp. v. Chem. Waste Mgmt., Inc.,
690 F. Supp. 1409, 1418-19 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (finding the UCFA was in accord with section
113(f)(2) for the purposes of allocation of liability among PRPs in private party settlements),
and Edward Hines Lumber Co. v. Vulcan Materials Co. 15 Chem. Waste. Litig. Rep. 554,
555-56 (N.D. Ill. 1987) (employing the UCFA allocation scheme).
123 CERCLA § 113(f), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f) (2000).
124 Id. § 9613(f)(2). Typically, settlements of CERCLA liability by private parties involve
both EPA and state government. In the author's experience, the interests of the state and
federal government can be quite distinct. The federal government incurs 90% of govern-
ment capital response costs, while the state government typically incurs the remaining
10% plus ongoing obligations for operations and maintenance. Therefore, a state govern-
ment may be particularly attuned to long-term risks and costs associated with operating
site O&M systems.
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a settlement is signed, and it is not dependant on the fulfillment of any
duties undertaken by the settlor.'25 A settlement with the government
confers absolute protection against counterclaims by nonsettling defen-
dants.'26 In order to ensure this protection, however, the settling PRP must
settle via a consent decree,'27 as opposed to responding to a unilateral
administrative order from EPA under section 106.128 This distinction is
critical.
Whether or not this optional provision is inserted in a consent
decree, CERCLA appears to automatically grant contribution protection
as part of any qualifying settlement. 29 The question of whether a state
government settlement can trigger this federal contribution protection
emerged as a critical issue after the Supreme Court's Aviall opinion.
130
It is addressed in the final section of this article.
A settling PRP, or group of PRPs, can settle for the entire response
cost, its proportionate share, or even less than its proportionate share.' 3 '
The settling PRP can then pursue nonsettling PRPs for the response costs
125 Dravo Corp. v. Zuber, 13 F.3d 1222, 1226 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding that, pursuant to
section 122(a), de minimis settlors receive automatic and instantaneous protection against
contribution actions).
126 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f) (2000).
127 Id.
" Id. While there are many differences between EPA's model consent decree and EPA's
model unilateral administrative order, there is a critical distinction in the provision of
contribution protection to settlors. The model consent decree utilized by EPA contains an
optional paragraph pertaining to the contribution protection contained in section 113(f)(2).
Model RD/RA Consent Decree, available at httpJ/www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/
policies/cleanup/superfund/mod-rdra-cd.pdf. See also Dravo Corp., 13 F.3d at 1227-28
(holding that contribution protection applies to administrative settlement as well as to con-
sent decrees). The court held that it lacked jurisdiction to second-guess EPA on admin-
istrative settlements. Id. at 1228. While nonparticipating settlors can object during the
standard 30-day public comment period, the court found that there was no other recourse
for a third party to challenge a settlement, even where that party would be prevented from
seeking contribution against the settling party. Id. Effectively, this removes judicial review
of administrative de minimis settlements.
"2 See 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(2). This contribution protection occurs when a settlement is
either judicially or administratively approved. Id. Some courts hold that this protection
operates as a complete bar to its contribution claims. See United States v. Pretty Prods.,
Inc., 780 F. Supp. 1488,1493-94 (S.D. Ohio 1991); Comerica Bank-Detroitv. Allen Indus.,
Inc., 769 F. Supp. 1408, 1413 (E.D. Mich. 1991); Allied Corp. v. Frola, 730 F. Supp. 626,
639 (D.N.J. 1990); United States v. Rohm & Haas Co., 721 F. Supp. 666, 675 (D.N.J.
1989). Under this theory, such protection could not be waived by the beneficiary of the
protection.
13 See supra Part I.
131 See 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f) (2000).
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of the settlement via either of two alternative allocation avenues. First,
pursuant to section 107, the settling party may seek restitution of response
costs under a theory ofjoint and several liability.132 Alternatively, pursuant
to section 113, the settling party may seek contribution of liability under
a theory of several liability. 133 The ultimate allocation is only clear after
a subsequent cost recovery or contribution action lodged by the settling
PRP against other nonsettling responsible parties.'
Contribution actions shift some of the settlor's costs to nonsettlors.
However, the theories employed by courts to effect such redistribution
focus not on the original settlement liability of the settling PRP, but rather
on the residual liability of nonsettling PRPs. Courts have calculated this
"residual liability" in one of two ways: (1) by reducing the overall liability
by the amount of the settlement, or (2) by reducing the overall liability by
the settlor's proportionate share.135 The method chosen is critical to the
final allocation of liability under contribution and can shift millions of
dollars of the clean-up burden.
d. The Contrasts in Liability Allocation Schemes
There are significant differences between sections 107 and 113. Key
advantages of section 107 are the application ofjoint and several liability,
a statute of limitations with a period twice as long to initiate suit, the
necessity only to name and prosecute a few and not all of the liable parties,
and the unavailability of equitable defenses to defendants beyond the stat-
utorily prescribed defenses. 136 Section 107 is less likely to result in the
plaintiff absorbing "orphan shares" of unfunded party liability.
13 7
The significant potential of section 107 joint and several liability
in private cost recovery actions was dramatically articulated in 1991 in
112 Id. § 9607(a)(4)(B).
33 Id. § 9613(f)(1).
134 Id.
'
35 In dealing with the effect of settlements on the liability of the nonsettlors, courts have
used state model tort law principles. See supra text accompanying note 80.13 6 CERCLA § 107,42 U.S.C. § 9607 (2000). See also Adhesives Research, Inc. v. Am. Inks
& Coatings Corp., 931 F. Supp. 1231, 1237 (M.D. Pa. 1996) ("[A1lthough not expressly
stated within the text of the statute, courts to rule on the issue have nearly unanimously
determined that liability under § 107 is joint and several unless the defendant can demon-
strate that the harm is divisible.").
137 For a detailed example of orphan share allocation under sections 107 and 113, see
STEVEN FERREY, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: EXAMPLES AND EXPLANATIONS 409-18 (4th ed.
2007).
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United States v. Kramer.3 The court in Kramer recognized the dual sword
and shield of private section 107 claims by allowing a private-party PRP
to bring a cost recovery action invoking section 107 joint and several lia-
bility.'39 The court held that only the three statutorily provided CERCLA
defenses are available to defendants in a section 107 action, 40 thereby
eliminating the infusion of equitable principles, and accepting the defense
of divisibility.' Finally, the court recognized that contribution claims are
only brought appropriately under section 113.142
The Kramer court clearly stated that a private party, whether or
not it is liable for contamination, may voluntarily clean up a site and
elect to seek its response cost reimbursement under section 107 or equi-
table contribution under section 113.43 However, settling parties receive
138 757 F. Supp. 397. The matter came before the court on plaintiffs motion to strike two
hundred of the almost three hundred affirmative defenses set forth in the answers of
some of the defendants. Id. at 404. The claims of the government were brought pursuant
to section 107(a) of CERCLA. Id. The motion to strike affirmative defenses related to
those defenses which may be asserted pursuant to a section 107(a) claim. Id. Also at issue
was a potential counterclaim against the government plaintifffor its contribution of wastes
subject to the site. Id. at 405. The issue arose as to whether equitable claims could be raised
in the context of section 107(a) litigation. Id. at 413. Several municipalities also disposed
of municipal solid waste at the facility. Kramer, 757 F. Supp. at 407. The government sued
twenty nine PRPs. Id. at 406. Some of these defendants then filed a third party complaint
naming more than two hundred fifty additional defendants, including seventeen municipal
governments. Id. The third party complaint sought contribution pursuant to section
113(f). Id.
139 Id. at 413.
140 Id. at 418-19 (referring to the three defenses listed at 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)). In this
matter, the plaintiffgovernment agencywas also potentially liable. Kramer, 757 F. Supp.
at 397-98. While the government as a prosecutor has discretion not to name itself as a
defendant in section 107 litigation, it remains potentially liable in a concurrent or subse-
quent section 113 contribution claim. See CERCLA § 113(f)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1) (2000).
The liability of the defendants in a section 107(a) action is joint and several, while the
liability of third party defendants is several only. See id. § 9607(a); see also H.R. REP. No.
99-253, pt.1, at 79-80 (1985), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2835, 2861-62.
141 Kramer, 757 F. Supp. at 405.
142 Id. at 417.
"
4 Id. at 416. Arguably, a private party that incurred costs and subsequently commenced
a section 107(a) action could have incurred those costs voluntarily in a manner consistent
with the NCP, or it could have incurred those costs as a function of a prior settlement
with a government agency. As part of this latter arrangement, the settling party would
receive contribution protection from the government under section 113(f) covering claims
from other private and governmental entities. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f) (2000). This potentially
positions the settling party to utilize section 107(a) as a"sword." The court concluded that
it will not allocate cleanup costs among defendants in a section 107 action, except on proof
of divisibility of these costs. Kramer, 757 F. Supp. at 405. Allocation on other principles
will get accomplished in a section 113 action. Id. at 416.
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statutory contribution protection against liability in subsequent section
113 actions.'"
There are critical distinctions between these two litigation routes
regarding the allocation and shifting of total response costs. If the plain-
tiff chooses to use a section 113 claim as a "sword," the settlor can theo-
retically recover severally from nonsettlers for their equitable shares of
the incurred remediation costs. However, the plaintiffs burden to demon-
strate several liability of each and every individual and potential defendant
is formidable and diminishes the probability of a full recovery. 145
Comparatively, under section 107, the settlor can settle for any
amount-more or less than the settlor's proportionate share-and then
initiate litigation against some nonsettling PRPs to shift the settlor's costs
under joint and several liability principles." An appropriate government-
approved settlement could become a section 107 incentive for settlors. An
additional advantage of a section 107 action is that it operates pursuant
to a six-year statute of limitations, while a section 113 action carries only
a three-year statute of limitations.
41
II. THE CHAOS IN ALTERED WASTE LIABILITY LAW
A. The Federal Circuit Courts Construct a Liability Wall
From 1994 to 2004, there were unanimous decisions from every
one of the eleven federal circuits which had considered the section 107
Superfund issue. 48 Often overruling lower courts, one after the other fed-
eral circuits cascaded down the same chute, negating all rights of private
developers to utilize section 107 of Superfund to recover their remediation
response costs.'
49
' CERCLA § 113(f), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f) (2000).
145 Because liability is several only in a section 113 action, plaintiff must shoulder the
burden of proving the liability of every PRP defendant and defend successfully against all
defenses raised by each defendant. Discovery must be conducted against each defendant.
For each defendant who is not brought into the litigation or is not successfully prosecuted,
a piece of the amount necessary for the plaintiffs full recovery is lost. The parts may not
equal the whole under section 113. See 42 U.S.C. § 9613 (2000).
1' Compared to a section 113 action, only a few defendants need be named, and only one
need be successfully prosecuted to shift liability jointly and severally. Id.
147 42 U.S.C. § 9613(g)(2)-(3). See also United Techs. Corp. v. Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc.,
33 F.3d 97, 98 (1st Cir. 1994).
148 See infra Part II.
"
49 See infra notes 156-166 and accompanying text.
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1. No Private Access to Section 107 According to Circuit
Precedent
Since first suggested in the Kramer opinion, the section 107 route
has been the preferred path of private party plaintiffs for cost realloca-
tion.150 Prior to 1994, none of the circuit courts had directly addressed the
issue of whether a PRP had standing under section 107 to recover clean-
up costs, and the Supreme Court had only touched upon the question as a
background issue.'5 ' District courts split on whether a PRP could choose
between a section 107 and a section 113 claim.5 2
A decade of cascading federal circuit opinions began in 1994. Over
the course of four years, ten circuits confronted the question of whether
or not section 107 of CERCLA could be utilized by PRPs to reallocate their
cost of voluntary cleanup at a hazardous waste site, as set forth in the
prior section. 5 3 Each of the circuits,' many reversing their district
courts, blocked the path dictated by section 107's unambiguous language.
The Eighth Circuit followed suit in 2003, and that decision became the
eventual vehicle for the 2007 Supreme Court decision.'55
In a compressed period of four years, ten of the twelve circuits de-
cided or opined on the availability of section 107 cost recovery in the fol-
lowing sequence: the Seventh 56 (July 1994), the First 57 (Aug. 1994), the
0 Section 107 has a longer statute of limitations, does not require suing all parties, and
imposes joint and several liability. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
"
51 See Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 511 U.S. 809,816 (1994). The Court did not de-
cide whether only "innocent" parties had standing under section 107 cost-recovery claims;
rather, the Court merely held that section 107 did not provide for the award of attorney's
fees. Id. at 819.
152 For examples of district courts that allowed a PRP to raise a section 107 claim, see,
e.g., Companies for a Fair Allocation v. Axil Corp., 853 F. Supp. 575, 579 (D. Conn. 1994);
United States v. SCA Servs. of Indiana, Inc., 849 F. Supp. 1264, 1272 (N.D. Ind. 1994);
Transp. Leasing Co. v. California, 861 F. Supp. 931,937-38 (C.D. Cal. 1993). For district
courts that have held that a PRP may not use section 107 to recover response costs, see
SC Holdings, Inc. v. A.A.A. Realty Co., 935 F. Supp. 1354, 1362-65 (D.N.J. 1996); Kaufinan
& Broad-South Bay v. Unisys Corp., 868 F. Supp. 1212, 1215 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
.
53 See infra notes 156-166, and accompanying text.
154 Id.
"' Atl. Research Corp. v. United States, 459 F.3d 827 (8th Cir. 2006) aff'd sub noma.
United States v. Atl. Research Corp., 127 S.Ct. 2331 (2007).
156 See Akzo Coatings, Inc. v. Aigner Corp., 30 F.3d 761, 770 (7th Cir. 1994). The court
unilaterally converted the section 107 claim against plaintiffs pleadings and upheld the
district court's holding that Akzo was actually seeking contribution under section 113(f)(1),
not cost recovery under section 107(a), regardless of Akzo's claim. Id. at 764.
157 See United Techs. Corp. v. Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc., 33 F.3d 96, 103 (1st Cir. 1994).
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Tenth 5 (Mar. 1995), the Eleventh 15 9 (Sept. 1996), the Third'r6 (May 1997),
the Ninth16 1 (July 1997), the Fifth 162 (Aug. 1997), the Fourth' (Apr. 1998),
the Sixth' (Aug. 1998), and the Second (Sept. 1998). The Eighth Circuit
followed in 2003.16' All closed off section 107 to private party plaintiffs.'
The D.C. Circuit Court is the only circuit court not among the group. It did
not get a case to decide.
Despite similar fact patterns, each circuit court took its own ap-
proach to disposing of the arguments put forward in favor of plaintiff PRP
standing under section 107. Some courts attempted to interpret the lan-
guage in sections 107 and 113 by looking at legislative and legal history
and engaging in a textual analysis of the provisions. Other circuit courts
simply ignored the express operative "any other person" language in sec-
tion 107(a)(4)(B), and instead construed only section 113 as a backhanded
way to limit section 107. Some circuit courts held only that their often
strained reading of CERCLA did not frustrate the goals of the statute.
Several circuits wrestled with the nature of section 113 contribu-
tion. In an attempt to decipher the parameters of the claims under sec-
tions 107 and 113, six of the eleven circuit courts discuss SARA and how
the 1986 amendment codified the common law right to contribution. 8
'5 See United States v. Colorado & E. R.R., 50 F.3d 1530, 1539 (10th Cir. 1995).
See Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Saraland Apartments, 94 F.3d 1489, 1508, 1514 (11th
Cir. 1996).
.
6o See New Castle County v. Halliburton NUS Corp., 111 F.3d 1116, 1119, 1126 (3d. Cir.
1997).161 See Pinal Creek Group v. Newmont Mining Corp., 118 F.3d 1298 (9th Cir. 1997), rev'g
926 F.Supp. 1400 (D. Ariz. 1996). The thinking of the Arizona district court was adopted
in the decision of a Pennsylvania district court in Adhesives Research, Inc. v. Am. Inks
& Coatings Corp., decided prior to Pinal Creek being overturned by the Ninth Circuit. See
931 F. Supp 1231, 1243 (M.D. Pa 1996).
'
62 See OHM Remediation Servs. v. Evans Cooperage Co., 116 F.3d 1574, 1583 (5th Cir.
1997).
63 See Pneumo Abex Corp. v. High Point, Thomasville & Denton R.R. Co., 142 F.3d 769,
776 (4th Cir. 1998).
1
" See Centerior Serv. Co. v. Acme Scrap Iron & Metal Corp., 153 F.3d 344, 345, 355-56
(6th Cir. 1998) (affirming the district court's holding that PRPs are precluded from seeking
joint and several cost recovery under section 107(a); Adhesives, 931 F. Supp. at 1243-44.
'
6 See Bedford Affiliates v. Sills, 156 F.3d 416, 432 (2d. Cir. 1998).
16 See Dico, Inc. v. Amoco Oil Co., 340 F.3d 525, 532 (8th Cir. 2003).
167 See sources cited supra notes 156-166.
1 See California v. Neville Chem. Co., 358 F.3d 661,668 (9th Cir. 2004); Bedford Affiliates
v. Sills, 156 F.3d 416, 423 (2nd Cir. 1998); Centerior Serv. Co. v. Acme Scrap Iron & Metal
Corp., 153 F.3d 344, 348 (6th Cir. 1998); New Castle County v. Halliburton NUS Corp.,
111 F.3d 1116, 1119 (3d Cir. 1997); United States v. Colorado & E. R.R., 50 F.3d 1530,
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The Second, Third and Tenth Circuits most exhaustively develop the argu-
ments for why an analysis of SARA, which did not alter the pre-existing
section 107, by silent implication precludes a PRP from using section 107.169
In distinguishing "cost recovery actions" under section 107's contrary lan-
guage from "contribution actions" under section 113, five of the eleven cir-
cuit courts determined that an action between PRPs for apportionment of
cleanup costs is always an action for contribution, notwithstanding section
107's contrary language. 17' The Sixth, the Seventh, and the Tenth Circuits
referred to either Black's Law Dictionary, the Restatement (Second) of
Torts (§ 886A), or American Jurisprudence in defining the term 'contri-
bution' in legal context.
171
The First Circuit countered the clear inclusiveness of the express
"any other person" language of section 107 by stating that "courts must
strive to give effect to each subsection in a statute," such as section 113,
"indeed, to give effect to each word and phrase.. .17' To give effect and
force to section 113, many of these circuit courts then ignored the lan-
guage of section 107, straining to avoid confronting or construing the
plain language of section 107's empowerment of "any other person." The
1535 (10th Cir. 1995); United Techs. Corp. v. Browning-Ferris Indus., 33 F.3d 96, 97 (1st
Cir. 1994). See also SARA, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986).
169 The three courts reasoned that SARA, as well as the pre-SARA case law recognizing
an implicit right of contribution, established the principle that PRPs should not be exposed
to joint and several liability in actions by other PRPs seeking to recover cleanup costs.
See BedfordAffiliates, 156 F.3d at 423-24; New Castle County, 111 F.3d at 1121; Colorado
& Eastern R.R., 50 F.3d at 1535. Legislative history indicates that a principal goal in
creating section 113 was to clarify and confirm "the right of a person held jointly and
severally liable under CERCLA to seek contribution from other potentially liable parties,
when the person believes that it has assumed a share of the cleanup or cost that may be
greater than its equitable share under the circumstances." S. REP. No. 99-11, at 44 (1985).
170 See Centerior, 153 F.3d at 344; New Castle County, 111 F.3d at 1116; Colorado & E. R.R.,
50 F.3d at 1531; Akzo Coatings, Inc. v. Aigner Corp., 30 F.3d 761 (7th Cir. 1994); United
Techs. Corp. 33 F.3d at 96.
" See Centerior, 153 F.3d at 350-351 (defining contribution as the "right of one who has
discharged a common liability to recover of another also liable, the aliquot portion which
he ought to pay or bear." BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 328 (6th ed. 1990)) (also referring to
18 AM. JUR. 2D Contribution § 9); Colorado & E. R.R., 50 F.3d at 1536 (referring to
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 886A(1979);Akzo Coatings, 30 F.3d at 764 (referring
to RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 886A (1979)).
12 United Techs. Corp., 33 F.3d at 101. Abroad reading of the statute is unacceptable be-
cause allowing PRPs to have standing under section 107 would eviscerate section 113(g)(3),
and PRPs would readily abandon a section 113 claim for a section 107 claim due to the
significant procedural advantages. Consequently, section 113(g)(3) would become a nullity
and section 113 would eventually be swallowed by section 107. Id.
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Ninth Circuit and the Sixth Circuit ignored the "any other person" lan-
guage in section 107 as moot because they surmised that sections 107 and
113 work in conjunction in contribution claims. 1'3 Thus, a contribution
claim brought pursuant to section 107 and its "any other person" language
is transformed into, and limited by, the mechanisms of section 113, thereby
allowing only several liability. The First and the Sixth Circuits left open
the question of which statute of limitations provision applies if a PRP
initiates a clean-up with government prodding.'74
2. Overcoming Their Own District Courts' Dissent
It is particularly noteworthy that many of the federal circuits had
to overrule their trial courts to arrive at these opinions. A series of more
than a dozen primarily trial court decisions found no legislative barrier to
a section 107 action by private plaintiff parties. 175 Beginning with Sand
73 See Pinal Creekv. Newmont Mining Corp., 118 F.3d 1298, 1301-03 (9th Cir. 1997). The
court also points toward legislative history, stating that section 113 "clarifies and
confirms existing law" to support the contention that the two provisions work together.
See also Centerior, 153 F.3d at 349-50. The Sixth Circuit adds that "one must necessarily
look to § 107 in contribution actions involving § 113(f... [because] § 107 [provides] the
basis and the elements of a claim for recovery of response costs and lists the parties who
are liable." Id. at 350. A contribution claim under section 113 is therefore an effort to
recoup the necessary costs of response by the person referred to in section 107. See id.
174 See United Techs. Corp., 33 F.3d at 99-100 n.8; Centerior, 153 F.3d at 354.
..
5 See Barmet Aluminum Corp. v. Doug Brantley & Sons, Inc., 914 F. Supp. 159, 161-62
(W.D. Ky. 1995); United States v. Atlas Minerals & Chems., No. 91-5118, 1995 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 13097, at *227-28 (E.D. Pa. 1995); Town of Walkill v. Tesa Tape, Inc., 891 F. Supp.
955,959-60 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); Bethlehem Iron Works, Inc. v. Lewis Indus., 891 F. Supp. 221,
223 (E.D. Pa. 1995); United States v. SCA Servs. of Ind., 865 F. Supp. 533, 546-47 (N.D.
Ind. 1994); Companies for Fair Allocation v. Axil Corp., 853 F. Supp. 575,579-80 (D. Conn.
1994); Barton Solvents, Inc. v. Southwest Petro-chem, Inc. No. 91-2382-GTV, 1993 WL
382047, at *3 (D. Kan., Sept. 30, 1993); Charter Twp. ofOshtemo v. American Cyanamid
Co., No. 1:92:CV:843, 1993 WL 561814, at *2 (W.D. Mich. Aug. 19, 1993); Amcast Indus.
Corp. v. Detrex Corp., 2 F.3d 746, 748 (7th Cir. 1993); Transp. Leasing Co. v. California,
861 F. Supp. 931, 938 (C.D. Cal. 1993); Chesapeake and Potomac Tel. Co. v. Peck Iron
Metal Co., 814 F. Supp. 1269, 1277 (E.D. Va. 1992); United States v. Kramer, 757 F. Supp.
397,412 (D.N.J. 1991) (finding no distinction between government or"any other person"
employing section 107 for cost recovery); Gen. Elec. Co. v. Litton Indus. Automation Sys.,
920 F.2d 1415, 1417 (8th Cir. 1990) (overruled on other grounds by Key Tronic Corp. v.
United States, 984 F.2d 1025, 1027-28 (9th Cir. 1993)); United States v. Hardage, 750 F.
Supp. 1460, 1495 (W.D. Okla. 1990); Kelley v. Thomas Solvent Co., 790 F. Supp. 710, 717
(W.D. Mich. 1990); Allied Corp. v. Acme Solvents Reclaiming, Inc. 691 F. Supp. 1100,
1119 (N.D. Ill. 1988); Sand Springs Home v. Interplastic Corp., 670 F. Supp. 913,915-16
(N.D. Okla. 1987).
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Springs in 1987,176 these decisions were elevated to eloquent expression
by the Kramer opinion in 1991,177 and proliferated through the mid-1990s.
In the mid-1990s, the circuit courts began their scramble to reverse and
effectively block the section 107 route, resulting in a majority of the cir-
cuits so holding by 1998.178 While it is, of course, the proper function of the
circuits to interpret issues of law, the wholesale cascade of the circuits
contradicting many of their trial courts was notable.
Unlike the eleven circuit courts, many of the district courts were
not so persuaded. District courts allowing use of section 107 generally base
their conclusions on a plain meaning review of CERCLA. One of these
contrary trial court opinions eventually reached the Supreme Court in
2007.'79 In Adhesives Research v. American Inks & Coatings, the district
court began its inquiry by dissecting the plain language of the statute,
which invests standing under section 107 to "any other person" who incurs
response costs.' ° The court found each of these terms to be unambigu-
ous.8 The court stated that if a statutory term was clear in meaning,
then a court should not alter that term solely because allowing the term
makes the statute broader in scope.8 2 Noting that the term "any," although
broad in scope, is clear and unambiguous, the court determined that ap-
plying the plain meaning standard of review ends judicial review of the
statute.8 3 The Adhesives Research court held that the "any other person"
language of§ 107(a)(4)(B) confers standing on persons who incur response
costs, regardless of their own potential liability.'84 Following this logic to
completion, the court held that a plaintiff PRP has standing to bring a
cost recovery action under CERCLA §107.185
Had the Eighth Circuit not overruled its trial court, allowing
this lone dissent to reach the Supreme Court earlier, the national crisis
could have been averted. The district court in Laidlaw Waste Systems v.
Mallinckrodt spurned its own circuit precedent and likewise found that
176 670 F. Supp. at 915-16.
177 757 F. Supp. at 416-17 (holding that any temporary windfall to the private plaintiff
employing section 107 for cost recovery was justified by the incentives for voluntary private
clean-up to foster the purpose of the statute).
178 See infra Part IV.A.
179 United States v. Atl. Research Corp., 127 S.Ct. 2331 (2007).
'" 931 F. Supp. 1231, 1238-39 (M.D. Pa. 1996).
181 Id. at 1239.
182 Id.
'
83Id. at 1238.
184 Id.
" Id. at 1246.
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the plain language of sections 107 and 113 does not deny plaintiff PRPs
bringing claims pursuant to section 107.56
The district court in Pinal Creek Group v. Newmont Min. Corp.
explained that section 107 confers standing upon any party that has in-
curred response costs, as the plain meaning of the statute does not provide
a modifier that should be applied to "any other person."8 7 The court stated
that the only limitation the statute provides is that the plaintiff must have
incurred response costs.' 8 This limitation is not based on the "innocent"
status of an individual, PRP or non-PRP, but limits the action based on
the form of injury incurred and redress sought.8 9
In Pinal Creek, the court was concerned about the inability to con-
trol the "orphan shares" under section 107.'° In Redwing Carriers, Inc., v.
Saraland Apartments, the court converted a claim by a PRP under sec-
tion 107 into an action under section 113, stating that "when one liable
party sues another liable party under CERCLA, the action is not a cost
recovery action under section 107(a). Rather, it is a claim for contribution
under section 113(f)." 191
Courts fear the reallocative power of section 107 joint and several
liability. Thus the courts in Centerior, Pinal Creek and Redwing all col-
lapsed the distinctions between sections 107 and 113, leaving available
186 925 F. Supp. 624, 630 (E.D. Mo. 1996).
117 926 F. Supp. 1400, 1405-06 (D. Ariz. 1996), rev'd, 118 F.3d 1298 (9th Cir. 1997). This
district court decision was overturned by the Ninth Circuit, but its holding was retained
by Adhesives Research, which adopted the Pinal Creek court's discussion of CERCLA
policy in its entirety. Adhesives Research, 931 F. Supp. 1231, 1243-44 (M.D. Pa 1996).
" Pinal Creek, 926 F. Supp. at 1406.
"'9 Id. at 1405-06.
19o See Pinal Creek Group v. Newmont Mining Corp., 118 F.3d 1298, 1303 (9th Cir. 1997).
Specifically, the court stated, "we hold that, under CERCLA, a PRP does not have a claim
for the recovery of the totality of its clean-up costs against other PRPs, and a PRP cannot
assert a claim against other PRPs for joint and several liability." Id. at 1306.
Likewise, the Pinal Group seeks to avoid the effect of § 113. By trying
to obtain the totality of its costs immediately (subject to contribution
counterclaims), it seeks to avoid the delay (and burden-of-proof rules)
implicit in § 113(f)'s mechanism for the equitable allocation of costs
among PRPs... without establishing any special per se rules.
Id. at 1304.
191 94 F.3d 1489, 1513 (11th Cir. 1996).
While the 'divisibility' defense tojoint and several liability is frequently
invoked in cost recovery actions brought under a § 107(a) action, a
contribution claim under § 113(f) is a means of equitably allocating
response costs among responsible or potentially responsible parties.
Id. (citing S. REP. No. 99-11, at 44 (1985)).
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only the latter, without any statutory basis for this reduction.'92 "Plain
language" interpretation would not merge the distinctions between section
107 response costs and section 113 contribution. The courts' belief that
the two paths should merge, which in fact they do not, does not justify
arbitrary elimination of one statutory avenue.
3. The Circuit Courts' Retention of Equitable Factors In the
Judicial Toolbox
Many of the circuits (with the exception of the First, Fifth and
Twelfth circuits) have held that there are no equitable defenses available
to a section 107 claim. In Velsicol Chemical Corp. v. Enenco, Inc., the Sixth
Circuit court disagreed with the district court's allowance of the doctrine
of laches as a defense under section 107 because the only statutorily avail-
able defenses under section 107 are those enumerated thereunder.1 93 In
192 See supra notes 187-191 and accompanying text.
193 9 F.3d, 524, 530 (9th Cir. 1993). Accord Town of Munster v. Sherwin-Williams Co. 27
F.3d 1268 (7th Cir. 1994). The court specifically stated:
While it may be logical to permit equitable defenses in an inherently
equitable proceeding, and sections 106 and 113 both permit equitable
considerations, the clear answer for section 107 is that Congress expli-
citly limited the defenses available to only those three provided in
section 107(b). It is within the powers of Congress to so limit the district
court's discretion, and Congress did so in section 107.
Id. (quoting United States v. Kramer, 757 F. Supp. 397,427 (D.N.J. 1991). The appellee,
Sherwin-Williams, argued that it should be able to raise the equitable doctrine of laches
as an affirmative defense. Id. at 1270. The court based its reasoning on section 107(a),
which states in relevant part:
Notwithstanding any other provision or rule of law, and subject only to
the defenses set forth in subsection (b)... Section 107(b) further states:
There shall be no liability under subsection (a) of this section for a
person otherwise liable who can establish by a preponderance of the
evidence that the release or threat of release of a hazardous substance
and the damages resulting therefrom were caused solely by (1) an act
of God; (2) an act of war; (3); an act or omission of a third party other
than an employer or agent of the defendant; or (4) any combination of
the foregoing paragraphs. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b). Under § 113(f), any party
found liable for clean-up costs may seek contribution from other liable or
potentially liable parties and in resolving contribution claims, the court
may allocate response costs among liable parties using such equitable
factors as the court determines are appropriate....
Id. The court used the specific language of CERCLA to hold that"CERCLA does not permit
equitable defenses to § 107 liability, although [they] do conclude that equitable factors
may be considered in the allocation of contribution shares." Id. The court went on further
to explain that:
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General Electric Co. v. Litton Industrial Automation Systems, Inc., the
appellants argued unsuccessfully that the court should allow a section 107
"unclean hands" defense.' The court in California ex rel California Dep't
of Toxic Substances v. Neville Chemical Company held that "the three
statutory defenses [to CERCLA liability expressly listed in § 107(b)] are
the only [defenses] available, and.., traditional equitable defenses are
not."
1 95
Here the clear and unambiguous language of§ 107(a) imposes liability
notwithstanding any other provision or rule of law, and subject only to
the defenses set forth in subsection (b).... Sections 107(a) and (b), read
together, plainly evince the exercise of Congress' authority to restrict
the equitable powers of the federal courts.
Id. at 1271.
194 920 F.2d 1415,1418(8th Cir. 1990). The court held that"unclean hands" is not a defense
to a private party's action to recover CERCLA response costs under § 107, stating:
CERCLA is a strict liability statute, with only a limited number of
statutorily-defined defenses available [under § 107(b)] .... CERCLA
does not provide for an "unclean hands" defense; the liability imposed
by [§ 107(a)] is subject only to the defenses [in § 107(b)].... The purpose
of allowing a private party to recover its response costs is to encourage
timely cleanup of hazardous waste sites. This purpose would be frus-
trated if a plaintiffs motives were subject to question.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
195 358 F.3d 661, 672 (9th Cir. 2004). The court stated that "[elvery court of appeals that
has considered the precise question whether § 9607 permits equitable defenses has con-
cluded that it does not, as the statutory defenses are exclusive." Id.
The argument was that Neville cannot be liable under CERCLA for the
costs of overseeing the clean-up incurred by the Department because
the Department had promised that it would not sue Neville for full
recovery costs if Neville conducted the research, planning, and clean-up
of the site. The district court ruled that Neville could not assert equitable
defenses to a CERCLA recovery action.
Id. at 671. The Ninth Circuit stated:
Suits for contribution, however, are entirely distinct under the statute
from suits for recovery of costs. The former is governed by [§ 113(f)(1)]....
The provisions of CERCLA governing suits for recovery of costs, [§§ 107(a)
and 113(g)(2)], make no such reference to equitable factors. Also, "the
critical distinction between [suits for contributions and suits for cost
recovery] is that under § 107, the court merely determines whether the
party is jointly and severally liable, without regard to the amount of
fault; but under § 113, the court also divides the fault of the parties,
using equitable factors. California is not bringing suit here for contri-
bution, so the specific language allowing the court to consider equitable
factors when apportioning contribution is inapplicable.
Id. at 672-673. See also Gen. Elec. V. Litton Indus. Automation Sys., 920 F.2d 1415, 1418
(8th Cir. 1990) (holding that CERCLA does not provide an "unclean hands" defense)
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To have equitable discretion at their disposal, courts have gravi-
tated to section 113 claims while refusing to sanction section 107 claims.
Some circuits have found that although PRPs must bring suit for recovery
for contribution under section 113, it is possible that PRPs can recover
100% of their costs if the court determines that they are not responsible for
contamination of the site. Courts require the parties as PRPs to bring a
claim for contribution under section 113, but due to equitable consider-
ations of section 113, allow for 100% cost recovery. 196 This result mirrors
(questioned on other grounds in Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 511 U.S. 809 (1994));
Blasland, Bouck & Lee, Inc. v. City of N. Miami, 283 F.3d 1286, 1304 (11th Cir. 2002)
(holding that CERCLA bars equitable defenses); Velsicol, 9 F.3d at 530 (also holding that
CERCLA bars equitable defenses) "In resolving contribution claims, the court may
allocate response costs among liable parties using such factors as the court determines
are appropriate .... "Munster, 27 F.3d at 1270 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 9613(g)).
" See Dent v. Beazer Materials and Services, 156 F3d 523 (4th Cir. 1998); PMC, Inc. v.
Sherwin-Williams Co., 151 F.3d 610 (7th Cir.1998); Morrison Enterprises v. McShares, Inc.,
1302 F.3d 1127 (10th Cir. 2002); W. Properties v. Shell Oil Co. (9th Cir. 2004). But see
Bedford Affiliates v. Sills, 156 F.3d 416,424 (2d Cir. 1998) (expressly holding that a PRP
"can never recover 100 percent of the response costs from others similarly situated since
it is ajoint tortfeasor-and not an innocent party-that ultimately must bear its pro rata
share of cleanup costs under § 107(a)."). In Dent v. Beazer Materials and Services v.
Braswell Shipyards, Inc., the owner of a creosote processing facility appealed a district
court finding that it was 100% liable under section 113, and the other PRPs, prior owners
of land adjacent to the facility who admitted to using fertilizer which contained lead on
the property, were found to have zero liability. 156 F. 3d. 523,530-31 (4th Cir. 1998). The
court held that the district court:
correctly ruled as a matter of law on the undisputed facts before it that
no harm caused by wood-treating constituents could fairly be attributed
to Conoco and Agrico....
Neither did the district court err in finding that the fertilizer
constituents, for whose disposal Conoco and Agrico were potentially
liable persons, had caused no harm requiring remediation.
Id. This decision showed that it is possible for a court to hold one or more PRPs 100% liable
for clean-up costs, and that another PRP is liable for none of the clean-up costs under
section 113 when the contamination by the PRP held not responsible for any costs was
so minimal that their contamination did not require any clean-up in and of itself. Id.
In PMC, Inc., the appellant, Sherwin-Williams, unsuccessfully argued that the
district court judge abused his equitable discretion in holding it 100% liable for all clean-
up costs under section 113, and finding that PMC was not liable for any of the costs. 151
F.3d at 616. The court held that"PMC's spills mayhave been too inconsequential to affect
the cost of cleaning up significantly, and in that event a zero allocation to PMC would be
appropriate." Id.
In Morrison Enterprises, the court agreed with Pinal Creek, stating that "[i] f the
plaintiffs are truly innocent PRP's, then there should be little difficulty in making the
additional required showing that the defendant PRPs should bear the entire cost under
the equitable factors." 1302 F.3d at 1135.
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what some courts fear would result if section 107 were enforced and the
entire PRP liability were shifted to the defendants.
Courts can also mitigate against inequitable results or windfalls
by allowing limited section 113 counterclaims when applying section 107
to the primary cause of action. The First Circuit, in United Technologies
Corporation v. Browning-Ferris Industries, made mention in dicta of the
possibility of allowing a PRP that does the clean-up without prodding by
the government to recover under section 107.' The court did not decide
that issue in this case because the parties began clean-up after govern-
mental prodding.'98 The 2007 Supreme Court decision inAtlantic Research
finds that this flexibility is indeed available.'99
B. Judicial Cascades and Superfund Chaos
While many federal district courts initially followed Kramer to
allow private use of section 107, eleven federal circuits, in a cascade-one
after the other, closed the section 107 path. According to many of the fed-
eral circuit courts, the evolved rule of thumb under CERCLA was that
PRPs may bring only a claim for contribution under section 113, and cannot
recover under section 107 unless they are asserting one of section 107(b)'s
defenses.2"0 There is no statutory directive and no supportive legislative
In Western Properties, while the court did not allow Western Properties to assert
the 7th Circuit "innocent landowner" exception, or recover response costs under section 107,
the court did hold that all PRPs, regardless of reason, must recover under section 113,
and that if the court finds the PRP to be a non-polluter or innocent of contamination, the
court may find the other PRPs 100% liable. 358 F.3d. at 690-91. The court stated:
Because, in an appropriate case, the court might properly exercise its
discretion under § 113(f)(1) to allocate a smaller portion or even no
portion of the cleanup cost to a non-polluting PRP landowner, there is
no reason to read such authority into § 107(a) against the limitations
of the words of § 107(b)....
On the other hand, if non-polluting PRP landowners could
recover through § 107(a) in addition to, or notwithstanding § 113, they
could evade the § 113(f)(1) requirement that factors for allocation be
'equitable,' and potentially could obtain double recoveries.
Id.
197 33 F.3d 96, 99-100 n.8 (1st Cir. 1994).
198 Id.
1 See generally 127 S. Ct. 2331 (2007).
200 42. U.S.C. §9607(b) (2000).
Defenses. There shall be no liability under subsection (a) of this section
for a person otherwise liable who can establish by a preponderance of the
evidence that the release or threat of release of a hazardous substance
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history to this effect. To reach this conclusion, the circuits ignore plain
statutory language, their own decisions in analogous CERCLA cases, and
several canons of statutory construction.
This strange set of decisions at the circuit level emanated from
practical consideration. The circuit courts, in requiring PRPs to recover
only under section 113, can inject subjective equitable factors when appor-
tioning liability between the parties. With the Supreme Court's decision
in Aviall, these circuit decisions have created chaos; they close the section
107 path, while Aviall closes the section 113 road.
There is a demonstrated lack of clarity in the section 107 discus-
sions of eleven circuits. They acknowledge the express universal statutory
entitlement of "any person" to employ section 107, then back-handedly
bar its plain implementation because it might interfere with their equi-
table discretion.201 While many courts found that section 107 allows "any
person" to recover all response costs from any responsible party whose
liability is joint and several,2 °2 many of the same courts also found that
only section 113 must be used by parties who are themselves PRPs, unless
they can assert one of the specific defenses described in section 107(b) of
CERCLA. 20 3
and the damages resulting there from were caused solely by (1) an act of
God; (2) an act of war; (3) an act or omission of a third party other than
an employee or agent of the defendant, or one whose act or omission
occurs in connection with a contractual relationship existing directly or
indirectly, with the defendant ....
201 See supra Part II.A.
202 See OHIM Remediation Servs. v. Evans Cooperage Co., 116 F.3d 1574, 1578 (5th Cir.
1999); Rumpke of Ind., Inc. v. Cummins Engine Co., 107 F.3d 1235, 1240 (7th Cir. 1997);
United States v. Colorado & E. R.R. Co., 50 F.3d 1530,1535 (10th Cir. 1995); United Techs.,
33 F.3d at 100. In Morrison Enterprises, the court employed specific language from section
107(a) of CERCLA, stating that "[plarties that have expended funds to respond to haz-
ardous waste releases, whether they are federal, state, or private, may in turn recoup their
costs from parties that might be liable under the statute, commonly known as 'potentially
responsible parties' or PRPs." 302 F.3d 1127, 1132 (10th Cir. 2002). In Carson Harbor
Village, Ltd. v. Unocal Corp., the court stated:
CERCLA 'generally imposes strict liability on owners and operators of
facilities at which hazardous substances were disposed.' 3550 Stevens
Creek Assocs. v. Barclays Bank, 915 F.2d 1355, 1357 (9th Cir. 1990). To
achieve that end, CERCLA'authorizes private parties to institute civil
actions to recover the costs involved in the clean-up of hazardous wastes
from those responsible for their creation.'
270 F.3d 863, 870 (9th Cir. 2001).
2o See New Castle Co. v. Halliburton NUS Corp., 111 F.3d 1116, 1120 n. 2 (3d Cir. 1997);
Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Saraland Apartments, 94 F.3d 1489, 1496 (11th Cir. 1996);
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The adoption of this precedent is also evidence of the tendency
of circuits to follow other circuits without reanalyzing the issue anew.
Professor Cass Sunstein and others in the context of appellate decisions,
have discussed the availability cascade, a chain reaction of plausible inter-
pretation that may rest on an initial misperception that is followed there-
after by other courts.2°4 This results in a self-reinforcing process where
publicly available preceptors of key decision makers spawn a cascading
chain reaction of perception in which followers adopt similar views and
judicial outcomes. Kuran and Sunstein observe that judges are subject to
reputational incentives and availability cascades.2"5 Sometimes a single
decision of one court shapes the entire constellation of perception about a
legal issue. Dissonant positions are punished and their holders are ostra-
cized or risk "reputational sanctions" in judicial circles, according to Kuran
and Sunstein. °6
To a certain degree, an availability cascade is one explanation of
what may have occurred with regard to unanimous circuit court interpre-
tation of CERCLA section 107.2°7 The subsequent decisions lean heavily
Colorado R.R., 50 F.3d at 1536; United Techs., 33 F.3d at 99; see also Morrison Enterprises,
302 F.3d at 1133 ("Under § 9613(f)(1), '[any person may seek contribution from any other
person who is liable or potentially liable under Section 9607(a).'"; Akzo Coatings, Inc. v.
Aigner Corp., 30 F.3d 761, 764 (7th Cir. 1994) ("[A claim by a potentially responsible
person] is a quintessential claim for contribution."); Bedford Affiliates v. Sills, 156 F.3d 416,
(2d Cir. 1998) ("A] potentially responsible person under § 107(a) that is not entitled to
any of the defenses enumerated under § 107(b)-like Bedford-cannot maintain a § 107(a)
action against another potentially responsible person.").
204 See, e.g., Timork K Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk
Regulation, 51 STANFORD L.R. 683 (1999); Heather K Gerken, Dissenting By Deciding,
57 STANFORD L.R. 1745 (2005).
2 5 Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 204, at 765 n.291, (citing Thomas J. Miceli & Metin M.
Cosgel, Reputation and Judicial Decision-Making, 23 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 31 (1994)).2 Id. at 766 n.300.
207 See Gerken, supra note 204, at 1771-72.
Cascades, ofcourse, occur precisely in such circumstances-when there
appears to be an emerging consensus among the first movers ....
Designing appellate panels to produce a more moderate set of decisions
creates the risk ofwhat Sunstein terms a "precedential cascade," where
subsequent appellate panels follow the lead of the initial panels in ruling
on a question. Subsequent appellate panels-or the Supreme Court-
might be less likely to depart from the "moderate" view than they would
be if the set of appellate decisions on a given issue varied. Dissenting
by deciding (in the form of an ("ideologically amplified") decision), then
would be useful to offset the precedential cascade that seems likely to
take place when all appellate decisions resemble one another.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
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on the early decisions in UTC and OHM. These decisions interpret the
words of section 107 by refusing to construe it directly. Instead, they
repackage judicial preference and practicality through the back-handed
interpretation of section 113, which is the cousin once-removed of section
107. Some later courts cascaded into conformance along this norm, appar-
ently without new independent analysis. However, behavioral research
indicates that changes in the availability of information will alter the
degree of such a cascade.20 8
While the outcome may seem similar to a court, the litigation input
of the plaintiffs is radically different. Section 107 actions are plaintiff-
friendly, while section 113 actions are resource intensive and often pro-
hibitive to plaintiffs.2 °s Inputs and incentives are important to encourage
private voluntary clean-ups, which will not occur if section 107 is restricted.
C. The 2004 Aviall Supreme Court Decision Traps the Last Avenue
of the Circuits
There was a visible tremor in 2004 when the U.S. Supreme Court
knocked out certain private party access to section 113 of the Superfund
statute. However, the Court could not deconstruct the wall constructed by
the eleven circuit courts regarding section 107 of Superfund. In its de-
cision in Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Aviall Services, Inc.,21° the Supreme
Court went around the wall created by the Circuits between 1993 and
2004.211 This decision threw the hazardous waste cost allocation scheme
2 8Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 204, at 767.
209 The duality of this choice was recognized by some courts, but other courts oddly fold
section 107 into section 113 as a subpart. There is no rationale for this in the statute. In
Centerior, the court held that:
Under such a reading, if § 113(f) is incorporated under § 107, then a
§ 113(f) action is an action to recover the necessary costs of response by
any other person, as referred to in § 107. The action only happens to be
an action for contribution. We agree. Section 107(a) clearly establishes
the right of parties to seek 'necessary costs of response.' It does not
specify whether these costs will arise from joint and several liability or
sound in contribution. As noted above, before the adoption of § 113(f),
courts found that § 107(a) created an implied right of action for both con-
tribution and joint and several recovery. Additionally, as the government
asserts, parties seeking contribution under § 113(f) must look to § 107
to establish the basis and elements of the liability of the defendants, as
well as any defenses to that liability.
Id.
210 543 U.S. 157 (2004).
211 See infra Part III.
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for billions of dollars of hazardous waste liability, as previously allowed
by most of the circuit courts, into a state of chaos. The Supreme Court's
opinion in Aviall prohibits a private party from initiating a claim under
section 113(f)(1) of CERCLA against other PRPs for contribution to haz-
ardous waste clean-up expenses, unless and until that plaintiff party has
first been sued for response costs by (or settled with) the government
under section 107(a) or section 106 of CERCLA.212
Legally, this was significant. The federal government only sues pri-
vate responsible parties at very high profile waste sites in limited situa-
tions. The existing system relies on voluntary private action to remediate
hazardous waste contamination.21 It also relies on subsequent private
judicial proceedings to reallocate the clean-up cost from the volunteering
party to others who contributed to, or are liable for, the contamination.214
With the cost-reallocation mechanism judicially disabled, the incentive
for voluntary clean-up of hazardous waste sites disappears because cost
recovery for the volunteering party becomes difficult or impossible.
The facts inAviall are straightforward.215 The federal district court
found for Cooper, barring Aviall's section 113 claim on the basis that it
had not been brought during or after a government action against
Aviall, nor subject to an approved settlement. 16 The Fifth Circuit
212 Aviall, 543 U.S. at 166-67.
213 See Answers.com, Air and Water Resource and Solid Waste Management (SIC 9511),
httpJ/www.answers.com/topic/air-and-water-resource-and-solid-waste-management (last
visited Mar. 16, 2009) ("[B]y the end of 1986, only 13 hazardous waste sites, out of more
than 800 identified by the EPA, had been cleaned up under the Superfund program at
a cost of $780 million."); see also Matthew J. Lawlor, Comment, Super Settlements for
Superfund: A New Paradigm for Voluntary Settlement?, 27 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 123
(1999) (discussing voluntary private action through voluntary settlement), available at
http-/www.bc.edu/schools/aw/lawreviews/meta-elements/journals/cealr/27_1/04FMS.htm.214 See STEVEN FERREY, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: EXAMPLES AND EXPECTATIONS ch. 9 (4th
ed. 2007).
215 Aviall purchased four aircraft manufacturing and maintenance facilities from Cooper
Industries.Aviall, 543 U.S. at 157. Hazardous substance contamination at the sites was cre-
ated by both companies' operations before and after the sale. Id. Aviall, as then current owner,
remediated the site under direction of the Texas environmental agency at a cost of almost $5
million, as a prerequisite to its sale of the property to a third party, whereupon it sought
section 113 contribution and/or section 107 CERCLA response cost recovery from Cooper, the
former owner. Id. These two claims were later amended to consolidate and launch just a sin-
gle section 113 claim, as per the controlling precedent in the circuit. Id. This would prove to be
a strategic legal error. Aviall performed the remediation voluntarily, having never been sued
by any environmental enforcement agency. Nor had Aviall ever entered a formal judicially-
or administratively-approved settlement with any environmental agency. Id. at 157-58.
216 Aviall Servs., Inc. v. Cooper Indus., Inc., No. Civ-A.397CV1926D, 2000 WL 31730, at *4
(N.D. Tex. Jan. 13, 2000).
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initially upheld the district court but eventually reversed the decision in
an en banc hearing. The en banc decision relied on the purpose of
CERCLA, "to promote prompt and effective cleanup."217 The Fifth Circuit,
en banc, found that the statute's savings clause was not limited to state
claims and that a private section 113 action by Aviall was not dependent
upon a prior or pending action.218
On certiorari, the odds on paper were stacked. Twenty-three states,
as well as numerous corporations and others, joined Aviall as amici to
argue in support of the final Fifth Circuit en banc decision.219 The U.S.
filed the sole amici brief supporting Cooper Industries.2 0 The Supreme
Court reversed the Fifth Circuit in a forceful opinion requiring that, prior
to any section 113(f) CERCLA contribution action, the private party-
plaintiff must have either (1) suffered prosecution for liability from the
federal government, or (2) entered a judicially or administratively ap-
proved settlement of such dispute with the government. 22 1 The Court
maintained the distinction between section 107 "cost recovery" and section
113 "contribution actions: "[Aifter SARA, CERCLA provided for a right
to cost recovery in certain circumstances, section 107 (a), and separate
rights to contribution in other circumstances, §§ 113 (f)(1), 113(f)(3)(B)."222
It required no leaps ofjudicial logic for the Supreme Court to reach
this outcome. The Court followed the plain meaning of the exact language
of section 113 of the statute, finding that the authorization to initiate a
contribution action after or during other litigation or settlement is the
only means of entitling one to bring contribution claims against other
potentially liable parties under the statute.223 Otherwise, a more permis-
sive interpretation of the section would "render... entirely superfluous"
217 Aviall Servs., Inc. v. Cooper Indus., Inc., 312 F.3d 677, 681 (5th Cir. 2002).
2 1 8 Id. at 687.
211 See Brief for New York et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, Cooper Indus.
Inc., v. Aviall Services, Inc., 543 U.S. 157 (2004) (No. 02-1192), 2004 WL 782371; Brief
for Superfund Settlements Project et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, Cooper
Indus. Inc., v. Aviall Services, Inc., 543 U.S. 157 (2004) (No. 02-1192), 2004 WL 782370;
Brief for Atlantic Richfield Company et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents,
Cooper Indus. Inc., v. Aviall Services, Inc., 543 U.S. 157 (2004) (No. 02-1192), 2004 WL
791894.
220 See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Cooper Indus.
Inc., v. Aviall Services, Inc., 543 U.S. 157 (2004) (No. 02-1192), 2004 WL 354181.22 1Aviall, 543 U.S. at 167.
2?2 Id. at 163.
2 23Id. at 166-67.
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the conditional "during or following" language of the Act.224 This interpre-
tation, in the view of the Court majority, gave every word of the statute
meaning: a plain meaning interpretation following the canons of statu-
tory construction.
While the Supreme Court decision in Aviall was by a 7-2 plurality,
the two dissenters did not seem to contest this core holding.2" Rather they
sought to go further to address the even more pressing issue of whether
there was a private right to cost recovery along the alternative road of
section 107(a) of CERCLA, notwithstanding the prior contrary opinions
of eleven Circuit Courts. 226 However, Aviall had been forced in the district
court to drop its alternative section 107 claim after the initiation of the
litigation, consolidating all claims under the less conducive section 113.
The issue was therefore not addressed in the circuit court opinion on re-
view, and therefore was not before the Court on certiorari.2 7 The Supreme
Court majority inAviall did not adjudge the section 107 rights of private
parties litigants sua sponte.225 In dissent, Justice Ginsberg, joined by
Justice Stevens, would have ruled on the section 107 issue notwithstand-
ing that it had not been briefed to the Court, potentially overturning the
section 107 roadblocks erected by the circuits.22 9
This 2004 Supreme Court decision significantly cut off section 113
as a cost reallocation route, often leaving few avenues for private hazardous
waste cost recovery and allocation. Critically, as examined later, these re-
strictive circuit decisions discouraged any incentives for parties to under-
take voluntary clean-up, rather than engage in CERCLA obfuscation.23 °
224 Id. at 166. In his opinion for the majority, Justice Thomas rejected the notion that"may"
should be read permissively so the "during or following" statutory language was one of
several mechanisms to utilize section 113. Id. Rather, the opinion held that only during
or after one of the statutorily specified requisites could a party as plaintiff initiate a section
113 civil contribution action. Id. Therefore, the"may" language was read as exclusive rather
than inclusive of the only statutorily authorized means to utilize the section 113 path for
private cost contribution to waste remediation.
" See Aviall, 543 U.S. at 171 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).226 Id. at 171-74.
227 See id. at 157-58.
228 See id. at 157-59.
229 Id. at 271-74 (Ginsburg, J. dissenting). Justice Ginsburg's dissent notes that in Key
Tronic, the Supreme Court in dicta stated that section 107 "unquestionably provides a
cause of action for [PRPs]." Id. at 172. Justices Scalia and Thomas, dissenting in Key
Tronic, but in the majority inAviall, also favored a private right of action under section
107. Justice Ginsburg notes that in Key Tronic "no Justice expressed the slightest doubt
that § 107 indeed enables a PRP to sue other covered persons for reimbursement... of
cleanup costs."Aviall, 543 U.S. at 172.
2 See supra Part II.
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The Supreme Court opinion cut off many of the potential section
113 cost contribution actions, where there is no litigation against the plain-
tiff or an administratively orjudicially approved settlement with the plain-
tiff. 1 There ensued some equivocation among four circuits as to whether
section 107 had been reinvigorated in the shadows of the Supreme Court
Aviall decision, or whether the impenetrable wall of the eleven circuits
remained unbreached."2 This provided the Supreme Court an opportunity
to reach the unbriefed issue it could not stretch to reach in 2004.
D. The Road Less Traveled: The Atlantic Research Revolution
There was drama leading up the to 2007 Supreme Court opinion
in Atlantic Research.23 3 The Second Circuit did an immediate U-turn after
Aviall.234 Despite its 1998 Bedford decision denying all PRPs access to
section 107 in order not to render section 113 "a nullity,"235 it had second
thoughts in Consolidated Edison.2 36 All of a sudden, the Second Circuit
noted the "plain language" of section 107, and the fear that it would
"impermissibly discourag[e] voluntary cleanup,"237 causing all voluntary
clean-ups to grind to a halt: "This would undercut one of CERCLA's main
goals, 'encouraging private parties to assume the financial responsibility
of cleanup by allowing them to seek recovery from others.' 238
231 See Aviall, 543 U.S. at 167.
232 Three circuits reinvigorated section 107 after the Aviall decision. See, e.g., Metropolitan
Water Reclamation Dist. of Greater Chicago v. N. Am. Galvanizing & Coatings, Inc., 473
F.3d 824, 834-35 (7th Cir. 2007); Atl. Research Corp. v. United States, 459 F.3d 827,
835-36 (8th Cir. 2006); Consol. Edison Co. of New York, v. UGI Util., Inc., 423 F.3d 90,
97 (2d Cir. 2005). The Third Circuit held to its prior precedent. See, e.g., E.I. du Pont de
Nemours & Co. v. United States, 460 F.3d 515, 521, 29, 43 (3d Cir. 2006).
233 127 S. Ct. 2331 (2007).
21 See Consol. Edison Co., 423 F.3d at 100.
235 See Bedford Affiliates v. Sills, 156 F.3d 416, 424 (2d Cir. 1998).
236 Consol. Edison Co., 423 F.3d at 97. The plaintiff entered into a "Voluntary Cleanup
Agreement" with the state of New York. Id. at 93. The plaintiff alleged that under that
agreement it had resolved its liability to the state, but the court held that the resolution of
liability must pertain to liability of claims under CERCLA. Id. at 96. The court noted that
while the plaintiff may have resolved its liability to the state of New York for claims arising
under the state's environmental laws, the agreement contained a "Reservation of Rights"
whereby the state reserved its right to bring CERCLA claims against the plaintiff, Id. at
96-97. Because the state reserved a right to bring future CERCLA claims against the
plaintiff, the court held that the plaintiff had not resolved its CERCLA liability to the state
and therefore it could not bring a contribution claim under section 113(f)(3). Id. at 97.237 Id. at 100.
' Consol. Edison Co., 423 F.3d at 100 (quoting Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 511
U.S. 809, 819 n.13 (1994)).
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To make this U-turn, the Second Circuit pivoted around the 1994
decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in Key Tronic Corp. v. United States,
511 U.S. 809 (1994). Regarding its prior contrary precedent in Bedford,
the circuit held straightforwardly that "[tihis holding impels us to con-
clude that it [Bedford] no longer makes sense .... 23 a However, rather
than formally overrule Bedford, it tried to distinguish it by noting that
Consolidated Edison had not been sued or found partially liable yet, un-
like in Bedford.24 ° Here, however, the logic stops. Without settling their
liability in an administratively or judicially approved settlement with the
federal government there is no contribution protection, and this minimizes
incentives for voluntary remediation. Even with section 107 available,
without contribution protection for a settlement there is scant incentive
for voluntary remediation.
The Consolidated Edison court viewed sections 107(a) and 113(f)
as operating in tandem because "[elach of those sections. . . embodies a
mechanism for cost recovery available to persons in different procedural
circumstances.""' The court's holding implies that a section 113(f)(1) claim
for contribution will be permitted for PRPs who are subject to an admin-
istrative proceeding, even if they were not subject to a judicial proceeding.
The Supreme Court stated in Aviall "that [one] must, if possible, construe
a statute to give every word some operative effect."242 Section 107(a) does
not exclude liable parties from raising a section 107 claim, thus section
107(a) is available to "any other person" who has incurred "any other
necessary costs of response."243
In a similar vein, the Eighth Circuit provided an interesting mech-
anism for the circuits to side-step their prior precedent blocking the use
2 91 Id. at 99.
4 Id. at 101 n.12.1 1d. at 99. The court found that "section 107(a) permits a party that has not been sued
or made to participate in an administrative proceeding, but that, if sued, would be held
liable under section 107(a), to recover necessary response costs incurred voluntarily, not
under a court or administrative order or judgment." Id. at 100. The court authorized
PRPs to bring claims for contribution under section 107(a) or section 113(f), depending
on their "procedural circumstances," but precluded those PRPs who are subject to an
administrative proceeding from bringing a claim for contribution under section 107(a).
Id. at 99.
242 Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Aviall Servs., Inc., 543 U.S. 157, 167 (2004).
913Consol. Edison Co., 423 F.3d at 99 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B)). The Second Circuit
in Consolidated Edison did not seem to recognize that a PRP counterclaim in response
to a private plaintiff section 107 action could be barred by section 113 counterclaim pro-
tection if the plaintiff had previously entered an approval settlement with the EPA. Id.
at 100 n.9. See also discussion supra Part I.C.
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of section 107.24 After Aviall, it decided that a private party PRP plain-
tiff may avail itself of a section 107 cost recovery action.245 To overcome
its prior contrary decision in Dico, Inc. v. Amoco Oil Co.,' the circuit did
not attempt to reverse this precedent, but rather indicated that a different
three-judge panel can depart from a prior panel's decision where the prior
panel's "rationale has been undermined." 7 The circuit found that once free
of this prior decision, Aviall compelled it to hold that sections 107 and 113
be regarded as separate and distinct avenues both accessible to PRP
plaintiffs; "any other person" in section 107 includes any parties other than
governments or Indian tribes that are previously expressly included.'
The Eighth Circuit found no intent on the part of the Congress,
when it enacted section 113(f) in 1986, to imply a repeal of just the "any
other person" provision of the preexisting section 107.249 The court pro-
ceeded to limit the amount of response costs of a PRP that has neither
been sued nor settled its liability to only its fair share costs, under the
"'any other necessary costs of response'" provision of section 107.250 This
proportionate concept removes one of the few logical criticisms of the abso-
lute result of section 107's shifting of private costs: that it could allow a
temporary windfall.25' The circuit goes even further to read into section
107(c) an implied right to contribution so as not to penalize parties who
voluntarily remediate sites.25 2 Therefore, this interpretation opens up to
all PRPs-even those who have not settled with the government and thus
have no section 113 action after the Supreme Court decision inAviall-the
ability to utilize section 107 for cost recovery.
But there was no unanimity for reopening the blocked section 107
path. The Third Circuit remained fixed: if the Supreme Court in Aviall
did not overrule the circuits, then the circuits should continue to deny
PRP access to section 107.253 Of course, while a minority of justices in
Aviall wished to address whether the circuit blockage of section 107 was
incorrect, the Court could not because that section 107 issue was neither
before the Court nor briefed in Aviall.2 4
24 See AtI. Research Corp. v. United States, 459 F.3d 827 (8th Cir. 2006).
245 Id. at 836.
246 340 F.3d 525 (8th Cir. 2003).
47 Atl. Research, 459 F.3d at 830.
24 Id. at 835-36.
?49 Id. at 836.250 Id. at 835.
251 See United States v. Kramer, 757 F. Supp. 397, 415-17 (D. N.J. 1991); supra Part III.D.
252 Atl. Research, 459 F.3d at 836.
253 E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. United States, 460 F.3d 515, 527 (3d Cir. 2006).
254 Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Aviall Servs., Inc. 543 U.S. 157, 168 (2004).
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On remand after the Supreme Court sent the Aviall case back
down, the district court reexamining the controversy similarly refused to
recognize the availability of the section 107 path.25 Over the years, dif-
ferent panels of the Fifth Circuit had suggested, but never squarely held,
that a private PRP could utilize section 107 for cost recovery.256 Holding
that the Fifth Circuit had not squarely addressed the issue, the district
court took license to interpret "any other person" in section 107(a) to only
apply to innocent parties and not PRPs.257 Their rationale was that allow-
ing access to section 107 would negate the contribution protection of sec-
tion 113(f)(2).258 The district court's ultimate defense was that the Supreme
Court in its Aviall decision did not command that the circuit precedent on
section 107 must yield. 9 The court concluded that section 107(a) also
cannot be used for seeking contribution, so that parties prior to a judicially
approved settlement with the federal government cannot recover costs
under any federal scheme, as both section 107 and 113 are walled off.
26 °
Other courts followed both the Second and Eighth Circuit access
to section 107,261 and still other courts followed the Third Circuit denial
of access to section 107 cost recovery. 2 The result was total chaos in cost
recovery and Superfund administration.
255 See Aviall Servs., Inc. v. Cooper Indus., L.L.C., No. 3:97-CV-1926-D, 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 55040, at *36 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 8, 2006).
256 See, e.g., Tanglewood E. Homeowners v. Charles-Thomas, Inc., 849 F.2d 1568, 1572
(5th Cir. 1988); Amoco Oil Co. v. Bordon, Inc., 889 F.2d 664, 668 (5th Cir. 1989).
257 Aviall Services, No. 3:97-CV-1926-D, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55040, at *14-15.
258 Id. at *22-24.
259 Id. at *29.
2 60 Id. at *35-36.
261 See Metropolitan Water Reclamation Dist. of Greater Chicago v. N. Am. Galvanizing &
Coatings, Inc., 473 F.3d 824,834 (7th Cir. 2007); Vine St., L.L.C. v. Keeling, 460 F.Supp.2d
728, 768 (E.D. Tex. 2006); City of Bangor v. Citizens Commc'ns Co., 437 F. Supp. 2d 180,
223 (D. Me. 2006); Raytheon Aircraft Co. v. United States, 435 F. Supp. 2d 1136 (D. Kan.
2006); Sunnyside Dev. Corp. v. Opsys U.S. Corp., 36 Envtl. L. Rep. 20083, at 3 (N.D. Cal.
2005); McDonald v. Sun Oil Co., 423 F. Supp. 2d 1114, 1133-34 (D. Or. 2006); Aggio v.
Estate of Aggio, 35 Envtl. L. Rep. 20189 (N.D. Cal. 2005); Ferguson v. Arcata Redwood Co.,
No. C03-05632SI, 2005 WL 1869445, at 8 (N.D. Cal. 2005); Viacom, Inc. v. United States,
404 F. Supp. 2d 3, 9 (D.D.C. 2005); Kotrous v. Goss-Jewett Co., No. S02-1520, 2005 WL
1417152, at 3 (E.D. Cal.2005), vacated on other grounds 523 F.3d 924 (9th Cir. 2008).
262 Spectrum Intl Holding, Inc. v. Universal Coops., Inc., No. 04-99, 2006 WL 2033377,
at 8 (D. Minn. 2006); Adobe Lumber, Inc. v. Hellman, 415 F. Supp. 2d 1070, 1083 (E.D.
Cal. 2006); R.E. Goodson Constr. Co. v. Intl Paper Co., No. C/A 4:02-4814-RBH, 2005 WL
2614927, at 20 (D.S.C. Oct. 13, 2005); Montville Twp. v. Woodmont Builders, No.
03-2680DRD, 2005 WL 2000204, at 13 (D.N.J. 2005); City of Rialto v. U.S. Dept. of Def.,
No. EDCV 04-00079-VAP (SSx), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26941, at 11-12 (C.D. Cal. 2005);
Boarhead Farm Agreement Group v. Advanced Envtl. Tech. Corp., 381 F. Supp. 2d 427,
437 (E.D. Pa. 2005); Blue Tee Corp. v. ASARCO, Inc., No. 03-501 1-CV-SW-F-JG, 2005 WL
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In mid-2007 the Supreme Court affirmed a 2006 post-Aviall opinion
of the Eighth Circuit that opened up private PRP access to section 107 cost
recovery.263 This was consistent with changes of opinion in the Second
and Seventh Circuits.2" The Court relied on a plain language interpreta-
tion in holding against the government's strained interpretation of sec-
tion 107 of Superfund. 265 The Court acknowledged that persons in differ-
ent procedural positions have access to either section 107 or the recently
limited section 113, as the situation merits.266
The Supreme Court opined on issues that every prior circuit de-
cision obscured or missed.267 Section 113 is available for equitable appor-
tionment of costs, including those not directly incurred, among jointly
liable parties.268 Section 107, by contrast and pursuant to plain meaning,
is freely available for any person or party to utilize to recover its own
actually expended costs of response to hazardous substance remediation.6 9
Sections 107 and 113 are complementary avenues, not the excluded ave-
nues determined by eleven circuits.27 °
Despite the section 113(f)(2) contribution protection afforded set-
tling parties, the Court assumed, without directly ruling, that plaintiffs
utilizing section 107 would not be immune from litigation counterclaims
pursuant to section 113, which would cause a court to equitably apportion
the total cost burden among co-liable litigants.2 71 This dicta by the Supreme
Court resolves the intriguing question originally posed in Kramer, to wit,
whether a section 107 plaintiff could recover a windfall from shifting an
inordinate share of its own equitable share of costs to defendants.272 In
the view of the Supreme Court, that answer is "no."273
1532955, at 6 (W.D. Mo., 2005); Atlantic Research Corp. v. United States, No. 02-CV-1199,
2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20484, at 9-10 (W.D. Ark. 2005), rev'd by 459 F.3d 827 (8th Cir.
2006); City of Waukesha v. Viacom Intl Inc., 362 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1027-28 (E.D. Wis.
2005); Mercury Mall Assocs. v. Nick's Mkt., Inc., 368 F. Supp. 2d 513,520 (E.D. Va. 2005).
26 See United States v. Atl. Research Corp., 127 S. Ct. 2331, 2339 (2007) affg sub nom.
Atl. Research Corp. v. United States, 459 F.3d 827, 835-37 (8th Cir. 2006).2
" See Atl. Research, 127 S. Ct. at 2334.
265 Id. at 2335-37.
26 6 Id. at 2338.
267 See cases supra note 163.
2
'Atl. Research, 127 S. Ct. at 2338.
269 Id.
270 Id.
271 Id. at 2338-39.
272 United States v. Kramer, 757 F. Supp. 397, 416-17 (D. N.J. 1991).
2 3Atl. Research, 127 S. Ct. at 2338.
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III. CHANGING THE LAW
A. The Policy Implications of Judicially Eliminating Waste
Remediation Recovery Routes
The practical result of the 2004 Supreme Court decision inAviall,
coupled with the decisions of the eleven circuit courts regarding section
107,274 combined to greatly discourage voluntary remediation activities
at some of the 450,000 contaminated sites in the U.S.2 75 This occurred
at a time when the Superfund hazardous substance clean-up effort was
starved by budgetary deprivation. EPA had to delay beginning remedi-
ation activities at 34 separate sites in FY 2004 because of ftnding short-
falls. 6 Consequently EPA was not listing any new sites on the National
Priorities List and was delaying all additional site remediation.2 " In
January 2004, the EPA's own Inspector General acknowledged that
"[wihen funding is not sufficient, [cleanup of] sites cannot begin, clean-
ups are performed in less than an optimal manner; and/or activities are
stretched over longer periods of time."278
The Superfund Trust Fund raised money from a tax on chemical
and petroleum companies to fund federal hazardous waste remediation
efforts.2 79 This tax expired in 1995, after the change in political control
of the House of Representatives.2 ° President Bush had not favored re-
authorization of the tax and Superfund trust.21 Efforts by Democrats in
the Senate to reinstate the Superfund tax on industry were rejected by
Senate Republicans, who stated that the tax does not target polluters
but taxes members of industry in general.282 Until its 1995 expiration,
this distinct Superfund tax separately contributed $1.45 billion annually
274 See infra Part V.B.2.a for a discussion and analysis of the circuit court opinions.
275 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 9, at 118.
276 Roeder, supra note 8, at S-14 to S-15.
277 Id. There are 1237 sites on the National Priority List as of 2005, with 68 additional sites
proposed for addition. Id. at S-15.
278 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. ENvTL. PROT. AGENCY, REP. 2004-P-00001,
CONGRESSIONAL REQUEST ON FUNDING NEEDS FOR NON-FEDERAL SUPERFUND SITES 4 (2004).
279 Roeder, supra note 8, at S-16. The funds were created by a three-part tax: a 9.7 cent
per barrel excise tax on petroleum, a feedstock excise tax on 42 listed chemicals, and an
income tax on corporations earning more than $2 million per year. Id.280 id.
28 1 
id.
22 Meredith Preston & Susan Bruninga, Amendment to Reinstate Industry Tax to Support
Trust Fund Defeated in Senate, 35 Env't Rep. (BNA)No. 11, at 536 (Mar. 12, 2004).
684 [Vol. 33:633
INVERTING THE LAW
between 1990-1995 to the Superfund trust fund, in addition to the regu-
lar federal line item for site clean-up appropriated annually as part of
the EPA budget.283
Clean-ups were still funded by the second source of funds, the
annual Congressional appropriation of approximately $1.25 billion.2' Be-
tween 1999 and 2003, the EPA annual clean-up budget declined 11% in
nominal outlays.2 5 In FY 2004, Congress approved a $15 million de-
crease from the FY 2003 level for the Superfund." 6 The federal appropri-
ation for CERCLA cleanup was frozen for FY 2005 at the FY 2004 level.28 7
Adjusting for inflation, this amounts to a real decrease.2' The Bush Admin-
istration requested 7.4% less in its FY 2006 request compared to the
Administration's FY 2005 budget request.2 9 The House Appropriations
Committee approved the proposed FY 2007 Superfund budget of $1.25
billion, which is a decline in real terms from the FY 2006 budget.290 The
budget would allow the completion of 40 clean-ups nationwide.2 91
Against this static nominal budget level and real decline, the cost
of clean-ups was increasing.292 Since the enactment of Superfund in 1980,
the average cost of site cleanup has doubled.293 In FY 2004, more than half
the EPA budget for long-term remediation had to be devoted to just nine
sites.294 This created at least a $750 million shortfall in required funds
2'2 Roeder, supra note 8, at S-15, S-16.
2 4Id. at S-15. The Bush Administration had requested $1.38 billion for FY 2005. Id. EPA
augmented the funds by recovering $109 million from PRPs in FY 2004. Linda Roeder, EPA
Faces Continued Funding Challenges in Cleaning Up Nation's Contaminated Sites, 36
Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 39, at 2057 (Oct. 7, 2005).
285 Roeder, supra note 8, at S-15. The FY 1999 level was $1.71 billion and by FY 2003 it
had declined to an inflation-adjusted $1.52 billion. Id.
28 Meredith Preston, Bigger Increase in Spending May be Needed for Superfund Cleanups
than 2005 Request, 35 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 6, at 254 (Feb. 6, 2004).
" Roeder, supra note 8, at S-15, S-16.
2m Id. at S-14, S-15.
28 2006 Proposed EPA Budget, 36 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 6, at S-1, S-40 tbl. (Feb. 11, 2005).
The FY 2006 budget request was $1.279 billion for the Superfund, as opposed to $1.381
billion requested in the FY 2005 budget. Id. This is a 7.4% decrease between the two years.
Id.
290 Joyce Hedges, Committee Approves $7.56 Billion for EPA, 37 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 19,
at 1018 (May 12, 2006).
291 Dean Scott, Bush Proposed 4 Percent Cut for EPA- Plan Targets Revolving Loans, State
Grants, 37 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 6, at 277 (Feb. 10, 2006).
292 See Roeder, supra note 8, at S-15.
293 id.2'4 Roeder, supra note 284, at 2057.
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over two years.295 According to the U.S. General Accounting Office, when
adjusted for inflation, funding for the Superfund had declined 35% since
1993.296 Representative John Dingell characterized this as a "failure of the
administration and the Republican-controlled Congress to properly fund
Superfund site cleanups."297
Between 1992 and 2000, the budget allowed for completion of be-
tween 60 and 90 priority site remediations annually.298 Since 2000, be-
cause the Superfund was not replenished by additional tax revenues, the
number of sites completed has fallen by about 50% or more each year.2 99
Each year since 2002, remediation projects that were ready to begin were
not able to be funded. °° In response, Democrats claimed that this budget
shortfall frustrated clean-ups planned at 46 contaminated sites.3 1' The
EPA has, for each of the past four years, completed 40 site remediations,
a significant decrease from the 85 to 88 annual site completions during the
second term of the Clinton administration. °2 Superfund's surplus, which
was responsible for hazardous waste site clean-ups since Superfund's
taxes expired in 1995, dwindled from $3.6 billion dollars to an estimated
$28 million and falling in 2003.303 The administration of the Superfund
was placed in jeopardy due to an extreme lack in funding.3°4 Despite
recovered funds pursuant to CERCLA being redeposited into the trust
fund when recovered from PRPs, the fund is now essentially empty. °5
295 Roeder, supra note 8, at S-15.
... Meredith Preston, Report Shows Drop in Funding Since 1993 When Budgets Account
for Yearly Inflation, 33 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 9, at 429 (Feb. 27, 2004). In FY 1993, $1.903
billion was appropriated in constant 2003 dollar equivalent, while in FY 2004 $1.241
billion in constant 2003 dollars was appropriated for Superfund. Id.
" Michael Janofsky, Changes May be Needed in Superfund, Chief Says, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 5, 2004, at N36.
'9' Roeder, supra note 8, S-16 tbl.
29 id.
30 Preston, supra note 286, at 254.
301 Meredith Preston, Democrats Say 46 Pending Cleanup Projects Delayed by Funding
Shortfall in Fiscal 2004, 35 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 34, at 1775 (Aug. 20, 2004).
302 Preston, supra note 286, at 254; Roeder, supra note 8, at S-16 tbl.
0 Superfund Program: Cleanups and Funding Issues: Hearing on Oversight of the
Environmental Protection Agency's Management of the Superfund Program Before the
Subcomm. On Superfund, Toxics, Risk, and Waste Management of the S. Comm. on
Environment and Public Works, 107th Cong. 59 (2002) (statement of Grant Cope, on
Behalf of the U.S. Public Interest Research Group).
304 Id.
5 Id. at 12 (statement of Sen. Barbara Boxer).
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About 5,000 sites annually were cleaned up by involved private
parties prior to 2004.306 The EPA during a recent decade has added an
average of 28 sites annually to the NPL. °7 This underscored the dimen-
sions of voluntary initiatives: For every site EPA traditionally cleans up,
private parties clean up 100 sites.0 8 There lay the rub: EPA had less fund-
ing for its share, andAviall and the circuit court opinions eviscerated the
legal paths and incentives for private volunteer clean-up.
This resulted in a fiscal crisis: "I cannot foresee any time in the
near future when we are going to get additional funding," stated Thomas
Dunne, EPA Acting Assistant Administrator for Solid Waste and Emer-
gency Response.0 9 The Office of Management and Budget has found that
overall the benefits derived from EPA regulation outweigh the costs.310
Over the period from 1980 to 2004, an estimated 17,000 sites were ad-
dressed publicly or privately in some way, motivated by the tools of
CERCLA. However, this was less than 5% of the estimated sites in the
nation requiring some remediation or monitoring.31' A report by the EPA
found that addressing the 350,000 remaining contaminated sites in the
United States over the next three decades would cost up to one-quarter
trillion dollars.312 This would require an expenditure of $6 to 8 billion
306 OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
CLEANING UP THE NATION'S WASTE SITES: MARKETS AND TECHNOLOGY TRENDS 1-10
(2004), available at http://clu-in.org/market/.
307 Id. at 1-6. The averages were calculated over the decade of 1993 to 2003. Id. at 1-6, 1-7.
There are still significant discoveries each year of new sites and new leaking underground
storage tank locations. Id. at 1-6.308 Id. at 1-4.
'o9 Roeder, supra note 8, at S-15. Sen. Frank Lautenberg (D-N.J.) commented, "These
[sites] could be potentially serious public health threats to our constituents and greater
funding is needed to remove the contamination and ensure the safety of drinking water
supplies." Id. at S-16.
310 See OFFICE OF MGMT. AND BUDGET, 2007 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE BENEFITS AND
COSTS OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS AND UNFUNDED MANDATES ON STATE, LOCAL, AND
TRIBAL ENTITIES 4 (2007), available at http'//www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/2007-cb/
2007 cb finalreport.pdf But see James T. Hamilton and W. Kip Viscusi, How Costly is
"Clean"? An Analysis of the Benefits and Costs of Superfund Site Remediations, 18 J. POL'Y
ANALYSIS & MGMT. 2 (1999) (finding "that at the majority of sites the expected number
of cancers averted by remediation is less than 0.1 cases per site and that the cost per
cancer case averted is over $100 million.").
311 EPA SCIENCE ADVISORY BOARD, SUPERFuND BENEFITS ANALYSIS ES-3 (2005), available
at http'//www.epa.gov/superfund/accomp'news/benfits.pdf); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
supra note 9, at vii.312 See OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE, supra note 306, at viii-xi. This
list includes 125,000 leaking underground storage tanks, 6,400 Department of Defense
facilities, 3,800 RCRA"corrective action" sites, 736 NPL Superfund sites, 5,000 Department
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annually-from all sources--over the next three decades.313 Now, the
actions of the circuit courts and the Supreme Court have decoupled legal
paths from economic incentives.
B. Chaos Created by the Aviall Wall
Aviall created uncertainty and chaos. Parties and states reacted.
In the words of Aviall's counsel more than a year after the decision, "the
controversy continues, sites remain unremediated, parties who act respon-
sibly remain uncompensated, and flagrant polluters still scoff at potential
liabilities."314 Post-Aviall, there were two types of newly minted initia-
tives by private party plaintiffs to try to end-run the roadblocks. First, in
new and future settlements, parties were insisting that state agencies in-
clude language that the agency otherwise would not include, to the effect
that the intent of the settlement is to resolve federal CERCLA and state
liability to the extent covered in the settlement. Some parties were going
even further, proactively working with state environmental authorities
to have the state file a friendly suit, to be immediately resolved by a con-
sensual settlement, which would then be judicially approved by stipulation
of the parties.315
Second, 25 years of prior settlements remained in limbo. Past set-
tling parties were claiming that even though not recited in past adminis-
trative settlements with state environmental agencies, the silent intent
of the parties was to resolve federal CERCLA liability. Some states also
are supporting this revisionist initiative, stretching long-past settlements
so as to empower such settlers to avail themselves of section 113 federal
contribution rights.3 16 The first cases demonstrated that it is not a straight-
forward proposition to navigate the post-Aviall world.317
of Energy sites, and 150,000 sites that will be addressed by other remediation programs.
Id. at 1-6 tbl. See also Linda Roeder, EPA Report Puts $253 Billion Price Tag On Cleanup
of Nation's Contaminated Sites, 35 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 49, at 2533 (Dec. 10, 2004).3 13 OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE, supra note 306, at viii.
314 Richard 0. Faulk et al., Cost Recovery Under CERCLA Section 107 After Cooper v.
Aviall, 37 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 12, at 641 (Mar. 24, 2006).315 See infra notes 340-370 and accompanying text.
316 Id.
317 See, e.g., W.R. Grace & Co. v. Zotos Intl, 61 Env't Rep. Cases (BNA) 1474, 1482
(W.D.N.Y. May 3, 2005); Vine St. L.L.C. v. Keeling, 362 F. Supp. 2d 754, 764 (E.D. Tex.
2005); City of Waukesha v. Viacom Intl Inc., 362 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1027-28 (E.D. Wis.
2005); Esso Standard Co. v. Rodriguez-Perez, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4267, at *13-14
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Unlike the unanimity of eleven circuit opinions initially barring
section 107, the response to the Supreme Court 2004 Aviall opinion was
fractured and inconsistent, both among and within the trial courts. After
Aviall, some courts tried to play the carom. A number of courts moved
immediately post-Aviall to dismiss contribution suits under section 113
by plaintiffs who had neither reached a judicially or administratively
approved settlement with, nor been sued by, the government. 31 A few
trial courts, including trial courts in the Fifth and Ninth Circuits, took
a pragmatic approach and allowed section 107 claims to be amended to
pending litigation post-Aviall that still-binding circuit opinions prohibit. 19
Yet, other courts, as set forth in the next two subsections, struggled
to rationalize past settlements that did not seem to meet the Supreme
Court's requirement of section 113 actions.320
(D.P.R. Mar. 21, 2005); Pharmacia Corp. v. Clayton Chem. Acquisition L.L.C., 382 F.
Supp. 2d 1079, 1091 (S.D. Ill. 2005); Elementis Chem. Inc. v. T.H. Agric. and Nutrition
LLC, 59 Env't Rep. Cases (BNA) 2071,2082-83 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 31,2005); AMW Materials
Testing, Inc. v. Town of Babylon, 348 F. Supp. 2d 4, 11 (E.D.N.Y 2004); Johnson v. City of
San Diego, 2005 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1979, at *27-28 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 4, 2005).
31 E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. United States, 460 F.3d 515,518 (3d Cir. 2006); R.E.
Goodson Constr. Co. v. Int'l Paper Co., 2005 WL 2614927, at *5 (D.S.C. Oct. 13, 2005);
W.R. Grace, 61 Env't Rep. Cases (BNA) at 1474-75; Metropolitan Water Reclamation
Dist. v. Lake River Corp., 365 F. Supp. 2d 913, 915, 19 (N.D. Ill. 2005); Vine St., 362 F.
Supp. 2d at 761; Waukesha, 362 F. Supp. 2d at 1026-27; Mercury Mall Assocs. v. Nick's
Market, 368 F. Supp. 2d 513, 515 (E.D. Va. 2005).
319 See, e.g., Kotrous v. Goss-Jewett Co. of N. Cal., 2005 WL 1417152 at *3 (E.D. Cal.
June16, 2005) (rationalizing that section 107 is the original source of contribution). Vine
St., 362 F. Supp. 2d at 763-64 (permitting access to section 107 as a default alternative
where section 113 is not available afterAviall). Note that the Fifth Circuit is where the
Cooper v. Aviall opinion arose, and returned on remand. However, on remand following
the Supreme Court's decision, the district court refused to recognize the availability of
the section 107 path. Aviall Servs., Inc. v. Cooper Indus., Inc., 63 Env't Rep. Cases (BNA)
1622, 1623 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 8, 2006). On remand, the Fifth Circuit, en bane ordered the
district court to permit Aviall to amend its complaint to reassert its original section 107
claim. Id. at 1624. The court concluded that section 107(a) also cannot be used for seeking
contribution, so that parties prior to a judicially approved settlement with the federal
government cannot recover costs under any federal scheme, as both section 107 and sec-
tion 113 are walled off. Id. at 1631. Over the years, different panels of the Fifth Circuit had
suggested, but never squarely held, that a private PRP could utilize section 107 for cost
recovery. Amoco Oil Co. v. Borden, Inc., 889 F.2d 664, 667 (5th Cir. 1989); Tanglewood
E. Homeowners v. Charles-Thomas, Inc., 849 F.2d 1568, 1575 (5th Cir. 1988).320 See infra Part III.B.2, particularly the discussions of Pharmacia, Zotos, and Boarhead
Farm.
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1. Controlling the Future: Crafting Original Post-Aviall
Compliant Settlements
To craft future settlements that allow access to section 113 for cost
contribution, it is not as simple as a mere recitation of magic words in a
settlement. First, EPA exercises unilateral discretion as to whom it names
as defendants in any section 106 administrative enforcement action under
CERCLA and with whom it will enter into an administratively approved
settlement.3 2' No party is deemed indispensable to an EPA enforcement ac-
tion and EPA does not allow interlocutory challenge to a section 106 order
until after compliance or remediation. 322 EPA can enter settlements as it
chooses, or not. Therefore, a PRP without its own litigation-established
defendant liability vis-a-vis the EPA under CERCLA, or without an ap-
proved settlement, lacks the requisites to bring a section 113 action under
the Court's new interpretive strictures.
In August 2005, in response to the Aviall decision, the EPA revised
its model administrative order on consent.3' The new language stated that
21 See Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980
(CERCLA), Pub. L. No. 96-510, § 106, 94 Stat. 2767 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 9606 (2000)).
'2 42 U.S.C. § 9606. Section 113(h) deprives the federal courts of jurisdiction over any
action seeking to challenge a removal or remedial action decision made under section 104
(response authorities), or embodied in a section 106(a) order (abatement actions). 42
U.S.C. § 9613. Exceptions to this rule include (1) in the context of a cost recovery, natural
resource damages, or contribution actions that have been instituted pursuant to section
107(a) (liability provisions), (2) a section106-based action to enforce an order or collect a
penalty for violation of an order, (3) a section 106(b)(2) action against the government for
reimbursement of voluntary clean-up expenditures, or (4) a citizen suit brought under
section 310 of CERCLA, or a section 106 citizen action to compel remedial action. Id. See
also United States v. Princeton Gamma-Tech, Inc., 31 F.3d 138, 151-52 (3d Cir. 1994)
(rejecting the citizen's allegation that such a bar was unconstitutional because it denied
access to the federal courts at any meaningful time). Relying on the doctrine of sovereign
immunity, the court concluded that the Congress can limit suits against the EPA as it
wishes. Id. at 151-52. Such a position is consistent with those taken by the Seventh, Eighth,
Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits. CERCLA section 106 provides authority for the EPA to act
by administrative order instead of seeking judicial relief. 42 U.S.C. § 9606. Such orders
appear to be sufficiently "final" actions to support an action brought by the recipient
seeking judicial review. However, courts such as the one in Wagner Seed Co. v. Daggett,
have ruled that such orders are not reviewable except in defense of EPA enforcement
suits. See 800 F.2d 310, 314-15 (2d Cir. 1986).
" Memorandum from Susan Bromm, Dir., Office of Site Remediation Enforcement and
Bruce S. Gelber, Chief, Envtl. Enforcement Section, Envtl. and Natural Resources Division,
to various EPA and Dep't of Justice Directors, Interim Revisions to CERCLA Removal,
RIIFS and RD AOC Models to Clarify Contribution Rights and Protection Under Section
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the Administrative Order on Consent ("AOC") is designed to resolve lia-
bility to the federal government and protect the settlors' rights to file con-
tribution claims against other parties.324 The optics also are altered. The
title of future orders will be changed from AOC to "administrative settle-
ment and order on consent," and the word "settlement" will be substituted
for the term "order" in the text of the document.3" These newly word-
smithed documents will apply to AOCs for RIIFSs, remedial designs, and
removal actions.326
For those courts content to look for certain magic words in a docu-
ment, such changes address that. This would address some of the concern
voiced by the southern district of Illinois in 2005 in Pharmacia.32 v How-
ever, courts are still confronted with the fact that by whatever name they
are labeled, these orders/settlements are implemented pursuant to EPA
authority under section 106 of CERCLA which authorizes unilateral EPA
orders, rather than under section 122 which authorizes settlements.328
It was far from clear how courts would respond after 25 years of EPA
calling unilaterally issued administrative orders pursuant to section 106
"orders," to EPA labeling these same documents "settlements," when the
settlement authority of CERCLA is not formally invoked.
It is not as simple a solution as the solo pronouncement of a state
official; courts remain as the final arbiters of all things CERCLA. In the
post-Aviall limbo, private parties could not count on section 113 contri-
bution rights if they voluntarily remediated a site in the absence of an
EPA settlement that qualifies as judicially or administratively approved.
Responding to an agency AOC or unilateral order from EPA may also not
qualify to trigger section 113 contribution rights. There are critical legal
distinctions between settlements and the unilateral EPA orders that are
issued by the agency. If a private party is forced to take action to clean
up a site pursuant to an EPA administrative order, section 113 is not
invoked to empower subsequent cost contribution from other parties.329
113(f) (Aug. 3,2005) available at http'//www.epa.gov/compliancetresources/policies/cleanup
superfund/interim-rev-aoc-mod-mem.pdf.
324 Id. at 2.
325 Id.
326 Id. at 3.
327 Pharmacia Corp. v. Clayton Chem. Acquisition LLC, 382 F. Supp. 2d 1079, 1085-86
(S.D.Il1. 2005).
3 Compare 42 U.S.C. § 9606 (authorizing unilateral EPA orders) with 42 U.S.C. § 9622
(authorizing settlements).
329 42 U.S.C. § 9613.
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Nor will settlements with a state agency necessarily trigger section 113
to allow a private contribution action by the settling party against other
recalcitrant and non-cooperating liable parties.33
Second, there are significant issues as to exactly what constitutes
an administratively approved settlement. The great bulk of hazardous
substance site remediation is driven by the enforcement efforts of state
environmental agencies, rather than the federal EPA.33' The states con-
duct 90% of enforcement actions, as well as 97% of the inspections at
regulated facilities, compared to the remainder, which are performed by
the federal EPA.332 The states operate under their own state statutes.333 In
the significant majority of instances, where private parties at a contami-
nated site settle with state environmental agencies pursuant to state law
rather than with the EPA, does such settlement qualify as the CERCLA
"administratively approved" settlement that after Aviall qualified as a
settlement triggering entitlement to a section 113 cost recovery action?
The facile answer might initially appear in the affirmative:
CERCLA section 113(f) does not define or limit what is an administra-
tively approved settlement.334 Moreover, the Court's language contem-
plates recourse to a section 113 contribution action "after an administrative
or judicially approved settlement that resolves liability to the United
States or a State."335 In the disjunctive, it would appear that an approved
settlement with a state environmental agency is an equally valid portal
to enable a subsequent section 113 federal CERCLA contribution action
by a private party so as to recover costs of clean-up.
However, a prearranged "sweetheart" settlement can be attacked
later by the defendant PRPs on at least three grounds. First, many state
environmental agencies do not have memoranda of understanding with
EPA to allow the state to be able to discharge or resolve any federal claims
via a settlement with the state. 336 Second, a pre-arranged settlement can
be attacked as resulting from a collusive arrangement in the first instance
330 Id.
" See Dean Scott, State Officials Urge Funding Shift to Restore Fiscal Year 2007 Grants,
37 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 8, at 401 (2006).332 id.
3 See id.
See 42 U.S.C. § 9613.
5 Pharmacia Corp. v. Clayton Chem. Acquisition, LLC, 382 F. Supp. 2d 1079, 1084
(S.D.Ill. 2005).
" See U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Memoranda of Agreement (MOAs) on State Voluntary
Cleanup Programs (VCPs), http'//www.epa.gov/brownfields/html-doc/statemoa.htm (last
visited Mar. 7, 2009).
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where there was no case or controversy, and thus have no binding effect.
Third, the state only has rights under CERCLA or state law to recover
its own specific site response and clean-up costs, which by definition do
not include any federal response costs or rights.337 Therefore, the state
settlement cannot qualify as a settlement under CERCLA, which creates
contribution rights after federally approved settlements.338 Any spring-
board from CERCLA section 113(f) to recover response costs in a contri-
bution action after Aviall must settle CERCLA claims.
The state of New York proactively pronounced that all of its past
hazardous substance settlements satisfied the requirements of section
113(f)(3) of CERCLA.339 While easy for them to say, it is not necessarily
legally binding. The courts have voiced skepticism that state settlements
qualify under CERCLA to allow subsequent federal section 113 cost re-
covery.34 ° For example, a federal judge ruled that settlements by consent
with the New York state environmental agency only resolve liability as
against the state and not potential federal CERCLA claims, thereby not
entitling a settling party to utilize federal section 113 contribution actions
under the Aviall precedent.34' The court held that a right of contribution
under state law cannot flow from the federal CERCLA statute.342 The
district court preempted any claim for section 113 federal contribution
not based on the two limited avenues specified by the Aviall court, includ-
ing any implied state right to section 113 contribution.343
331 See 42 U.S.C. § 9607.338 See 42 U.S.C. § 9613.
" Memorandum of Law of the State of New York as Amicus Curiae in Opposition to
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss at 1, Seneca Meadows, Inc. v. ECI Liquidating, Inc., 427
F. Supp. 2d 279 (W.D.N.Y. 2006) (No. 95-CV-6400L) (2005 WL 4089408). The New York
Attorney General filed an amicus brief representing the New York State Department of
Environmental Conservation, opposing defendant's motion to dismiss, arguing that
CERCLA constitutes the very basis of New York's settlement authority, and asserting
that all settlements are meant to satisfy section 113(f) requirements. Id. at 1. The
Attorney General cited the opinion in Pfohl Bros. Landfill Site v. Allied Waste Sys., 255
F. Supp. 2d 134 (W.D.N.Y. 2003), which, before the Aviall decision, had held that orders
of consent in New York qualified as approved settlements under section 113(f)(3) of
CERCLA. Id. at 6. The Attorney General argued that the court should distinguish the
Pharmacia decision because that involved a section 106 EPA order rather than a settle-
ment with a state environmental agency. Id. at 7.
' See, e.g., W.R. Grace & Co. v. Zotos Intl, 61 Env't Rep. Cases (BNA) 1474, 1482
(W.D.N.Y. May 3, 2005).
341 Id.
342 Id.
343 d.
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Therefore, any party who is liable pursuant to CERCLA is pre-
empted from maintaining a separate state law claim for contribution that
would conflict with the limitations in Aviall.' Regardless of the defen-
dant's liability, the court found that the plaintiff was precluded from shift-
ing liability to that defendant.' Such decisions made the partially blocked
section 113 route after Aviall an even more significant impediment.
State agencies can typically issue letters to private PRPs that
they are taking no further action at a remediation site, rather than enter
a formal settlement when they are not further pursuing an enforcement
action against a responsible party at a site.3 Such a letter does not rise
to the level of an administratively or judicially approved settlement. 4 v
A letter of no further action neither invokes the contribution protection
for settling parties under section 113(f), nor triggers the ability to utilize
section 113 for a federal contribution action afterAviall.3 s This is impor-
tant in that the great majority of hazardous substance enforcement actions
are prosecuted by state, rather than federal, agencies.349
Where there is a settlement with a state environmental enforce-
ment agency, the settlement typically references state statutory provisions.
It typically may not reference CERCLA at all. Under CERCLA, most
states have no dollar liability to resolve in their settlements with private
parties, as the state often itself has incurred no federally cognizable and
required response costs.35 ° Some courts find that this failure to reference
CERCLA prevents such a state settlement from qualifying as the type
of settlement that allows a federal section 113 contribution action post
Aviall.351
3 Id. at 1484 (citing PMC, Inc. v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 151 F.3d 610 (7th Cir. 1998))
(where both plaintiff and defendant are PRPs pursuant to CERCLA, CERCLA's savings
clause does not allow a party to obtain contribution under state law, predicated on that
CERCLA liability, since that would nullify or veto the CERCLA limitation).
U5Id.
3 Environment, Health and Safety Online, All About Superfund Brownfields: Remediation
and CERCLA, SARA, Superfumd Guidance, http'//www.ehso.com/brownsfields.htm (last
visited Mar. 7, 2009).
7 For some of the precedent interpreting what is an administratively approved settlement,
look to the requirements of section 122 of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9622 (2000), which sanc-
tions settlements of the agencies. See also United States v. Cannons Eng'g Corp., 899 F.2d
79,85,90-91 (st Cir. 1990); General Time Corp. v. Bulk Materials, Inc., 826 F. Supp. 471,
474-75 (M.D. Ga. 1993); United States v. Serafini, 781 F. Supp. 336,338-39 (M.D. Pa. 1992).
3 " See Environment, Health and Safety Online, supra note 346.
34See Scott, supra note 331, at 401.
3 oSee 42 U.S.C. § 9607.
3 " See City of Waukesha v. Viacom Int'l, 362 F. Supp. 2d 1025 (E.D. Wis. 2005); W.R. Grace
& Co. v. Zotos Int'l, 61 Env't Rep. Cases (BNA) 1474, 1476-78 (W.D.N.Y. May 3, 2005).
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Where PRPs encountered a post-Avialljudicial minefield, attorneys
for PRPs attempted post-Aviall to squeeze around its restrictive contours.
Some tried to collude on behalf of their settling PRPs with state environ-
mental authorities to create a settlement: a prearranged quick suit filed
against the PRP by the state making very broad allegations and immedi-
ately filing a prearranged settlement, then offering this administratively
or judicially approved settlement as the on-ramp to a section 113 claim
against other non-settling PRPs.352
In a Texas case, the federal district court created the concept that
the prohibition on section 107 actions created by the federal circuits
applied only where a separate section 113 action was available, so as to
restrict duplicative actions.353 Since the Supreme Court's Aviall opinion
had made section 113 actions unavailable in many instances, the Texas
court reasoned this meant that section 107 actions were not barred in
such circumstances.M It then proceeded to hold that section 107 includes
contribution actions, despite their distinct separation in space, time, and
role in the statute.355
This, of course, is pure legal sophistry. There is absolutely nothing
anywhere in the legislative history of CERCLA to suggest that section
107 cost recovery, which was initially drafted into the statute in 1980, was
designed to be available to private parties only when section 113 contri-
bution, which was later added in 1986, was not available.356 This does not
follow logically or under any canons of statutory construction. Moreover,
section 107 cost recovery is distinct procedurally and substantively from,
and is not an action for, contribution. As discussed in Part II of this
article, contribution and the principles of allocating contribution respon-
sibility, are distinct from response cost recovery under section 107.
352 See, e.g., Pharmacia Corp. v. Clayton Chem. Acquisition, L.L.C., 382 F. Supp. 2d 1079,
1085 (S.D.Ill. 2005) (discussing an attempt by the plaintiff to use an Administrative Order
by Consent as an administratively approved settlement in a contribution claim in order
to overcome a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim).
31 Vine St., L.L.C. v. Keeling, 362 F. Supp. 2d 754, 763 (E.D. Tex. 2005) (relying on In re
Hemingway Transp., Inc., 993 F.2d 915 (1st Cir 1993)).
354 Id.
355 Id. at 764. Section 107 as now embodied was in the original 1980 CERCLA, while section
113 was added by the SARA amendments in 1986 to codify an implied right of common law
contribution that the federal courts had recognized in CERCLA precedent in the interim.
See supra Part III; see also Steven Ferrey, Allocation and Uncertainty in the Age of
Superfund, 3 N.Y.U. ENVT'L. L.J. 35, 44-45, 49-50 (1994). Section 107 is a primary build-
ing block of CERCLA; section 113 is a collection of miscellaneous provisions added at
different times. See id. at 45 n.52.
356 See Ferrey, supra note 355, at 44-45, 49-51.
... See supra Part I.
20091 695
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POLY REV.
In one instance, the Northern District of Illinois decided that there
is an implied right of contribution in section 107(a), even though the pri-
vate party-plaintiff was not an innocent landowner and could not avail
itself of this exception in the section 107 circuit case law.358 However, as
overwhelmingly interpreted by the federal courts, there is no contribution
right embedded in section 107; the case precedent allowing private party
section 107 actions since its enactment distinguished section 107 cost re-
covery from contribution actions 9.3 " The opinion in Aviall set off other
efforts to find the legal creases in inconsistent precedent.
2. Controlling the Past: Rehabilitating Retroactively Past
Settlements to Comply with Aviall
Some states were willing to collude post hoc in an effort to create
retrospective federal rights for some PRPs who previously settled with the
state. This involved state agencies going back, months or years after a
settlement was finalized, to rewrite old settlement documents for settled
PRPs in order to make the settlement fit the newly articulated contours
ofAviall.360 Long after the substance of the settlement was concluded and
final, it is reworked cooperatively by the state and the PRP to recite pur-
ported federal elements of settlement that were not initially included.36'
What is the dispositive value of a settlement among adverse parties that
is redrafted after-the-fact by the supposedly legally adverse state enforce-
ment agency and the PRP target parties?
The desire to paper-over prior state settlements that do not even
purport by their original written terms to address, let alone resolve, fed-
eral CERCLA liability sets off a new task center for attorneys post-Aviall.
In essence, states were asked to mask the true and originally cited facts
for the settlement so as to provide additional protection for certain parties.
Indeed, some state environmental agencies will have to divert resources
5 Metropolitan Water Reclamation Dist. v. Lake River Corp., 365 F. Supp. 2d 913,916,
919 (N.D.Ill.) (denying defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint). It is important to
note that Aviall did not affect the right of non-PRPs to utilize the innocent owner defense
in CERCLA or to utilize section 107 actions to recover costs in those jurisdictions that
allow "innocent" parties to utilize section 107. See generally Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Aviall
Servs., Inc., 543 U.S. 157 (2004).
... See discussion infra, Part III.
' See Pharmacia Corp. v. Clayton Chem. Acquisition, LLC, 382 F. Supp. 2d 1079, 1084-85
(S.D.ll. 2005).
361 Id.
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from dealing with existing polluted sites in order to rework existing settle-
ments so that they recite purposes that were not evident at the time of
settlement. Clearly, suchpost-hoc modifications are not part of the original
bargain, not supported by either the original or new consideration, and
could misstate the original purpose and authority of the state in making
the settlement.
Case law began to emerge post-Aviall on what type of prior state
settlements qualify as an administratively approved settlement for pur-
poses of the finality of CERCLA section 113(f). Some of these cases involved
a single plaintiff pursuing a single PRP defendant.362 In a Wisconsin case,
it was tested whether a plaintiff could retroactively paper-over its settle-
ment deficiencies post-Aviall.363 There, a city sued the successor to a
corporation which disposed of hazardous substances at a city landfill.3"
Even though the city had not been sued by either EPA or the state en-
vironmental authority before the Aviall decision, the court interpreted
section 113(f)(1) to permit the city to bring a section 113(f)(3) action for
contribution.6 5
After the Aviall decision, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss
the prior ruling in conformance with Aviall.366 The city then went into
motion to attempt to disguise the fact that it had no settlement with any
environmental enforcement agency. The city filed an amended complaint
adding a section 113(f)(3)(B) count, claimed that its clean-up cost-sharing
pilot agreement with the state was the legal equivalent of a settlement,
and, for good measure, submitted to the state environmental agency, after
the fact, a settlement purporting to settle all possible CERCLA claims and
state liability.3 7
Having initially allowed the section 113 action, the court after
Aviall dismissed the section 113 contribution claim.31 It held that the cost-
sharing agreement between the city and the state was not the requisite
settlement that resolved the plaintiffs liability, and that the agreement
expressly provided that it did not affect any statutory or common law
362 See, e.g., City of Waukesha v. Viacom Intl, 362 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1027 (E.D. Wis. 2005).
363 id.
364 Id. at 1028.
36 5 Id. at 1026.
36 Id. at 1027.
" Id. The court stated that a PRP must resolve its liability to the state before bringing
a section 113(f)(3) contribution action and "[ilf the unsigned administrative settlement
agreement demonstrates anything, it demonstrates that the City has not yet resolved its
CERCLA liability to the State." Waukesha, 362 F. Supp. 2d at 1027.
'68 Id. at 1026-27.
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liability.36 9 The court held that the city's effort to disguise this deficiency
by trying to create the "settlement" after the fact, rather than resolving
the issue, demonstrated that the city knew that its original arrangement
did not legally resolve its liability to the state. v°
Other case law construed multi-party CERCLA contribution
actions.371 In Pharmacia, 19 PRPs entered an administrative order on
consent with EPA pursuant to section 106 of CERCLA to perform the re-
medial investigation and feasibility study ("RI/FS") at a Superfund site.372
The plaintiff PRP brought suit for contribution against a group of unset-
tled PRPs who were not party to any of the EPA orders.373 The court held
that the administrative order on consent was not an "administrative
settlement" contemplated by section 113 of CERCLA for purposes of a
subsequent contribution action. 374 The court focused on the facts that the
administrative order on consent entered by the parties did not qualify as
a civil action,375 and that it contained standard language that the parties
369 Id. at 1027.
370 id.
371 See, e.g., Pharmacia Corp. v. Clayton Chem. Acquisition, LLC, 382 F. Supp. 2d 1079,
1081 (S.D.Ill. 2005).372 Id. The EPA also issued an administrative order unilaterally after the administrative
order on consent. Id.373 Id. at 1083.
374 Id. at 1085. In Pharmacia, despite the holding inAviall, the plaintiffs asserted their
contribution claim under section 113(f)(1) on the basis that its facts were distinguishable,
since, unlike in Aviall, the plaintiffs incurred clean-up costs by responding to two sep-
arate orders issued by the EPA: an Administrative Order on Consent and a Unilateral
Administrative Order pursuant to section 106. Id. at 1080. The court noted that CERCLA
section 122 authorized EPA to enter into administrative settlements, but the adminis-
trative order on consent was issued pursuant to section 106 rather than section 122(d)(3).
Pharmacia, 382 F. Supp at 1085. It was consistently captioned as an "order" rather than
a "settlement." Id. The plaintiffwas attempting to recoup, through a contribution action,
some of the $3 million that it had expended after entering the administrative order on
consent. Id. at 1081. The court noted that the caption of the AOC provided that it was
issued pursuant to section 106, but that the provisions of section 106 do not provide for
settlements and the term "settlement" does not appear in section 106. Id. at 1085. More-
over, the court found that the penalties for violating the AOC were those imposed pur-
suant to section 106 and that if the AOC was intended as a settlement, then the penalties
provided in the document would have been consistent with the penalties provided by
section 122(1). Id. at 1086.375 Id. at 1087. The court looked to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and found that
under Rule 2(a) "'civil action' refers to the 'entire civil proceeding, including all component
'claims' and 'cases' within that proceeding;'" under Rule 3, "'[a] civil action is commenced
by filing a complaint with the court.'"Pharmacia, 382 F. Supp at 1087 (quoting FED. R. CIV.
P. 2(a)). Nowhere within the Federal Rules is an administrative order even discussed. Id.
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did not admit to liability, which belied any argument that it was a settle-
ment.376 Therefore, there was no ability for the responding PRPs to initiate
a contribution action after they began clean-up in compliance with an
AOC.
The court applied the Aviall reasoning that if Congress intended
to allow a contribution action at any time, it would not have created two
separate avenues for a PRP to seek contribution, nor would it have spec-
ified separately the conditions of a civil action, in section 113(f)(1), and
an administrative or judicially approved settlement, in section 113(f)(3).311
The decision in Pharmacia significantly narrowed the ability of a PRP to
bring a contribution action pursuant to section 113(f)(1), by barring a
PRP who has incurred clean-up costs pursuant to a section 106 adminis-
trative order from bringing a claim for contribution.
The plaintiffs in Boarhead Farm Agreement Group v. Advanced
Environmental Technology Corp., 381 F. Supp. 2d 427 (E.D. Pa. 2005),
also sought to distinguish their situation from Aviall. In Boarhead, the
plaintiffs had entered into a private cooperative agreement to share in the
costs of cleaning up two areas of the Boarhead Farm Superfund Site.379
The court stated that to "stretch the holding of Cooper Industries in such
a way.., would torture the plain meaning of the statute and discourage
PRPs not sued from cooperating and settling with PRPs who were sued."38 °
Of note, there was no civil action in Boarhead.
38 1
A court in New York limited the ability of a settlement with the
state to be stretched after-the-fact to resolve CERCLA liability so as to
enable a private party section 113 contribution action.3 2 Where a party
376 Id. at 1085-86. The court looked at the term "civil action" in Black's Law Dictionary
to find the term defined as a "non-criminal litigation," whereas "administrative order" is
defined as "'[a]n order issued by a government agency after an adjudicatory hearing' as
well as '[an agency regulation that interprets or applies a statutory provision.'" Id. at 1087
(quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1123 (7th ed. 1999)).
377 Id. at 1087.
378 Id.
1 381 F. Supp. 2d at 429-30 (E.D. Pa. 2005). All but one of the members in the group had
entered into one or more settlement agreements with the EPA, which were thereafter
entered in the district court as consent decrees. Id.
''Id. at 427.
38 1 Id. at 435-36. Even though the EPA settlement in Boarhead was entered in the district
court as consent decrees, the actions inBoarhead were not section 106 or section 107 civil
actions, but rather were governed by section 122 of CERCLA and therefore do not fall
within the scope of section 113(f)(1). Id. at 435-37.
32 W.R. Grace & Co. v. Zotos Intl, 61 Env't Rep. Cases (BNA) 1474, 1482 (W.D.N.Y.
May 3, 2005). The AOCs were entered with the state environmental agency during the
2009] 699
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POLY REV.
enters an AOC with the state that does not contain any reference to
CERCLA and does not purport to release federal CERCLA liability of the
settlor, that settlement relieves only state liability of the settlor and does
not qualify to enable a federal contribution action under CERCLA section
113."' In this case, the settling party amended its complaint after the
decision in Aviall to add the section 113(f)(3) contribution claim. 3 4 The
plaintiff argued that it had entered into "two administratively approved
settlements" with the state Department of Environmental Conservation,
that by their terms resolved its liability to the state, and therefore could
bring a claim for contribution under §113(f)(3). 385
The court disagreed and held that for a settlement to be valid
under CERCLA section 122, it "must bejudicially approved-i.e., entered
as a consent decree in the appropriate United States district court."
386
Section 122 of CERCLA provides the EPA with the authority to enter into
settlement agreements with a PRP and states that the settlement "must
be 'entered in the appropriate United States district court as a consent
decree."'38 7 Section 104 of CERCLA provides that a state may seek to exer-
cise CERCLA authority, including the EPA's authority to enter into settle-
ment agreements, upon application to the EPA, and the EPA "enter[ing]
into a contract or cooperative agreement with the State.' 388
In fact, states do not have direct enforcement power under
CERCLA, other than those rights of which a private party can avail it-
self. The states, which shoulder the great majority of hazardous sub-
stance legal enforcement responsibility, resolve disputes subject to
their state statutory authority. A Texas court held that state consent
1980s. Id. at 1479. The AOC purported only to resolve state liability, did not purport to
release CERCLA liability, and did not indicate any EPA concurrence with the settlement.
Id. at 1479-80. The liability was relieved only as to the state claims and not the CERCLA
claims. Id. at 1480.31 Id. at 1480.
38 Id. at 1475.385 Id. at 1476.
386 W.R. Grace & Co., 61 Env't Rep. Cases (BNA), at 1479.
387 Id. at 1477 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 9622(d)(1)(A) (2000)).
'Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 9604(d)(1)(A)). In looking at the terms of the 1988 Consent Order
issued by the state, the court found that nowhere did it "state that the DEC was exercising
any authority under CERCLA,... indicate that the EPA concurred with the remedy
selected and . . . provide a release as to any CERCLA claims." Id. at 1480. Moreover,
nowhere within the order was the term "CERCLA" used. Id. Thus, the 1988 Consent
Order only resolved Grace's liability to New York state and it could not bring a claim for
contribution under section 113(f)(3). Id.
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agreements do not constitute settlements resolving CERCLA liability.3"9
Where a state settlement is not subject to some form of public comment
and agency response before it is finalized, as is required by CERCLA
regulations,39 ° it is questionable whether it could qualify under section
113 of CERCLA as an administratively or judicially approved settlement.
InFerguson v. Arcata Redwood Company, L.L. C., No. C 03-05632SI, 2005
WL 1869445 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 5, 2005), the court articulated these require-
ments, holding that the letters exchanged between the plaintiff and the
state and federal authorities did not qualify as a settlement agreement
under section 113(f)(3) because the words "settlement" and "CERCLA"
were nowhere contained in the letters, nor did the agency documents state
that the state was acting pursuant to authority granted by the EPA.39'
State law bases for settlement do not satisfy the requisite for section
107 cost recovery. In ASARCO v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., No. CV 04-
2144-PHX-SRB, 2006 WL 173662 (D. Ariz. Jan. 24,2006), a memorandum
agreement settling a dispute that had not evolved to litigation was not
deemed a settlement satisfying the post-Aviall section 113 requirement.3 92
In Cadlerock Prov. Joint Venture v. Schilberg, a state civil order to
remediate a site was not a federal order under section 106 of CERCLA and
could not qualify to enable a section 113 contribution cost recovery path. 93
While it may provide neither the "sword" to empower private
party section 113 contribution rights, nor the "shield" of section 113(f)
protection from suit for contribution, a settlement with a state authority
at an eligible hazardous waste response site complying with a state pro-
gram can create a bar on subsequent federal prosecution.394 This is sim-
ilar to the "overfiling" bar that the court has imposed in certain instances
389 See Vine St., L.L.C. v. Keeling, 362 F. Supp. 2d 754, 761 (E.D. Tex. 2005). In this
case, a settlement with the Texas environmental agency did not constitute an admin-
istratively-approved settlement for purposes of also having CERCLA liability. Id.
39o See 42 U.S.C. § 9622(d)(2) (2000).
391 See Ferguson v. Arcata Redwood Co., No. C03-05632SI, 2005 WL 1869445, at *5 (N.D.
Cal. Aug. 5, 2005).392 See Asarco v. Union Pac. R.R., No. CV 04-2144-PHX-SRB, 2006 WL 173662, at *1 (D.
Ariz. Jan. 24, 2006). The court found that the agreement satisfied neither section 113 nor
section 122 of CERCLA, and rejected the argument that where states were delegated to
oversee clean-up, the states could fashion CERCLA clean-up outside the normal contours
of section 111. Id. at *9. See also Pharmacia Corp. v. Clayton Chem. Acquisition LLC, 382
F. Supp. 2d 1079, 1084-86 (S.D.Ill. 2005); W.R. Grace, 61 Env't Rep. at, 1478-79 (discussing
what rises to the meaning of "settlement" under CERCLA).
... Cadlerock Prop. Joint Venture, L.P. v. Schilberg, No. 3:01CV896 (MRK), 2005 WL
1683494 at *5-6 (D. Conn. July 19, 2005).
394 42 U.S.C. § 9628(b) (2000). The state program must qualify, and the site addressed
must also qualify. 42 U.S.C. § 9628(b).
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to protect private parties from both federal and state prosecution for the
same offense.395 Courts can suspend the entry of judgment on state law
claims until federal Superfund claims are resolved, so as to prevent double
recovery.39" Alternatively, prospective purchaser agreements can be nego-
tiated with the EPA as an alternative means of barring subsequent fed-
eral liability, but they do not provide a springboard for section 113 private
party contribution claims.397 Thus, this could bar subsequent federal lia-
bility of a potential party defendant, but would not open an avenue under
Aviall to initiate a section 113 action by a private settling party against
other allegedly co-responsible private parties.
IV. RESOLVING INTERPRETIVE CRISIS: ATLANTIC RESEARCH
The 2007 decision of the Supreme Court in United States v. Atlantic
Research Corp., 127 S. Ct. 2331 (U.S. 2007), reopened one of the paths for
private Superfund cost allocation by PRPs.39 s Without this subsequent
decision, the 2004 Aviall decision of the Supreme Court, coupled with the
various decisions of eleven federal circuit courts, would have barred most
of the means of allocating private Superfund liability among responsible
parties. The interesting question is how this blockage was created. The
answer is that it was the decision of the eleven federal circuit courts, not
the Supreme Court, that created the blockage.
395 Some courts have ruled that principles of resjudicata bar the EPA from pursuing an
enforcement case against a company that is settling the same charges with the state re-
garding the same violation. See Harmon Indus., Inc. v. Browner, 191 F.3d 894,902-4 (8th
Cir. 1999). The principle of resjudicata comes from the Full Faith and Credit Act, 28 U.S.C.
§1738 (2000). Most federal courts, however, have not found a bar to overfiling. United
States v. Elias, 269 F.3d 1003, 1011-12 (9th Cir. 2001) (RCRA supplants only the permit-
ting, and not the enforcement, authority of RCRA via an authorized state RCRA program).
See also United States v. Flanagan, 126 F. Supp. 2d 1284, 1285-86, 89 (C.D. Ca. 2000);
United States v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 143 F. Supp. 2d 1054, 1088-92 (W.D. Wisc. 2001)
(despite prior and ongoing state actions alleging identical issues, EPA allowed to proceed
on Clean Air, Clean Water and RCRA violations because lack of res judicata). Amend-
ments to CERCLA in 2001 attempted to prevent federal overfiling, where both the state
and federal government pursue simultaneous, and perhaps duplicative, enforcement
actions. See Small Business Liability Relief and Brownfields Revitalization Act, Pub. L.
No. 107-118, § 9628 (2002). Excepting limited circumstances, under Title 42 § 9614 of the
U.S. Code, the EPA may not bring an administrative or judicial enforcement action to
recover response costs at sites that have been addressed under a state program. 42 U.S.C.
§ 9614(b).
" Braswell Shipyards, Inc. v. Beazer E., Inc., 2 F.3d 1331, 1338-39 (4th Cir. 1993).
397 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B).
398 Atlantic Research, 127 S. Ct. at 2335.
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There is no logical reason why all of the circuit courts should have
gone where they did in blocking access to CERCLA section 107 actions for
private hazardous substance liability prior to 1994. It appears that this
is a deviation from all other CERCLAjudicial precedent. The rich palette
of CERCLA precedent has always applied a consistent and expressly
liberal construction of CERCLA-with only one exception: the restrictive
section 107 limitations of eleven federal circuits, discussed in this article.39
These section 107-denying circuit decisions are notably contrary to the rest
of the CERCLA precedent.
The statutory text itself, its legislative history, and the remedial
purpose of CERCLA compel liberal construction of the statute, which would
create a different interpretation of section 107's reach than that reached
by the circuit courts. In fact, courts interpreting CERCLA have invoked
the remedial purpose canon of statutory construction to liberally inter-
pret CERCLA, doing so more often than in the interpretation of any other
environmental statute.400 The purpose of liberal interpretation of CERCLA,
as articulated by the federal courts, is: (1) to protect public health and the
environment, (2) to promote prompt and efficient clean-ups of hazardous
substance problems, and (3) to shift the costs of site remediation from
taxpayers to those dealing in hazardous substances.40 '
A. Key Superfund Interpretive Precedent
1. Liberal Statutory Construction to Protect Public Health &
Environment
CERCLA, with the notable exception of the circuit courts' section
107 private-party cost recovery rights that are discussed in this article,
is always liberally construed to protect public health and the environ-
ment as its remedial purpose. CERCLA was enacted by Congress to
"address the increasing environmental and health problems associated
with inactive hazardous waste sites."402 Specifically, "CERCLA is a 'broad
399 See infra Part IV.A.1.
40 See Blake A. Watson, Liberal Construction of CERCLA Under the Remedial Purpose
Canon: Have the Lower Courts Taken a Good Thing Too Far?, 20 HARv. ENVTL. L. REV.
199, 238, 241, 261-63, 271, 280, 286 (1996).401Id. at 272-73. (citing United States v. Witco Corp., 865 F. Supp. 245,247 (E.D. Pa. 1994)).
4 2 Nurad, Inc. v. William E. Hooper & Sons Co., 966 F.2d 837,841 (4th Cir. 1992). See also
Axel Johnson, Inc. v. Carroll Carolina Oil Co., 191 F.3d 409,416 (4th Cir. 1999) (quoting
Westfarm Assocs. v. Washington Suburban Sanitary Comm'n, 66 F.3d 669,677 (4th Cir.
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remedial statute' . . enacted to assure that those responsible for any
damage, environmental harm, or injury from chemical poisons bear the
costs of their actions."4 °3
In fact, "courts generally resolve ambiguities in CERCLA's lan-
guage in favor of imposing the most expansive interpretation, citing the
statute's remedial purpose.' ° The federal courts have held that "'statutes
which are enacted for the protection and preservation of public health'
are to be given 'an extremely liberal construction for the accomplishment
1995)) ("Congress enacted CERCLA 'to protect public health and the environment from
inactive hazardous waste sites.'"); Westfarm Assocs. v. Washington Suburban Sanitary
Comm'n, 66 F.3d 669, 677 (4th Cir. 1995) ("Congress enacted CERCLA to protect public
health and the environment from inactive hazardous waste sites."); United States v.
Kayser-Roth Corp., 910 F.2d 24, 26 (1st Cir. 1990) ("It [CERCLA] is a remedial statute
designed to protect and preserve public health and the environment.... [We] construe
its provisions liberally to avoid frustration of the beneficial legislative purpose.");
Dedham Water Co., v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc., 805 F.2d 1074,1081 (lstCir. 1986)
("CERCLAis essentially a remedial statute designed by Congress to protect and preserve
public health and the environment.").
4 Prisco v. A & D Carting Corp., 168 F.3d 593, 602 (2d Cir. 1999) (CERCLA is a broad
remedial statute that should be liberally construed to carry out its purposes.). See also
Uniroyal Chem. Co., v. Deltech Corp., 160 F.3d 238, 242 (5th Cir. 1999).
CERCLA was enacted in 1980 as a broad remedial measure aimed at
assuring that "those responsible for any damage, environmental harm,
or injury from chemical poisons bear the costs of their actions."... In
light of that purpose we are obligated to construe its provisions liberally
in order to avoid frustrating Congress' intent.
Id. (quoting S. REP. No. 848, at 13 (1980)) (citations omitted); United States v. Chapman,
146 F.3d 1166, 1175 (9th Cir. 1998) ("CERCLA is remedial legislation that should be con-
strued liberally to carry out its purpose."); Schiavone v. Pearce, 79 F.3d 248, 253 (2d Cir.
1996). Schiavone held that Congress enacted CERCLA with the expansive, remedial
purpose of ensuring
"that those responsible for any damage, environmental harm, or injury
from chemical poisons bear the costs of their actions." . . . One of
CERCLA's primary goals is to extend liability to all those involved in
creating harmful environmental conditions.... Courts should construe
the statute liberally in order to effect these congressional concerns.
Id. (quoting S. REP. No. 848, at 13 (1980)) (citations omitted); United States v. Carolina
Transformer Co., 978 F.2d 832,838 (4th Cir. 1992) ("[Slince CERCLA is a remedial statute,
its provisions should be construed broadly to avoid frustrating the legislative purpose.");
United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 964 F.2d 252,258 (3d Cir. 1992) ("As numerous
courts have observed, CERCLA is a remedial statute which should be construed liberally
to effectuate its goals."); United States v. Parsons, 936 F.2d 526, 528-29 (11th Cir. 1991)
(holding that CERCLA should not be interpreted "in any way that apparently frustrates
the statute's goals, in the absence of a specific congressional intention otherwise.").
4 United States v. A & N Cleaners and Launderers, Inc., 788 F. Supp. 1317, 1331
(S.D.N.Y. 1992).
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and maximization of their beneficent objectives.'"4 5 Several courts have
also stated that CERCLA was designed to "enhance the authority of the
EPA to respond effectively and promptly to toxic pollutant spills that
threaten the environment and human health," and as such should be
construed liberally in order to effectuate this purpose.40 6 There is a con-
sistent pattern of liberal CERCLA construction to protect public health
and the environment.4 7
2. Liberally Interpret CERCLA to Effectuate Legislative Purpose
of Facilitating Prompt Voluntary Clean-Ups
A "fundamental purpose of CERCLA," as structured with two
avenues for allocation of private party remediation costs, is the "prompt
and efficient clean-up of hazardous waste sites." °8 A second goal is to
encourage voluntary clean-ups.40 9 A number of courts found these policy
40 United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 619 F. Supp. 162,192 (D.C.Mo. 1985) (quoting
3 SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, §71.02 at 313). See also
Westfarm Assocs. v. Washington Suburban Sanitary Comm'n, 66 F.3d 669,677 (4th Cir.
1995) ("CERCLA is a comprehensive remedial statutory scheme, and as such, the courts
must construe its provisions liberally to avoid frustrating the legislature's purpose.");
First United Methodist Church v. United States Gypsum Co., 882 F.2d 862,867 (4th Cir.
1989) ("... CERCLA, as all remedial statutes, must be given a broad interpretation to
effect its ameliorative goals.").
" Mainline Contracting Corp. v. Chopra-Lee, Inc., 109 F. Supp. 2d 110, 117 (W.D.N.Y.
2000) (quoting B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Murtha, 958 F.2d 1192, 1197 (2d Cir. 1992)).
17 See, e.g., Hanford Downwinders Coal., Inc. v. Dowdle, 71 F.3d 1469, 1473-74 (9th Cir.
1995) (holding that CERCLA was enacted to preserve and protect the environment and
public health by facilitating prompt, efficient cleanups); Westfarm, 66 F.3d at 677; General
Elec. Co. v. AAMCO Transmissions, Inc., 962 F.2d 281, 285 (2d Cir. 1992)
CERCLA is a broad, remedial statute enacted by Congress in order to
enable the Environmental Protection Agency... to respond quickly and
effectively to hazardous waste spills that threaten the environment, and
to ensure "that those responsible for any damage, environmental harm,
or injury from chemical poisons bear the costs of their actions."
Id. (quoting S. REP. No. 848, at 13 (1980)); Prisco v. New York, 902 F. Supp. 374, 382
(S.D.N.Y. 1995) ("CERCLA should be interpreted liberally, as Congress intended.");
Verticare, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3062, at *4; United States v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., No.
86-2862-4B, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17123, at *3 (W.D. Tenn. Apr. 6, 1988) ("CERCILA is...
essentially a remedial statute, the provisions of which must be construed liberally in order
to avoid frustration of the beneficial legislative purpose."); Moore, 698 F. Supp. at 626.
' Voluntary Purchasing Groups, Inc. v. Reilly, 889 F.2d 1380, 1386 (5th Cir. 1989); J.V.
Peters & Co. v. EPA, 767 F.2d 263, 264 (6th Cir. 1985); United States v. Kramer, 770 F.
Supp. 954, 958 (D.N.J. 1991).
' See, e.g., Mobay Corp. v. Allied-Signal, Inc., 761 F. Supp. 345, 349 (D.N.J. 1991):
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goals to be driving rationales in upholding the incentives for voluntary
clean-up embedded in private party access to section 107 cost recovery.41°
Other courts have kept section 107 open so as to promote PRP settle-
ment.41' These dual policy goals are consistent with the plain meaning
of section 107's broad language.
In the first two decades of the statute, this policy was a luxury, as
the EPA had the Superfund and its Superfund tax base to fund clean-ups.412
However, in recent years, with the demise of the Superfund tax and in-
creasingly smaller real levels of annual congressional appropriation for
clean-up, policy goals to motivate voluntary clean-ups are paramount.413
Although Congress enacted the Superfund as a last resort to pay
for the clean-up of hazardous waste sites, CERCLA places the ultimate
financial burden for toxic waste clean-up on those parties deemed respon-
sible for creating the harmful conditions.414 Specifically, Congress in-
tended that liability under CERCLA apply retroactively. 415 The Second
Circuit Court of Appeals explained, "[a]s a remedial statute, CERCLA
A fundamental policy underlying CERCLA is to accomplish this objec-
tive at the primary expense of private responsible parties rather than
taxpayers. The House Report explained that the purpose of § 107 of
CERCLA is "to provide a mechanism for prompt recovery of monies
expended for the costs of [remedial actions] ... from persons respon-
sible therefore and to induce such potentially liable persons to pursue
appropriate environmental response actions voluntarily."
Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 1016, at 33 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119,6136).
41 Amcast Indus. Corp. v. Detrex Corp., 2 F.3d 746,748 (7th Cir. 1993); General Elec. Co.
v. Litton Indus. Automation Sys., 920 F.2d 1415, 1417-18 (8th Cir. 1990); Charter Twp.
Of Oshtemo v. American Cyanamid Co., No. 1:92:CV:843,1993 WL 561814, at *1-2 (W.D.
Mich. Aug. 19, 1993); Kelly v. Thomas Solvent Co., 790 F. Supp. 710, 717 (W.D. Mich.
1990); United States v. Hardage, 733 F. Supp. 1424, 1431-32, 39 (W.D. Okla. 1989);
O'Neil v. Picillo, 682 F. Supp. 706, 725-26 (D.R.I. 1988); Colorado v. ASARCO, Inc., 608
F. Supp. 1484, 1492 (D. Colo. 1985); City of Philadelphia v. Stepan Chem. Co., 544 F.
Supp. 1135, 1142-43 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
411 See, e.g., B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Betkoski, 99 F.3d 505, 514 (2d Cir. 1996); In re
Cuyahoga Equip. Corp., 980 F.2d 110, 119 (2d Cir. 1992).412 See Roeder, supra note 8, at S-16.
413 Id. at S-14, S-15.
414 United States v. Sharon Steel Corp., 681 F. Supp. 1492, 1495 (D. Utah 1987). See also
Artesian Water Co. v. Government of New Castle County, 659 F. Supp. 1269, 1276
(D.Del. 1987).
415 Ninth Ave. Remedial Group v. Fiberbond Corp., 946 F. Supp. 651, 656-57 (N.D. Ind.
1996). This court, however, rejected the argument that the general remedial purpose of
CERCLA should encourage a "liberal" construction on the retroactivity issue: "That the
statute was enacted to remedy a hazardous waste problem does not make the statute
'remedial' for the purpose of retroactive application." Id. at 657.
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should be construed liberally to give effect to its purposes .... These
include facilitating efficient responses to environmental harm, holding
responsible parties liable for the costs of the cleanup,... and encourag-
ing settlements that reduce the inefficient expenditure of public funds on
lengthy litigation."416
In implementing this concept, a district court stated that CERCLA
must be construed broadly and liberally to effect its pur-
poses, namely, to allow the federal government to respond ef-
fectively to 'problems of national magnitude resulting from
hazardous waste disposal' and to assure that those who profit
from hazardous activities 'bear the costs and responsibility for
remedying the harmful conditions they created.' 17
This court found that a narrow interpretation of CERCLA would be detri-
mental because it would "'limit the liability of those responsible for
cleanup costs beyond the limits expressly provided.'"418 There is a consis-
tent pattern of liberal construction of CERCLA language to promote
prompt remediation of contaminated sites.419
416 B.F. Goodrich v. Betkoski, 99 F.3d 505,514 (2d Cir. 1996) (internal citations omitted);
see also United States v. U.S.X. Corp., 68 F.3d 811, 822 (3d Cir. 1995) (quoting United
States v. Cordova Chem. Co. of Mich., 59 F.3d 584, 588 (6th Cir. 1995) (holding that
CERCLA is "to be construed liberally in order to effectuate its goals .... 'Liberal con-
struction,' however, may not be employed 'as a means for filling in the blanks so as to
discern congressional intent to impose liability under nearly every conceivable scenario.').
417 United States v. Sharon Steel Corp., 681 F. Supp. 1492, 1495 (D. Utah 1987) (quoting
United States v. Reilly Tar & Chem. Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100, 1112 (D. Minn. 1982)).
Accord Prisco v. New York, 902 F. Supp. 400, 405 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) ("The statute is to be
construed broadly in order to accomplish Congressional intent."); State of New York v.
Lashins Arcade Co., 856 F. Supp. 153, 158 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) ("A broadly phrased statute,
like CERCLA must be interpreted to promote its objectives."); CP Holdings, Inc. v.
Goldberg-Zoino & Assocs., Inc., 769 F. Supp. 432 (D.N.H. 1991) (CERCLA is remedial and
must be construed liberally to achieve its purposes); Violet v. Picillo, 648 F. Supp. 1283,
1288 (D.R.I. 1986)
Congress intended broad judicial interpretation of CERCLA in order to
give full effect to two important legislative purposes: to give the federal
government the tools necessary for a prompt and effective response to
hazardous waste problems and to force those responsible for creating
hazardous waste problems to bear the cost of their actions.
Id.
418 Sharon Steel Corp., 681 F. Supp. 1495.
419 One Wheeler Road Associates v. Foxboro Co., 843 F. Supp. 792, 795 (D. Mass. 1994)
("CERCLA should be given a broad and liberal construction, and should not be narrowly
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3. Congressional Purpose and Responsibility To Pay
According to many courts, the statutory language of CERCLA
should also be interpreted liberally so that taxpayers do not have to pay
for the clean-up of hazardous materials.42 ° Specifically, many courts have
stated that "[blecause it is a remedial statute, CERCLA must be construed
liberally to effectuate its two primary goals: (1) enabling the EPA to re-
spond efficiently and expeditiously to toxic spills, and (2) holding those
parties [potentially] responsible for the releases liable for the costs of the
cleanup."421 In order to accomplish those goals, "Congress created a broad
scheme of liability which provided that responsible 'persons' should be
held liable for the costs of environmental cleanup, subject only to the
interpreted to frustrate the government's ability to respond promptly, or to limit the
liability of those responsible for cleanup costs beyond the limits expressly provided.");
Freudenberg-NOK Gen. P'ship v. Thomopoulos, No. C91-2976, 1991 WL325290, at 3
(D.N.H. Dec. 9, 1991) ("CERCLA should be given a broad and liberal construction," so as
not "to frustrate the government's ability to respond promptly and effectively, or to limit
the liability of those responsible for cleanup costs beyond the limits expressly provided.").
420 Commander Oil Corp. v. Barlo Equip. Corp., 215 F.3d 321, 327 (2d Cir. 2000);
Burlington N. and Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Consolidated Fibers, Inc., 7 F. Supp. 2d 822, 826
(N.D. Tex. 1998)
CERCLA is a federal statute which provides for the cleanup of sites con-
taminated by the disposal of hazardous substances. Its "broad, remedial
purpose is to facilitate the prompt cleanup of hazardous waste sites and
to shift the cost of environmental response from the taxpayers to the
parties who benefited from the wastes that caused the harm."
Id. (quoting OHM Remediation Servs. v. Evans Cooperage Co., 116 F.3d 1574, 1578 (5th
Cir. 1997)); Chesapeake and Potomac Tel. Co. of Va. v. Peck Iron & Metal Co., 814 F.
Supp. 1266, 1269 (E.D. Va. 1992) ("The broad remedial purposes behind the enactment
of CERCLA seek to attempt to hold responsible parties liable for cleaning up hazardous
waste sites.., in lieu of imposing that duty upon taxpayers with absolutely no connection
to the pollution at issue.").
421 Commander Oil, 215 F.3d at 327 (quoting B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Murtha, 958 F.2d 1192,
1198 (2d Cir. 1992)); Nestle USA Beverage Div., Inc. v. D.H. Overmyer Co., Inc., No.
C-96-1207 VRW, 1998 WL 321450, at 4 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 27,1998) ("This view is consistent
with the notion that CERCLA is to be liberally construed to accomplish the goal of allo-
cating the ultimate cost of cleaning up disposal sites to the parties responsible for their
contamination."); California v. Verticare, Inc., No. C-92-1006 MHP, 1993 WL 245544, at
*2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 1, 1993) ("Congress intended that those who are responsible for
the release of hazardous substances, rather than the taxpayers, shall be liable for the
financial burden of remedying the harmful conditions they created."); CPC Int'l v.
Aerojet-General Corp., 777 F. Supp. 549, 571 (W.D. Mich. 1991) ("CERCLA is a broad
remedial statute" and must be construed "broadly to avoid frustrating its legislative
purpose" of facilitating prompt cleanups by placing financial responsibility "on those
responsible for the pollution.").
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enumerated defenses laid out in § [sic] 107(b), and '[nlotwithstanding any
other provisions or rule of law [.],,422
This legislative purpose is illustrated with the creation of the
Superfund, coupled with the private right of action created under section
107 of CERCLA that holds responsible parties liable for clean-up cost
recovery: "Congress intended that those responsible for problems caused
by the disposal of chemical poisons bear the costs and responsibility for
remedying the harmful conditions they created."423
In order to avoid frustrating these legislative purposes and effec-
tuate prompt clean-ups by private parties under section 107, the First
Circuit Court of Appeals in Dedham Water held that it was obligated to
422 Burlington N., 7 F. Supp. 2d at 826 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (2000)); see also 42
U.S.C. § 9607(b) (2000)
There shall be no liability under subsection (a) of this section for a person
otherwise liable who can establish by a preponderance of the evidence
that the release or threat of release of a hazardous substance and the
damages resulting therefrom were caused solely by-
(1) an act of God;
(2) an act of war;
(3) an act of omission of a third party other than an employee or agent
of the defendant, or than one whose act or omission occurs in connection
with a contractual relationship, existing directly or indirectly with the
defendant ....
Id.
423 Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Dairy Farms, Inc., 805 F.2d. 1074, 1081 (1986); see
also Olin Corp. v. Yeargin Inc., 31 C.W.L.R. 1, 45-46 (E.D. Tenn. 1998) (quoting United
States v. Cordova Chem. Co. of Mich., 59 F.3d 584, 588 (6th Cir. 1995)) (holding that
courts should not rely "on the principle of liberally constructing remedial legislation as
a means for filling in the blanks of CERCLA 'so as to discern a congressional intent to
impose liability under nearly every conceivable scenario'.. . CERCLA liability 'attaches
only to those parties who.., helped create the harmful conditions."); Verticare, 1993 WL
245544, at *2 ("Congress created the Superfund, which empowers the federal government
to respond to hazardous waste disposal."); Piccolini v. Simon's Wrecking, 686 F. Supp.
1063, 1068-67 (M.D. Pa. 1988); Pinole Point Prop., Inc. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 596 F.
Supp. 283, 287 (1984)
A review of the statute and the Committee Reports reveals at least two
Congressional concerns that survived the final amendments to the Act.
First, Congress intended that the federal government be immediately
given the tools necessary for prompt and effective response to problems
of national magnitude resulting from hazardous waste disposal. Second,
Congress intended that those responsible for problems caused by the
disposal of chemical poisons bear the cost [sic] and responsibility for
remedying the harmful conditions they created.
Id. (quoting United States v. Reilly Tar & Chem. Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100, 1112 (D.C.
Minn. 1982)).
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interpret the terms of CERCLA liberally: "[wie will not interpret section
9607(a) in any way that apparently frustrates the statute's goals, in the
absence of a specific congressional intent otherwise."4 Specifically, the
court held that "[tihis reading of the statute serves both congressional
purposes by preserving the limited resources of the Fund and by ensuring
that liability will be apportioned among parties responsible for the re-
lease of hazardous substances whenever possible."425 The Ninth Circuit
held that since CERCLA should be "given a broad, liberal construction....
exceptions to CERCLA liability should.., be narrowly construed."426
B. Applying the Correct Judicial Principles of Statutory
Construction
1. Canons of Statutory Construction
The canons of statutory construction are a set of prudential rules
that guide judges in interpreting the meanings of statutes.427 They have
also been called "'the collective folk wisdom of statutory interpretation."42
There are two general types of canons: text-oriented and substantive.429
The text-oriented canons are aimed at ascertaining the legislature's in-
tent.43 ° Conversely, the substantive canons "'do not purport to describe
accurately what Congress actually intended or what the words of a statute
mean, but rather direct courts to construe any ambiguity in a particular
way in order to further some policy objective."'43' There are canons that
424 Dedham Water, 759 F.2d at 1081 (quoting New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d
1032, 1045 (2d Cir. 1985). See also Cordova Chem., 59 F.3d at 588 (quoting United States
v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 910 F.2d 24, 26 (1st Cir. 1990)) (internal citations omitted)
("Congress did enact CERCLA as a 'remedial statute designed to protect and preserve
public health and the environment.'... Accordingly, courts generally will not interpret
§ 9607(a) in a way that apparently frustrates the statute's goals in the absence of specific
congressional intent otherwise.").425 Dedham Water, 759 F.2d at 1081.
426 Idaho v. Hanna Mining Co., 882 F.2d 392, 396 (9th Cir. 1989) (internal citations
omitted).
427 Watson, supra note 400, at 208 (citing Tucker, The Gospel of Statutory Rules Requiring
Liberal Interpretation According to St. Peter's, 35 U. TORONTO L.J. 113, 114 (1985)).4
1 Id. (quoting RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 280 (1990)).
429 Id. at 223.
430 Id.
1 Id. at 225 (quoting Stephen F. Ross, Where Have You Gone, Karl Llewellyn? Should
Congress Turn its Lonely Eyes to You?, 45 VAND. L. REV. 561,563 (1992) (emphasis added)).
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can be contradictory and can be used as post-hoc justifications. 2 Canons
applicable to the section 107 versus section 113 cost recovery debate in
the circuit courts are summarized below.
a. The Plain Meaning Rule
This canon was a foundation of the 2007 Supreme Court opinion
in United States v. Atlantic Research Corp., 127 S. Ct. 2331 (U.S. 2007).
The circuit courts had more difficulty determining what the "plain mean-
ing" of the section 107 CERCLA phrase "any other person" meant. 3
This canon asserts that the actual words of the statute are "the
most important evidence of its meaning,"434 "the final expression of the
meaning intended,"' and"the most authoritative interpretive criterion." s
Under the Plain Meaning Rule, the language used in the statute can be
objectively determined without recourse to, for example, legislative his-
tory.437 Where there is no significant or substantive legislative history,
as with section 107 of CERCLA, this canon becomes more applicable. This
canon restricts statutory interpretation to those circumstances unambig-
uously addressed in the legislative process, as evidenced by the specific
terms of the law." The key operative language of section 107 is "any other
person," stated after just having discussed EPA rights of cost recovery
and including others eligible for such cost recovery.
42 See Karl Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or
Canons About How Statutes are to be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 401 (1950).
See United States v. Atl. Research Corp., 127 S.Ct. 2331 (2007).
Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation-in the Classroom and in the Courtroom,
50 U. CHI. L. REv. 800, 808 (1983) (refuting conception that most judges actually begin
statutory interpretation by looking at the language of the act).
" Watson, supra note 400, at 212-13 (quoting United States v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co.,
278 U.S. 269, 278 (1929)).
436 Id. at 243 (quoting William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Inter-
pretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321, 354 (1990)).
437 Id. at 219-20. Adherents to the Plain Meaning Rule are also known as textualists, the
most well-known modern textualist being U.S. Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia.
See id.
' See id. at 219.
43' CERLCA § 107, 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (2000).
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b. The Ordinary Meaning Rule
The ordinary meaning canon is ancillary to the plain meaning
rule."' It directs the judiciary to interpret terms in accordance with their
ordinary "everyday" meaning unless otherwise defined by the statute. 1
Similarly, legal terms are to be given their ordinary legal meaning." 2
The section 107 CERCLA language of "any other person" in ordinary
meaning is an inclusion of all other persons not discussed in the prior
section 107 reference to the government and tribes. "Person" is defined
in CERCLA and its case law to include all natural and legal persons. 43
c. Give Meaning to Every Term
This canon derives from the precept that Congress, in drafting laws,
deliberately and specifically chooses the words in each statute." Terms in
a statute should neither be ignored, nor have their meanings diminished
when a court construes the law." As one court held: "[elvery word should
be given meaning and no word should be treated as surplusage or rendered
nugatory if at all possible."' Here, there are three key words to interpret
in section 107 of CERCLA: "any other person." Related to this canon is the
legal concept that a law "means as much as it says, not less."" 7 It is pre-
sumed that Congress would delete any terms that are unnecessary to give
the law its full meaning and effect.' If Congress did not want to include all
persons as potential party-plaintiffs under section 107, it could easily have
employed less broad or more restrictive language.
d. Purposivism
If the meaning of a statute is unclear, this canon counsels the
judiciary to look to the legislative purpose in drafting the law as an aid to
o See David L. Shapiro, Continuity and Change in Statutory Interpretation, 67 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 921, 931-34 (1992).
441 See Watson, supra note 400, at 224 n.109.
442 See United Techs. Corp. v. Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc., 33 F.3d 96, 99 (1994).
4342 U.S.C. § 9601.
44MICHAEL SINCLAIR, A GUIDE TO STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 146-47 (2000).
"5 Id.
"
6 Id. at 146 (quoting Stowers v. Wolodzko, 386 Mich. 119, 133 (1971)).
447 Id. at 147.
' See id. at 146.
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interpreting its meaning."9 The canon is premised on the idea that a
statute should be construed to effectuate the purpose or intent of Congress
in drafting it. 0 The uniform liberal construction of CERCLA to effect its
remedial and private clean-up incentive purposes, would be consistent with
the purposivism canon to interpret the Congress's use of the clause "any
other person" to include a broadest group of persons including other PRPs. 1
e. The Remedial Purpose Canon
The remedial purpose canon provides that public welfare statutes
are to be construed broadly."52 It was first postulated as the "mischief rule"
by Sir Edward Coke in Heydon's Case.453 This canon is further under-
girded by the conception that "if the legislature is trying to remedy some
ill, it would want the courts to construe the legislation to make it a more
rather than a less effective remedy for that ill."' Statutes that protect
public health and safety, or that are otherwise beneficial to the public, are
generally considered to be "remedial."455 As highlighted in Section (A)
above, the CERCLA case law interprets CERCLA as remedial in purpose
and broadly construes its terms.456
f. Repeals by Implication are Disfavored
This canon rests on the idea that Congress is aware of all statutes
drafted prior to the statute being construed, and would have explicitly re-
pealed any prior conflicting statutes, if that was its intent.4"7 By leaving
49 Donna D. Adler, A Conversational Approach to Statutory Analysis: Say What You Mean
& Mean What You Say, 66 MISS. L.J. 37, 56-58 (1996).
450 See id. at 56-59. Most commonly, the legislative history is reviewed by the judiciary
if it resorts to purposivism as an aid in interpreting a statute. See id. at 59-60.
451 See supra Part III.
452 Joel Mintz, Can You Reach New "Greens" if You Swing Old "Clubs"? Underutilized
Principles of Statutory Interpretation and Their Potential Applicability in Environmental
Cases, 7 ENVTL. LAWYER 295, 302 (2001).
41 Watson, supra note 400, at 229. At that time in England there were few statutes; most
law was common law. See id. Coke stated that in interpreting a statute the court should
suppress the mischief, and advance the remedy.' Id. (quoting Heydon's Case, 3 Co. Rep.
7a, 7b, 76 Eng. Rep. 637, 638 (Ex. 1584)).4
1 Posner, supra note 434, at 809. Posner argues that because statutes are the result of
compromise within the legislature, it is difficult to find a common remedial objective. Id.
455 Watson, supra note 400, at 236-38.
45See supra Part III.A.457 See Posner, supra note 434, at 812-813. See also Watson, supra note 400, at 225.
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the prior statutes intact, the legislature implies that they do not conflict
with the provisions of new statutes. Here, when SARA added section 113(f)
in 1986, section 107 as it currently stands-and more importantly as it had
been interpreted broadly by the courts to that point-had existed since
the original 1980 version of CERCLA.45 s Congress did not repeal or alter
section 107 to accommodate the new section 113." It was the circuits' de-
cisions that "repealed" effective private party access to section 107, merely
because section 113 is the primary vehicle favored by many of the cir-
cuits. 0 There should be no implied repeal where there is no explicit repeal.
2. The Circuits' Misapplication of the Core Canons Construing
CERCLA Sections 107 and 113
The eleven federal circuits did not apply the canons of statutory
construction as the Supreme Court did in Atlantic Research.461 The fed-
eral circuit courts took two basic steps to arrive at their blockage of sec-
tion 107. First, several of the later-to-decide circuits followed the lead of
earlier circuits.462 Second, many construed the language of section 113,
rather than the language of section 107, to determine the meaning of
section 107.463 However, there is no such interpretive preference in the
458 See CERCLA § 107, 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1980).
459 See CERCLA, § 107 (1980).4
"o See infra Part IV.B.2.a.
461 See 127 S. Ct. 2331 (2007).
462 See discussion of the Sixth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuit decisions, infra Part
IV.B.2.a.
" See discussions of the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuit Court
decisions infra Part IV.B.2.a. These circuits decided that section 113 is available to
private party-plaintiffs for cost contribution and that there needs to be no other path,
without ever construing the meaning of the express language of section 107 itself. They
then eliminated section 107 as interfering with or superfluous to section 113. This typical
judicial rationale proceeds that (1) the ordinary meaning of the term "contribution"
encompasses claims between liable parties, (2) the legislative history of the 1986 SARA
amendments makes clear that Congress's intent in drafting section 113(f) was to codify
the contribution action for liable parties that have paid more than their pro rata share of
remediation costs, (3) allowing a PRP to pursue the section 107 cost recovery cause of action
would render section 113 superfluous because few plaintiffs would choose that more
burdensome section 113 cause of action, and (4) the earlier decisions of the other circuits
limited PRPs to only the section 113(f) claim for contribution. See, e.g., discussions of the
First, Sixth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuit Courts infra Part IV.B.2.a. Thus, the federal courts
of appeal identified section 113(f) as a cause of action for PRPs and extrapolated that
interpretation to negatively imply that section 107 cost recovery claims cannot also be
available to PRPs. See for example the discussion of United Technologies Corp. v.
Browning-Ferris Industries, Inc., infra Part IV.B.2.a.
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statute or the legislative history.4" It is suspect to determine the intent
of section 107 without interpreting the language of section 107.
Some of the circuit courts that held that section 107 was not avail-
able to private parties inferred a congressional purpose, in enacting section
113(f) in the 1986 SARA amendments, of impliedly correcting and pre-
empting the use of the previously enacted section 107.465 However, there
was nothing to "correct." The first court decision granting broad section 107
rights to private PRPs did not even occur until 1987, after the Congress
added section 113 with the SARA amendments in 1986.466 Section 113(f)
was added before any critical section 107jurisprudence was decided. There-
fore, the rationale adopted by some circuits, that section 113 was added to
correct and limit the rampant application of section 107 by private party-
plaintiffs to recover costs, does not comport with a true time line. The SARA
amendments' legislative history indicates that SARA's creation of the new
section 113 was only meant to accomplish the codification of the implied
right to contribution found in court decisions, not to impliedly preempt
any other avenues for cost recovery contained elsewhere in CERCLA.1
7
a. The Individual Circuit Decisions
The First Circuit in United Technologies Corp. v. Browning-Ferris
Industries, Inc., 33 F.3d 96 (1st Cir. 1994), looked to the traditional sec-
tion 113 meaning of the term "contribution" and followed the "ordinary
meaning" canon of construction, stating that actions between potentially
liable parties to recover an over-payment of a party's fair share is by defi-
nition a contribution claim.468 But this approach interpreted section 113
rather than section 107. By negative implication, it is not appropriate to
interpret and endorse section 113, and without direct interpretation there-
after backhandedly preclude section 107 cost recovery claims by PRPs.469
4- See CERCLA §§ 107, 113,42 U.S.C. §§ 9607,9613 (2000); H.R. REP. No. 99-253, pt. 1, at
59 (1985) (demonstrating no intention to substitute the meaning of section 113 for that
of section 107).
4" See, e.g., Centerior Servs. Co. v. Acme Scrap Iron & Metal Corp., 153 F.3d 344, 352
(6th Cir. 1998).
' Sand Springs Home v. Interplastic Corp., 670 F. Supp. 913, 916 (N.D. Okla. 1987)
(holding that there is implied right to contribution where PRP brought and was allowed
to maintain section 107 cost recovery action against other PRPs).
47 See H.R. REP. No. 99-253, pt. 1 (1985), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2835,2863; S.
REP. No. 99-11, at 44 (1985).
United Techs., 33 F.3d at 98-101, 103.
9 See id. at 98-103.
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The issue is not to clear an unobstructed path for section 113, but to inter-
pret the express words and meaning of section 107, which the court avoids.
The Second Circuit first looked at this issue in Bedford Affiliates v.
Sills, 156 F.3d 416 (2d Cir. 1998), and similarly held that section 107 was
"not available.., for a potentially responsible party."470 It did so by find-
ing that section 113 was "added... as an express authorization of claims
for contribution" and then eliminating by negative implication the alterna-
tive competitive route of section 107 cost recovery.471 Like the First Circuit,
this court also held that allowing PRPs to pursue cost recovery actions
would render section 113 a nullity.472
Similarly, the Third Circuit also held that a PRP may not bring a
claim for recovery of costs against another PRP, relying on the ordinary
meaning of the legal term "contribution," as well as equitable concerns.473
However, the court again assiduously avoided construing the meaning of
section 107's language, preferring instead to endorse section 113 and then
eliminate the alternative of section 107, so as not to crowd section 113.
The Fifth Circuit did not immediately join the elimination of re-
course to section 107 cost recovery, instead interpreting the "any other
person" language broadly under plain meaning.475 In 1989, when the Fifth
Circuit first addressed the issue of response costs in Amoco Oil Co. v.
470 Bedford Affiliates, 156 F.3d at 423.
471 Id.
472 Id. at 424.
473New Castle County v. Halliburton NUS Corp., 111 F.3d 1116, 1119, 21 (3d Cir. 1997).
The Third Circuit defined contribution as "a claim by and between jointly and severally
liable parties for an appropriate division of the payment one of them has been compelled
to make." Id. at 1121 (quoting United Technologies Corp. v. Browning-Ferris Indus., 33
F.3d 96, 99 (1st Cir. 1994)). See also In re Reading Co., 115 F.3d 1111, 1117-19 (3d Cir.
1997) (holding that the plain language of section 113 provided for contribution to be the
cause of action between PRPs); New Jersey Tpk. Auth. v. PPG Indus., Inc., 197 F.3d 96,
104 (3d Cir. 1999) (Following precedent by holding that "[s]ection 113 of SARA provides
for recovery by way of contribution by one PRP from another PRP.").474 New Castle County, 111 F.3d at 1123-24, n.8. The Third Circuit cited the arguments
of other circuits in holding that PRPs may not bring section 107 cost recovery actions. Id.
at 1124 (citing the First, Seventh and Tenth Circuits). The Fourth Circuit also chose to
disregard the canons of construction. See, e.g., Axel Johnson, Inc. v. Carroll Carolina Oil
Co., 191 F.3d 409,415 (4th Cir. 1999); Pneumo Abex Corp. v. High Point, Thomasville and
Denton R.R., 142 F.3d 769, 776 (4th Cir. 1998). By the time of the Axel Johnson decision,
the Sixth and Ninth Circuits had ruled on this issue. See, e.g., Centerior Serv. Co. v.
Acme Scrap Iron & Metal Corp., 153 F.3d 344, 356 (6th Cir. 1998); Pinal Creek Group v.
Newmont Mining Corp., 118 F.3d 1298, 1306 (9th Cir. 1997).475 See OHM Remediation Servs. v. Evans Cooperage Co., 116 F.3d 1574, 1579 (5th Cir.
1997).
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Borden, Inc., 889 F.2d 664 (5th Cir. 1989), it did not require that only a con-
tribution claim is available to such PRPs.4 7' Later, in OHM Remediation
Services v. Evans Cooperage Co., Inc., 116 F.3d 1574 (5th Cir. 1997), the
Fifth Circuit addressed whether a section 107 action "is restricted to per-
sons with a 'protectable interest' in the cleanup site."477 The court held
that there was no such requirement in CERCLA, and further stated that
"section 107 does not limit the class of plaintiffs who may recover response
costs .... [The construction ofil section 107 evidences congressional intent
that anyone is eligible to recover response costs."4 7
In confronting the issue of standing to sue under section 107, the
Sixth Circuit cascaded behind the other circuits that had previously ruled
on the issue.479 Without dealing with the meaning of section 107, the court
determined that the ordinary meaning of the term "contribution" in sec-
tion 113 encompasses actions by one liable party that has paid more than
its pro rata share against another liable party.480 The court construed only
section 113's plain language, not that of section 107."' The court ruled that
the legislative purpose of the statute supported this conclusion. 2 It also
stated that construing the statute so that PRPs are limited to section 113
contribution actions "gives meaning" to both section 107 and section 113.'
In reality, the meaning it gives section 107 is so restrictive as to be non-
operative in most cases and to bludgeon the remedial incentives and
purposes of CERCLA. Post-Aviall, it leaves no significant avenue for cost
recovery.
476Amoco Oil, 889 F.2d at 672 ("[wlhen one liable party sues another to recover its equitable
share of the response costs, the action is one for contribution....") The Amoco Oil court
discussed response costs without requiring a showing that the plaintiff is not a PRP. Id.
at 669-70.
177 OHM Remediation Servs., 116 F.3d at 1579.478 Id. In the same decision, however, the court expressly agrees with the First Circuit's
holding in United Technologies that an action for contribution should be understood in
its ordinary legal context to mean an action by one liable party against another liable party
to recover expenses incurred, "'in excess of its pro rata share.'" Id. at 1582 (quoting United
Technologies Corp. v. Browning-Ferris Indus., 33 F.3d 96, 103 (1st Cir. 1994)).47 9 Centerior Serv. Co. v. Acme Scrap Iron & Metal Corp., 153 F.3d 344, 349, 53 (6th Cir.
1998).
480 Id. at 350-51.
" Id. In interpreting the "any other person" language of section 107, the court held that
.any person may seek to recover costs under § 107(a) [sic], but... it is the nature of the
action which determines whether the action will be governed exclusively by § 107(a) or
by § 113(f) as well." Id. at 353.
482 Id. at 352.
' Id. See also id. at 352 n.11 (noting concern that section 113(f) not be rendered mean-
ingless).
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The Seventh Circuit, while leaving section 107 available for "inno-
cent" parties, implicitly relied on the ordinary meaning of the section 113
term, "contribution" as the basis for its ruling.4 In attempting to define
section 113 broadly, the court backhandedly restricted section 107, due to
the absence of a straightforward interpretation of section 107's language.
A 2003 Eighth Circuit ruling followed the cascade of circuit precedents and
held that a PRP's claim for recovery of cleanup costs is a claim for contri-
bution."5' The court cited the decisions of the other circuits as support for
its holding.48
The Ninth Circuit, in ruling that a PRP may not jointly and sever-
ally recover its cleanup costs from another liable party, purported to rely
on precedent and on "the text, structure, and legislative history of §§ 107
and 113.""' Again, the court focused only on the ordinary meaning of the
term "contribution" in section 113.488 Here, the court at least made some
attempt to dispose of the purpose of section 107."' The court stated that
section 107 implicitly contains a right for PRPs to bring contribution
4 Akzo Coatings, Inc. v. Aigner Corp., 30 F.3d 761, 764-65 (7th Cir. 1997). This was one
of the first of many times when a circuit court of appeals called this type of claim "a quin-
tessential claim for contribution."Id. at 764. However, the court suggested that a landowner
required to clean up a release of hazardous substances deposited on its land by entirely
unrelated third parties might be able to pursue a section 107 cost recovery action. See id.
Subsequent Seventh Circuit decisions reiterated this "innocent landowner" exception.
See, e.g., NutraSweet Co. v. X-L Eng'g Co., 227 F.3d 776, 784 (7th Cir. 2000); Rumpke of
Ind., Inc. v. Cummins Engine Co., 107 F.3d 1235, 1241 (7th Cir. 1997); AM Int'l, Inc. v.
Datacard Corp., 106 F.3d 1342, 1347 (7th Cir. 1997). But see W. Props. Serv. Corp. v. Shell
Oil Co., 358 F.3d 678,689-90 (9th Cir. 2004) (declining to adopt the innocent landowner
defense); Morrison Enters. v. McShares, Inc., 302 F.3d 1127, 1134-35 (10th Cir. 2002)
(ruling innocent landowner defense "does not square with the underlying purposes of
CERCLA"). InAkzo Coatings, the court asserted that the plaintiffs claim was, by definition,
for contribution regardless of how the plaintiff pled it. Akzo Coatings, 30 F.3d at 764. The
court stated Akzo's claim "remains one by and between jointly and severally liable parties
for an appropriate division of the payment one of them has been compelled to make." Id.
' Dico, Inc. v. Amoco Oil Co., 340 F.3d 525, 530-31 (8th Cir. 2003).
"s
6 Id. at 530 (citing New Jersey Tpk. Auth. v. PPG Indus., 197 F.3d 96, 104 (3d Cir. 1999);
Axel Johnson, Inc. v. Carroll Carolina Oil Co., 191 F.3d 409,415 (4th Cir. 1999); Bedford
Affiliates v. Sills, 156 F.3d 416,424 (2d Cir. 1998); Centerior Serv., 153 F.3d at 350; Pinal
Creek Group v. Newmont Mining Corp., 118 F.3d 1298, 1306 (9th Cir. 1997); Redwing
Carriers, Inc. v. Saraland Apartments, 94 F.3d 1489, 1496 (1 1th Cir. 1996); United States
v. Colorado & E. R.R. Co., 50 F.3d 1530, 1536 (10th Cir. 1995); United Techs. Corp. v.
Browning-Ferris Indus., 33 F.3d 96, 101 (1st Cir. 1994); Akzo Coatings, 30 F.3d at 764;
Amoco Oil Co. v. Borden, Inc., 889 F.2d 664, 672 (5th Cir. 1989)).
" Pinal Creek, 118 F.3d at 1299-1301.
488 Id. at 1301-02.
481 Id. at 1301.
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claims, codified by the SARA amendments in 1986, so that sections 107
and 113 are to be read together as one cause of action for a PRP.4 9° There
is no such legislative history in the SARA amendments.49' The court did
not construe the specific "any other person" text of section 107.492
The Tenth Circuit looked to the purpose of the SARA amendments,
rather than the exact language of the statute, to find that the ordinary
legal meaning of the term "contribution" is a claim to reapportion costs
between responsible parties .493 No controversy there. However, the court
proceeded, without fully discussing why, to hold that by allowing PRPs
to recover costs under section 107, "§ 113(f) would be rendered meaning-
less."494 The court explained its preference for section 113 to the exclusion
of section 107, and then eliminated access to section 107. The fact that
some private plaintiffs prefer the original and unchanged section 107 ave-
nue of cost recovery to the newer section 113, does not make the latter
"meaningless. 4 96
Relying on decisions of the Tenth and Fifth Circuits, the Eleventh
Circuit held that PRPs may not assert claims for recovery of costs under
section 107 in lieu of a contribution claim under section 1.3. Rather
than work through the applicable canons of statutory construction, the
41 Id. at 1301-02. The court goes on to state, "'Islection 113(f), however, does not create
the right of contribution-rather the source of a contribution claim is section 107(a).
Under CERCLA's [liability] scheme, section 107 governs liability, while section 113(f)
creates a mechanism for apportioning that liability among responsible parties.'" Id. at
1302 (quoting United States v. Asarco, Inc., 814 F. Supp. 951, 956 (D. Colo. 1993) (cita-
tions omitted)). The court also noted dictum from In re Dant & Russell, specifically, that
section 113 applies to cost recovery actions brought by responsible parties, as support for
its holding. Id. The court found persuasive the decisions of the other circuits that had
previously ruled on this issue. Id. at 1301-04 (citing decisions of the First, Third, Seventh
and Tenth Circuits).
491 See H.R. REP. No. 99-962, at 221 (1986).
492 See Pinal Creek, 118 F.3d at 1301-02.
491 United States v. Colorado & E. R.R. Co., 50 F.3d 1530, 1535-36 (10th Cir. 1995). See also
Morrison Enters., v. McShares, Inc., 302 F.3d 1127, 1133 (10th Cir. 2002); Sun Co. v.
Browning-Ferris, Inc., 124 F.3d 1187, 1190 (10th Cir. 1997); Bancamerica Commercial
Corp. v. Mosher Steel of Kan., Inc., 100 F.3d 792, 800 (10th Cir. 1996).4
1 See Colorado & E. R.R., 50 F.3d at 1536.495 Id. at 1535-36.
49 See id. at 1536.
417 Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Saraland Apartments, 94 F.3d 1489, 1513 (11th Cir. 1995)
(citing Colorado & E. R.R., 50 F.3d at 1535-36; Amoco Oil Co. v. Borden, Inc., 889 F.2d
664,672 (5th Cir. 1989)). The court also cited decisions of the First and Seventh Circuits.
Id. at 1513 (citing Akzo Coatings, Inc. v. Aigner Corp., 30 F.3d 761, 764 (7th Cir. 1997);
United Techs. Corp. v. Browning-Ferris Indus., 33 F.3d 96, 99-100 (1st Cir. 1994)).
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court impliedly rested its decision on what it viewed as the underlying goal
of CERCLA: placing the responsibility for cleaning up releases of hazard-
ous substances on the parties responsible for those releases.49 However,
where there is no effective or manageable redress under section 113 at
complex multi-party sites, that responsibility is not well placed by this
reasoning.
CONCLUSION: THE IMPLICATIONS FOR "PLAIN MEANING" STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION IN THE FUTURE JUDICIAL FIRMAMENT
The 2007 Supreme Court decision in Atlantic Research, although
very important in the constellation for interpretation of hazardous sub-
stance liability, is at least equally important in articulating the emer-
gence of the judicial canon of "plain meaning" interpretation of legislative
statutes. This emerging canon signals a new decision rule for the Roberts
Court, which builds on two years of interpretive precedent.
In 2005, the Supreme Court announced that courts should interpret
statutes by a reading "that makes sense of each phrase" and that is "the
one favored by our canons of interpretation."499 In addition, the Supreme
Court has held that it is the duty of the courts to regard separate statutes-
or in this case, by analogy, separate provisions of the section 107 CERCLA
statute-as each fully effective: "Judges 'are not at liberty to pick and
choose among congressional enactments, and when two [or more] statutes
are capable of co-existence, it is the duty of the courts, absent a clearly
expressed congressional intention to the contrary, to regard each as
effective.""
In rendering its 2007 decision on carbon dioxide regulation in
Massachusetts v. EPA, the Supreme Court resorted to plain meaning in-
terpretation of the Clean Air Act.5° ' The Court's slightly later opinion on
section 107 hazardous substance liability in United States v. Atlantic
Research Corp., again relied on the "plain meaning" canon of statutory
interpretation."0 2 Thus, the lasting precedential imprint of the 2007
Atlantic Research decision is fourfold:
498 Redwing Carriers, 94 F.3d at 1514.
9 Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 449 (2005).
5 County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 502
U.S. 251, 265-66 (1992).
501 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1462 (2007).
50 127 S. Ct. 2331, 2336 (2007).
[Vol. 33:633720
INVERTING THE LAW
* It unknots an entire paralysis in the Superfund
program created by the confluence of decisions of
eleven circuit courts barring access to section 107,
and the Supreme Court in 2004 in Aviall barring
access to section 113 for private hazardous sub-
stance remediation. °3
0 It injects new flexibility and vitality into judicial
supervision of the nation's hazardous waste program.
* It warns lower federal courts about the possibility
of cascades of judicial decisions, especially when
application of the canons of statutory construction
would lead to an opposite result.
0 It cements the foundation and preeminence of the
"plain meaning" canon in the interpretation of the
federal statutes.
While all of these lasting impacts of the precedent are significant,
there is possible transcendent lasting impact beyond the interpretation of
the hazardous waste laws. The emergence of "plain meaning" as the canon
of construction decision rule for statutory interpretation will bear on a
wide variety of future cases before the Supreme Court. Atlantic Research
is precedent in which the "plain meaning" canon enjoys almost a classic
textbook application. 4
The practical and policy impacts accompanying this decision are
very significant in terms of both the allocation of financial responsibility
and the number of contaminated sites affected. It sets a fundamentally
different legal course for the future. The avenues of the statutory provi-
sions, sections 107 and 113 of CERCLA, are distinct, unique, and inter-
preted by their plain meanings."'
o3 See supra Part II.
o See AtI. Research, 127 S. Ct. at 2336.
o The language in section 107, creating a cost recovery action for "any other person,"
employs relatively common language, and actually repeats language that is used previously
in section 107 to impose liability on"any person" who meets specified criteria. See CERCLA
§ 107, 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (2000). There also was a history of liberal interpretation of both
this and other sections of section 107 of the statute. See supra Part IV. The interpretation
of the Supreme Court that the "plain meaning" of "any other person" in section 107, appears
straightforward. See Ati. Research, 127 S. Ct. at 2336. It provides a platform for the
application of this canon.
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This fundamentally alters the allocation of, and responsibility for,
hazardous substance liability in the United States as previously articu-
lated and decided by the federal circuit courts. It has resolved the chaos
created by eleven circuits' unusual, but consistent, interpretations of
CERCLA liability allocation." 6 The Supreme Court has created the only
cost allocation system that makes fundamental sense. When the Supreme
Court finally found the case vehicle to express the opinion that it could not
reach in Aviall, it resolved major crisis in the United States' misinter-
pretation of the Superfund law.
' See supra Parts II.A, II.B.
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